- Added by: Giada Fratantonio, Contributed by:
Summary: In this paper, the author argues that the “I” that we often use to refer to ourselves, actually does not refer to an object, it does not refer to a non-physical mind, and it does not even refer to a physical body. Ascombe’s conclusion will be that the “I” fails to be a referring expression at all.
Comment: This can be used as secondary reading in a postgraduate course on philosophy of language. Otherwise, it can also be used as primary reading for a postgraduate course on philosophy of language focusing on indexicals.[This is a stub entry. Please add your comments to help us expand it]Export citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format
- Metaphysics & Epistemology
- Philosophy of Language
- Philosophy of Mind
- First-Person Contents
- Indexicals and Demonstratives
- The First Person
The First Person
Anscombe, G. Elizabeth M.. The First Person
1981, In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language. Oxford University Press 45-65.