- Added by: Giada Fratantonio, Contributed by:
Summary: In this paper, the author argues that the “I” that we often use to refer to ourselves, actually does not refer to an object, it does not refer to a non-physical mind, and it does not even refer to a physical body. Ascombe’s conclusion will be that the “I” fails to be a referring expression at all.
Comment: This can be used as secondary reading in a postgraduate course on philosophy of language. Otherwise, it can also be used as primary reading for a postgraduate course on philosophy of language focusing on indexicals.Export citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format
- Metaphysics & Epistemology
- Philosophy of Language
- Philosophy of Mind
- First-Person Contents
- Indexicals and Demonstratives
- The First Person
The First Person
Anscombe, G. Elizabeth M.. The First Person
1981, In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language. Oxford University Press 45-65.