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Abstract: In this paper I offer an original account of intellectual modesty and some of its surrounding vices: intellectual haughtiness, arrogance, servility and self-abasement. I argue that these vices are attitudes as social psychologists understand the notion. I also draw some of the educational implications of the account. In particular, I urge caution about the efficacy of direct instruction about virtue and of stimulating emulation through exposure to positive exemplars.
Comment: This article examins an intellecutal vice of arrogance, and also touches upon the issue of how to teach virtues. This paper works well in teaching individual vice to undergrads, it does not require any prior knowledge of virtue epistemology, hence, perfect for introductory course of virtue epistemology.[This is a stub entry. Please add your comments to help us expand it]Export citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format
- Metaphysics & Epistemology
- Science, Logic & Mathematics
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Virtue Epistemology
- Philosophy of Education
- Philosophy of Learning
- Philosophy of Teaching
- Teaching Virtue Changing Attitudes
Teaching Virtue Changing Attitudes
Tanesini, Alessandra. Teaching Virtue Changing Attitudes
2016, Logos and Episteme 7(4): 503-527.