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Summary: Argues against deflationary conceptions of truth. Deflationism provides a descriptive account of the term ‘true’, but these claims, argues Gupta, are both very strong and problematic.
Comment: This would be very useful in a course on the nature of truth, or any course in which deflationary conceptions of truth are relevant. The paper is not technical and provides a good account of deflationism about truth. This would be suitable for undergraduates or graduates.[This is a stub entry. Please add your comments to help us expand it]Export citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format
- Metaphysics & Epistemology
- Philosophy of Language
- Science, Logic & Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Minimalism and Deflationism about Truth
- Liar Paradox
- A Critique of Deflationism
A Critique of Deflationism
Gupta, Anil. A Critique of Deflationism
1993, Philosophical Topics 21: 57-81.