- Added by: Jie Gao, Contributed by:
Abstract: In this review I focus on the arguments advanced by Coady in the main task to which he addresses himself in Testimony: arguing the case against the reductive position, and in favour of a non-reductive conception of testimonial knowledge. I introduce some distinctions which I believe enable the subject to taken further.
Comment: This review critically discusses the first book on testimony in contemporary philosophy and advances the dabates. It is a very good background reading for courses on epistemology or social epistemology. It saves students from reading Coady's original book.[This is a stub entry. Please add your comments to help us expand it]Export citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format
- Metaphysics & Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Epistemology of Testimony
- Normative Ethics
- Critical notice: Telling and trusting: Reductionism and anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony
Critical notice: Telling and trusting: Reductionism and anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony
Fricker, Elizabeth. Critical notice: Telling and trusting: Reductionism and anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony
1995, Mind 104 (414): 393-411.