Abstract: In this paper I distinguish three degrees of epistemic egoism, each of which has an ethical analogue, and I argue that all three are incoherent. Since epistemic autonomy is frequently identified with one of these forms of epistemic egoism, it follows that epistemic autonomy as commonly understood is incoherent. I end with a brief discussion of the idea of moral autonomy and suggest that its component of epistemic autonomy in the realm of the moral is problematic.
Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus. Ethical and epistemic egoism and the ideal of autonomy
2007, Episteme 4 (3):252-263.
Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Wayne Riggs
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