

DIVERSITY READING LIST PRESENTS:

A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF NON-HUMAN ANIMALS

A DRL READING GROUP BLUEPRINT BY BJÖRN FRETER
LEVEL: INTERMEDIATE

INTRODUCTION

A comparative, explicitly non-eurocentric and non-anthropocentric introduction to philosophical thought about the non-human animal. This blueprint aims to develop a deeper understanding of the problem of speciesism and advocates the inclusion of non-human animals in philosophical thinking. It is divided into two parts. First, the understanding of non-human animals in Western, Zen-Buddhist, Maori, Indian and African thought is examined. In the second part, with the help of what was learned in the first part, special problems in dealing with non-human animals are dealt with, including the problem areas of meat consumption, the rights of non-human animals, and speciesism. The texts given are all essential readings for holding the respective weekly units.

CATEGORIES

- Non-Human Animals
- Philosophy of Biology
- Animal Ethics
- Applied Ethics
- Japanese Philosophy
- African/Africana Philosophy
- Māori Philosophy
- Indian Philosophy

AVAILABLE ONLINE AT:

<https://diversityreadinglist.org/blueprint/a-comparative-introduction-to-the-philosophy-of-non-human-animals>

WEEK 1. WHAT IS AN ANIMAL IN WESTERN THOUGHT?

HOLLAND, PETER. *THE ANIMAL KINGDOM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION*

2011, Oxford University Press.

Difficulty: Easy

Fragment: Chapter 1, Chapter 2

Abstract: *The Animal Kingdom: A Very Short Introduction* presents a modern tour of the animal kingdom. Beginning with the definition of animals, this VSI goes on to show the high-level groupings of animals (phyla) and new views on their evolutionary relationships based on molecular data, together with an overview of the biology of each group of animals. This phylogenetic view is central to zoology today. The animal world is immensely diverse, and our understanding of it has been greatly enhanced by analysis of DNA and the study of evolution and development.

Comment: Provides a summary of the modern (Western) understanding of the animal world and its evolution .

GRUEN, LORI. *ANIMALS*

1991, In Peter Singer (ed.) *A Companion to Ethics*,
Blackwell Publishers: Oxford, Malden, 343-353.

Difficulty: Easy-Intermediate

Abstract: While there are different philosophical principles that may help in deciding how we ought to treat animals, one strand runs through all those that withstand critical scrutiny: we ought not to treat animals the way we, as a society, are treating them now. We are very rarely faced with lifeboat decisions: our moral choices are not usually ones that exist in extremes. It simply isn't the case that I will suffer great harm without a fur coat or a leg of lamb. The choice between our baby and our dog is one that virtually none of us will be forced to make. The hypothetical realm is one where we can clarify and refine our moral intuitions and principles, but our choices and the suffering of billions of animals are not hypothetical. However the lines are drawn, there are no defensible grounds for treating animals in any way other than as beings worthy of moral consideration.

Comment: Introduction into basic questions of (non-human) animal ethics.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS:

1. What is a non-human animal in the Western (scientific) understanding?
2. What are the specific differences between human and non-human animals?
3. What are the ethical implications of the posited differences between human and non-human animal?
4. Why has the non-human animal been so long disregarded in Western philosophy?
5. Is an anthropocentric ethics possible without contradiction? In what way must the capacity for suffering of non-human beings be considered?
6. Is the difference between human and non-human animal of normative relevance? Who determines and how what a living being is worth? Does the particular understanding of the of difference allow the establishment of a dominance relationship?

WEEK 2. WHAT IS AN ANIMAL IN JAPANESE THOUGHT?

MCRAE, JAMES. *CUTTING THE CAT IN ONE: ZEN MASTER DŌGEN ON THE MORAL STATUS OF NONHUMAN ANIMALS*

2014, In Neil Dalal and Chloë Taylor (eds.) *Asian Perspectives on Animal Ethics*. London: Routledge

Difficulty: Easy-Intermediate

Abstract: Dōgen's ethics of nonhuman animals is grounded in wisdom of interdependent arising, which produces a sense of compassion for all beings, including nonhuman animals. While there are rules and precepts that prohibit the killing of living beings—human and nonhuman alike—the precepts are not unbreakable universal laws, but rather guidelines that promote the cultivation of the twin virtues of wisdom and compassion, which are the real ground of ethical conduct in Zen. Though all beings are part of the same karmic cycle of rebirth, human beings have a special soteriological status as thinking, moral beings, which means only we are capable of realizing enlightenment. This results in an ethic that is somewhat weaker than the strong animal rights view: while causing suffering to sentient beings is wrong, it may be done on those rare occasions when it promotes the awakening of human beings. This means that eating meat or using animals for medical testing might be justified, so long as there is no reasonable alternative available that would minimize suffering and maximize awakening more effectively. Even though skillful means might be used to justify violations of the precepts against killing, Dōgen argues that the only time a bad unintended consequence is justified is when the agent's motive is pure and there is no better option. Zen prompts us to continually reevaluate the ways in which we both perceive and conceive the world. The purpose of a kōan is to discourage our everyday ways of thinking and push us to a higher level of understanding grounded in interdependent arising. Often, we choose to harm sentient beings, not because we have no other choice, but because we lack the imagination to create alternative solutions that minimize suffering to the greatest possible extent. The law of karma is always in effect: the infliction of wanton suffering upon sentient beings will become an impediment to one's awakening.

Comment: Introduction into Dōgen's ethics of nonhuman animals based on the wisdom of interdependent arising producing a sense of compassion for all beings, including nonhuman animals.

DŌGEN. *DŌGEN 道元 (1200–1253)*

2011, In James W. Heisig, Thomas P. Kasulis and John C. Maraldo (eds.) *Japanese Philosophy. A Sourcebook*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, pp. 141-162.

Difficulty: Intermediate

Abstract: In Japanese religious history, Dōgen (1200–1253) is revered as the founder of the Japanese school of Sōtō Zen Buddhism. Tradition says he was born of an aristocratic family, orphaned, and at the age of twelve joined the Tendai Buddhist monastic community on Mt Hiei in northeastern Kyoto. In search of an ideal teacher, he soon wandered off from the central community on the mountain and ended up in a small temple in eastern Kyoto, Kennin-ji.

Comment: Excerpts from Shōbōgenzō (Repository of the Eye for the Truth), the major philosophical work of Dōgen (1200–1253), founder of the Japanese school of Sōtō Zen Buddhism allowing to deepen his philosophical understanding of nature.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS:

1. What is a non-human animal in the Zen-Buddhist understanding?
2. What are the specific differences between human and non-human animals?
3. What are the ethical implications of the posited differences between human and non-human animal?
4. What are similarities and differences between the Zen-Buddhist and the Western understanding of non-human animals?
5. What obligations do human beings have to animals in Zen-Buddhism? Can it ever be acceptable to injure non-human animals for human benefit? What role does the hōben-principle play in this?
Is anthropocentricity possible from a Zen-Buddhist perspective?

WEEK 3. WHAT IS AN ANIMAL IN MĀORI THOUGHT?

WOODHOUSE, JORDAN ET AL. *CONCEPTUALIZING INDIGENOUS HUMAN–ANIMAL RELATIONSHIPS IN AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND: AN ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE*

2021, *Animals*. 11(10): 2899.

Difficulty: Easy-Intermediate

Abstract: This article considers the complexity and diversity of ethical concepts and beliefs held by Maori, the indigenous people of Aotearoa New Zealand (hereafter New Zealand), relating to animals. A combination of interviews and focus group discussions were conducted with individuals who identify as Maori and were working with wildlife, primarily in an eco-tourism and conservation context. Two main themes emerged from the data: ethical concepts relating to the environment, and concepts relating to the spiritual relationships between people, animals and the environment. These findings highlight that the connections between humans and animals through a Māori lens are nuanced in ways not typically accounted for in Western philosophy. This is of particular importance because of the extent to which standard Western thought is embodied in law and policy related to human treatment of animals and the environment. In New Zealand, relationships and partnerships are informed by Te Tiriti o Waitangi, one of New Zealand's founding documents. Where these partnerships include activities and environments involving human–animal interaction, policy and legislation should account for Maori knowledge, and diverse of thought among different hapu (tribal groups). We conclude by exploring ways of including Maori ethical concepts around animals in general, and wild animals in particular, in law and policy, providing a case study relevant to other bicultural or multicultural societies.

Comment: Some ethical concepts and beliefs held by the Maori people are explained through interviews and focus group discussions with focus on ethical concepts relating to the environment, and concepts relating to the spiritual relationships between people, animals and the environment.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS:

1. What is a non-human animal in Maori understanding?
2. What are the specific differences between human and non-human animals?
3. What are the ethical implications of the posited differences between human and non-human animal?
4. What are similarities and differences between the Western, the Zen-Buddhist and the Maori understanding of non-human animals?
5. Is the difference between human and non-human animal of normative relevance? Who determines and how what a living being is worth? Does the particular understanding of the of difference allow the establishment of a dominance relationship?
6. How can we understand the concept of mauri (spiritual health of animals) and what ethical implications does it have?
7. What role does the environment (material and non-material) play in Maori understanding?
8. What is meant by Kaitiakitanga and mana whenua and how are they related?

WEEK 4. WHAT IS AN ANIMAL IN AFRICAN THOUGHT?

HORSTHEMKE, KAI. *ANIMALS AND AFRICAN ETHICS*

2017, *Journal of Animal Ethics*. 7 (2):119-144.

Difficulty: Intermediate

Abstract: African ethics is primarily concerned with community and harmonious communal relationships. The claim is frequently made on behalf of African moral beliefs and customs that, in stark contrast with Western moral attitudes and practices, there is no comparable objectification and exploitation of other-than-human animals and nature. This article investigates whether this claim is correct by examining the status of animals in religious and philosophical thought, as well as traditional cultural practices, in Africa. I argue that moral perceptions and attitudes on the African continent remain resolutely anthropocentric. Although values like ubuntu (humanness) or ukama (relationality) have been expanded to include nonhuman nature, animals are characteristically not seen to have any rights, and human duties to them are almost exclusively “indirect.” I conclude by asking whether those who, following their own liberation, continue to exploit and oppress other creatures—simply because they can—are not thereby contributing to their own dehumanization.

Comment: An examination of the status of non-human animals in religious and philosophical African thought with a focus on the problem that animals are characteristically not seen to have any rights.

ODOUR, REGINALD M.J.. *AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY, AND NON-HUMAN ANIMALS [INTERVIEW]*

2012, *Rainer Ebert* [Blog].

Difficulty: Intermediate

Abstract: University of Nairobi’s Reginald M. J. Oduor talks to Anteneh Roba and Rainer Ebert.

Comment: A general introduction into African philosophy and ethics with a focus on the role of non-human animal life in African philosophy, explaining that in indigenous African thought, humans are not understood as animals, but as a class of their own superior to the class of animals.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS:

1. What is a non-human animal in African understanding?
2. What are the specific differences between human and non-human animals?
3. What are the ethical implications of the posited differences between human and non-human animal?
4. What are similarities and differences between the Western, the Zen-Buddhist, the Maori and the African understanding of non-human animals?
5. Is the difference between human and non-human animal of normative relevance? Who determines and how what a living being is worth? Does the particular understanding of the of difference allow the establishment of a dominance relationship?
6. Is ubuntu-philosophy necessarily anthropocentric?

WEEK 5. WHAT IS AN ANIMAL IN INDIAN THOUGHT?

CARPENTER, AMBER. *ILLUMINATING COMMUNITY – ANIMALS IN CLASSICAL INDIAN THOUGHT*

2018, In Peter Adamson and G. Fay Edwards (eds) *Animals: A History*.
Oxford University Press.

Difficulty: Intermediate

Abstract: This chapter presents a discussion of the rich tradition of reflection on animals in ancient Indian philosophy, which deals with but is not restricted to the topic of reincarnation. At the center of the piece is the continuity that Indians saw between human and nonhuman animals and the consequences of this outlook for the widespread idea of nonviolence. Consideration is also given to the philosophical interest of fables centrally featuring animals, for example the Pañcatantra. In general it is suggested that ancient Indian authors did not, unlike European counterparts, focus on the question of what makes humans unique in contrast to all other animals, but rather on the ethical and metaphysical interconnections between humans and various kinds of animals.

Comment: An overview of the role of non-human animals in Indian Thought pointing out that there is not much evidence of that presumption of a fundamental difference between human and nonhuman forms of life that allows us in English to use the word “animal” simply to mean “nonhuman animal.” The concept of the animal is thus not best suited to explore the nature of the human by contrast. Instead we more often find a background presumption of a common condition: whatever lives seeks to sustain its life, wants pleasure and not pain, wants its desires and aims satisfied rather than thwarted.

CARPENTER, AMBER. *AMBER CARPENTER ON ANIMALS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY [PODCAST]*

2018, *History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps* [Blog].

Difficulty: Intermediate

Abstract: An interview with Amber Carpenter about the status of nonhuman animals in ancient Indian philosophy and literature.

Comment: An interview about the status of nonhuman animals in ancient Indian philosophy and literature; a very good complement to her paper.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS:

1. What is a non-human animal in Indian understanding?
2. What are the specific differences between human and non-human animals?
3. What are the ethical implications of the posited differences between human and non-human animal?
4. What are similarities and differences between the Western, the Zen-Buddhist, the Maori, the African and the Indian understanding of non-human animals?
5. Is the difference between human and non-human animal of normative relevance? Who determines and how what a living being is worth? Does the particular understanding of the of difference allow the establishment of a dominance relationship?

WEEK 6. HARDLYANIMAL AND JUSTANIMAL

KANT, IMMANUEL. *THE FALSE SUBTLETY OF THE FOUR SYLLOGISTIC FIGURES*

1992, In his *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770*, David Walford (trans. and ed.). Cambridge University Press, pp. 102-5.

Difficulty: Advanced

Fragment: pp. 102-105 [§6. Concluding Remarks]

Comment: A classical Western philosophical text insisting on a foundational difference between human and non-human animals; human animals have higher knowledge than non-human animals because human animals are able to make their own ideas objects of their thoughts. This has severe implications for the ethical value of non-human animals.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS:

1. How is difference construed in Kant's text?
2. Why is difference so important? Some existential remarks and some reflections on Kant's idea that the difference between the human animal and non-human animals is the ability to differentiate ("it is one thing to differentiate things from each other, and quite another thing to recognize the difference between them" [Kant 1762/1992, 104])
3. Do we need difference? And if so, for what? And if not, why is difference (between human and non-human animal) such a persistent motive in (Western) philosophy?
4. What are the ethical consequences for non-human animals when we understand them in the Kantian way?

WEEK 7. SPECIESISM

JOY, MELANIE. *WHY WE LOVE DOGS, EAT PIGS AND WEAR COWS*

2009, Red Wheel.

Difficulty: Intermediate

Fragment: pp. 23-72.

Abstract: *Why We Love Dogs, Eat Pigs, and Wear Cows* offers an absorbing look at what social psychologist Melanie Joy calls carnism, the belief system that conditions us to eat certain animals when we would never dream of eating others. Carnism causes extensive animal suffering and global injustice, and it drives us to act against our own interests and the interests of others without fully realizing what we are doing. Becoming aware of what carnism is and how it functions is vital to personal empowerment and social transformation, as it enables us to make our food choices more freely—because without awareness, there is no free choice.

Comment: Introduction to Joy's concept of carnism, the invisible but dominant paradigm used to defend meat consumption; argues against carnism, by showing that there is indeed a problem with eating non-human animals, that meat eating is not necessarily to be understood as normal, that carnism prevents the cognitive dissonance (of caring for animals and at the same time consuming them) by re-defining non-human animals as objects.

WILLIAMS, BERNARD. *THE HUMAN PREJUDICE*

2006, In his *Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline*, A. W. Moore (ed.).
Princeton University Press.

Difficulty: Advanced

Fragment: pp. 135-152.

Abstract: What can — and what can't — philosophy do? What are its ethical risks — and its possible rewards? How does it differ from science? In *Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline*, Bernard Williams addresses these questions and presents a striking vision of philosophy as fundamentally different from science in its aims and methods even though there is still in philosophy "something that counts as getting it right." Written with his distinctive combination of rigor, imagination, depth, and humanism, the book amply demonstrates why Williams was one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century.

Comment: A sophisticated defense of speciesism, i.e. the human privilege; to be juxtaposed to the reading of Melanie Joy.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS:

1. What is Speciesism? What are arguments for or against speciesism?
2. Can speciesism and/or carnism be compared with, e.g., racism or sexism?
3. Do we need the species-difference? Is the species-difference normatively relevant?
4. Can we be truly indifferent to suffering? Do we have to make use of speciesist/carnist arguments to convince ourselves to be indifferent?
5. If we assume - for the sake of the argument - that the human animal has to be considered more valuable, what would be necessary consequences of this understanding?
6. Looking at Joy's and Williams' arguments - what are their respective strengths and weaknesses? Do any of their arguments have practical impact on you?

WEEK 8. EATING AND KILLING

FISCHER, BOB. *THE ETHICS OF EATING ANIMALS: USUALLY BAD, SOMETIMES WRONG, OFTEN PERMISSIBLE*

2019, New York: Routledge.

Difficulty: Intermediate

Fragment: pp. 20-49 and pp. 104-127.

Abstract: Intensive animal agriculture wrongs many, many animals. Philosophers have argued, on this basis, that most people in wealthy Western contexts are morally obligated to avoid animal products. This book explains why the author thinks that's mistaken. He reaches this negative conclusion by contending that the major arguments for veganism fail: they don't establish the right sort of connection between producing and eating animal-based foods. Moreover, if they didn't have this problem, then they would have other ones: we wouldn't be obliged to abstain from all animal products, but to eat strange things instead—e.g., roadkill, insects, and things left in dumpsters. On his view, although we have a collective obligation not to farm animals, there is no specific diet that most individuals ought to have. Nevertheless, he does think that some people are obligated to be vegans, but that's because they've joined a movement, or formed a practical identity, that requires that sacrifice. This book argues that there are good reasons to make such a move, albeit not ones strong enough to show that everyone must do likewise.

Comment: A philosophical overview on bad arguments for eating animals and on eating animals the rights [sic] way - text to be read juxtaposed to the Bernard Williams and Melanie Joy.

DOGGET, TYLER. *MORAL VEGETARIANISM*

2018, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

Difficulty: Intermediate-Advanced

Abstract: The topic of this entry is moral vegetarianism and the arguments for it. Strikingly, most contemporary arguments for moral vegetarianism start with premises about the wrongness of producing meat and move to conclusions about the wrongness of consuming it. They do not fasten on some intrinsic feature of meat and insist that consuming things with such a feature is wrong. They do not fasten on some effect of meat-eating on the eater and insist that producing such an effect is wrong. Rather, they assert that the production of meat is wrong and that consumption bears a certain relation to production and that bearing such a relation to wrongdoing is wrong. So this entry gives significant space to food production as well as the tricky business of connecting production to consumption.

Comment: A solid overview of the history and arguments of moral vegetarianism.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS:

1. What are arguments against and what are arguments for the consumption of non-human animal meat? Try to take into account your knowledge of the Western, Buddhist, Maori, Indian and African traditions.
2. What were the most prominent arguments vegetarianism in its historical development?
3. Is plant-consumption speciesist?
4. What do you think of arguments claiming a normative difference between different non-human species? Can there be valid arguments claiming the inferiority of certain species, eg. of fishes or insects?

WEEK 9. NON-HUMAN INDIVIDUALITY

SKABELUND, AARON. *A DOG'S LIFE: THE CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES OF ANIMAL*

2018, In *Animal Biography: Re-framing Animal Lives*. André Krebber and Mieke Roscher (eds.). Palgrave Macmillan.

Difficulty: Easy-Intermediate

Abstract: If one were to write a biography of a nonhuman animal, a likely candidate is Hachikō, an Akita dog who became popular in 1932 when a newspaper claimed he had been awaiting the return of his master at a Tokyo train station since his owner's death seven years earlier. That fame led to the production of an enormous variety of source material that a historian could use to reconstruct his life's story. This chapter uses Hachikō to explore the methodological and theoretical challenges of animal biography. It argues that two new(er) kinds of primary sources—taxidermy and photography—allow Hachikō (and some other animals) to “speak” and play a collaborative role in telling their own stories.

Comment: Using Hachikō as example (an Akita dog who became popular in 1932 when it was claimed it waited for his owner at a train station for seven years) this article explores the methodological and theoretical challenges of animal biography.

BARATAY, ÉRIC. *ANIMAL BIOGRAPHIES: TOWARD A HISTORY OF INDIVIDUALS*

2022, Lindsay Turner (trans). University of Georgia Press.

Difficulty: Easy-Intermediate

Fragment: Chapter 7 'Bummer and Lazarus'.

Abstract: What would we learn if animals could tell their own stories? Éric Baratay, a pioneering researcher in animal histories in France, applies his knowledge of historical methodologies to give voice to some of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries' most interesting animals. He offers brief yet innovative accounts of these animals' lives in a way that challenges the reader's thinking about animals.

Baratay illustrates the need to develop a nonanthropocentric means of viewing the lives of animals and including animals themselves in the narrative of their lives. *Animal Biographies* launches an all-new investigation into the lives of animals and is a major contribution to the field of animal studies.

This English translation of Éric Baratay's *Biographies animales: Des Vies retrouvées*, originally published in France in 2017 (Éditions du Seuil), uses firsthand accounts starting from the nineteenth century about specific animals who lived in Europe and the United States to reconstruct, as best as possible, their stories as they would have experienced them. History is, after all, not just the domain of humans. Animals have their own.

Baratay breaks the model of human exceptionalism to give us the biographies of some of history and literature's most famous animals. The reader will catch a glimpse of storied lives as told by Modestine, the donkey who carried Robert Louis Stevenson through the Alps; Warrior, the World War I horse made famous in Steven Spielberg's *War Horse*; Islero, the bull who gored Spain's greatest bullfighter; and others. Through these stories we discover their histories, their personalities, and their shared experiences with others of their species.

Comment: The chapter provides one of the very few attempts to write the biography of a non-human animal; strictly focussing on the dogs Lazarus and Bummer and how they might have experienced the events of their lives.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS:

1. Can non-human animals have a biography? Can non-human animals have a personal history?
2. Can we - as human beings - know enough about a non-human being to write an autobiography?
3. What could be the (ethical) purpose of non-human animal biographies?
4. Why is the non-human animal biography such a rare literary genre?
5. Is writing a non-human animal biography speciesist?
What are the ethical consequences of taking the idea of non-human biographies seriously?

WEEK 10. UTOPIA AND ZOOPOLIS: PHILOSOPHICAL AND ARTISTIC VISIONS OF THE FUTURE

MCKENNA, ERIN. *LIVING WITH ANIMALS: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND RESPECT*

2020, Rowman and Littlefield.

Difficulty: Easy-Intermediate

Fragment: pp. 1-18.

Abstract: *Living with Animals* brings a pragmatist ecofeminist perspective to discussions around animal rights, animal welfare, and animal ethics to move the conversation beyond simple use or non-use decisions. Erin McKenna uses a case study approach with select species to question how humans should live and interact with various animal beings through specific instances of such relationships. Addressing standard topics such as the use of animals for food, use for biomedical research, use in entertainment, use as companions, use as captive specimens in zoos, and use in hunting and ecotourism through a revolutionary pluralist and experimental approach, McKenna provides an uncommonly nuanced accounts for complex relationships and changing circumstances. Rather than seek absolute moral stands regarding human relationships with other animal beings, and rather than trying to end such relationships altogether, the books urges us to make existing relations better.

Comment: This chapter provides philosophical arguments for a better understanding of the complexity of human relationships with other animal beings through a pragmatist and ecofeminist lens.

DONALDSON, SUE. *ZOOPOLIS: A POLITICAL THEORY OF ANIMAL RIGHTS*

2011, Oxford University Press.

Difficulty: Intermediate

Fragment: pp. 1-16.

Abstract: *Zoopolis* offers a new agenda for the theory and practice of animal rights. Most animal rights theory focuses on the intrinsic capacities or interests of animals, and the moral status and moral rights that these intrinsic characteristics give rise to. *Zoopolis* shifts the debate from the realm of moral theory and applied ethics to the realm of political theory, focusing on the relational obligations that arise from the varied ways that animals relate to human societies and institutions. Building on recent developments in the political theory of group-differentiated citizenship, *Zoopolis* introduces us to the genuine "political animal". It argues that different types of animals stand in different relationships to human political communities. Domesticated animals should be seen as full members of human-animal mixed communities, participating in the cooperative project of shared citizenship. Wilderness animals, by contrast, form their own sovereign communities entitled to protection against colonization, invasion, domination and other threats to self-determination. 'Liminal' animals who are wild but live in the midst of human settlement (such as crows or raccoons) should be seen as "denizens", resident of our societies, but not fully included in rights and responsibilities of citizenship. To all of these animals we owe respect for their basic inviolable rights. But we inevitably and appropriately have very different relations with them, with different types of obligations. Humans and animals are inextricably bound in a complex web of relationships, and *Zoopolis* offers an original and profoundly affirmative vision of how to ground this complex web of relations on principles of justice and compassion.

Comment: An introduction to the groundbreaking theory of Zoopolis focussing on developing a political vision of human animals and non-human animals living together.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS:

1. What is a Zoopolis?
2. What are the ethical consequences to accept non-human animals as citizens?
3. How would our lives change if non-human animals had enforceable rights?
4. Is Anti-speciesism possible? How could we live anti-speciestically? Can and should Anti-Speciesism become codified law?
5. What does it mean when a non-human animal has rights? What would be the consequences for our understanding of the human species