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Abstract: In this paper I offer an original account of intellectual modesty and some of its surrounding vices: intellectual haughtiness, arrogance, servility and self-abasement. I argue that these vices are attitudes as social psychologists understand the notion. I also draw some of the educational implications of the account. In particular, I urge caution about the efficacy of direct instruction about virtue and of stimulating emulation through exposure to positive exemplars.
Comment: This article examines the intellectual vice of arrogance, and also touches upon the issue of how to teach virtues. The author is urging caution about the efficacy of exemplarism: a popular view on the education for virtues, and instead offers an alternative method of teaching virtues: self-affirmation.[This is a stub entry. Please add your comments to help us expand it]Export citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format
- Metaphysics & Epistemology
- Science, Logic & Mathematics
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Virtue Epistemology
- Philosophy of Education
- Philosophy of Learning
- Philosophy of Teaching
- Teaching Virtue: Changing Attitudes
Teaching Virtue: Changing Attitudes
Tanesini, Alessandra. Teaching Virtue: Changing Attitudes
2016, Logos and Episteme 7(4): 503-527.