Taylor, Sunaura. Beasts of Burden: Animal and Disability Liberation
2017, The New Press.
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Added by: Chris Blake-TurnerPublisher’s Note: How much of what we understand of ourselves as “human” depends on our physical and mental abilities—how we move (or cannot move) in and interact with the world? And how much of our definition of “human” depends on its difference from “animal”? Drawing on her own experiences as a disabled person, a disability activist, and an animal advocate, author Sunaura Taylor persuades us to think deeply, and sometimes uncomfortably, about what divides the human from the animal, the disabled from the nondisabled—and what it might mean to break down those divisions, to claim the animal and the vulnerable in ourselves, in a process she calls “cripping animal ethics.” Beasts of Burden suggests that issues of disability and animal justice—which have heretofore primarily been presented in opposition—are in fact deeply entangled. Fusing philosophy, memoir, science, and the radical truths these disciplines can bring—whether about factory farming, disability oppression, or our assumptions of human superiority over animals—Taylor draws attention to new worlds of experience and empathy that can open up important avenues of solidarity across species and ability. Beasts of Burden is a wonderfully engaging and elegantly written work, both philosophical and personal, by a brilliant new voice.Comment (from this Blueprint): In this excerpt from her book, Beasts of Burden, Taylor resists the way that animals and intellectual disabled people are often framed in terms of one another. She argues that this does a disservice to both groups. Animals are not voiceless, as they are often constructed. And their comparison to disabled people in the (in)famous argument from marginal cases should not be accepted. Perhaps most importantly, the argument opens for discussion the worth of disabled people’s lives. But this is not something that should be open for discussion, especially given the marginalization of disabled people.Telfer, Elizabeth. Food for Thought: Philosophy and Food1996, New York: Routledge.
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Added by: Rochelle DuFordSummary: The importance of food in our individual lives raises moral questions from the debate over eating animals to the prominence of gourmet cookery in the popular media. Through philosophy, Elizabeth Telfer discusses issues including our obligations to those who are starving; the value of the pleasure of food; food as art; our duties to animals; and the moral virtues of hospitableness and temperance. Elizabeth Telfer shows how much traditional philosophy, from Plato to John Stuart Mill, has to say to illuminate this everyday yet complex subject.Comment: This book could serve as a main text for a course on an introductory course on ethical aspects of food, eating, and food distribution. Some chapters may also be of use in other sorts of courses: there are chapters on hunger and starvation (for a course that considers poverty), food as art (for a course concerning aesthetics or taste), and food and hospitality (for a course concerning hospitality, friendship, or entertaining).ter Meulen, Alice. Logic and Natural Language2001, In Lou Goble (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic. Blackwell
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Added by: Franci MangravitiAbstract:
Logicians have always found inspiration for new research in the ordinary language that is used on a daily basis and acquired naturally in childhood. Whereas the logical issues in the foundations of mathematics motivated the development of mathematical logic with its emphasis on notions of proof, validity, axiomatization, decidability, consistency, and completeness, the logical analysis of natural language motivated the development of philosophical logic with its emphasis on semantic notions of presupposition, entailment, modality, conditionals, and intensionality. The relation between research programs in both mathematical and philosophical logic and natural language syntax and semantics as branches of theoretical linguistics has increased in importance throughout the last fifty years. This chapter reviews the development of one particularly interesting and lively area of interaction between formal logic and linguistics—the semantics of natural language. Research in this emergent field has proved fruitful for the development of empirically, cognitively adequate models of reasoning with partial information, sharing or exchanging information, dynamic interpretation in context, belief revision and other cognitive processes.
Comment: Can be helpful in an introductory course to philosophy of language or in an introductory course to logic, to emphasize the connection with linguistics. There are basically no formal prerequisites.Terkel, Studs. Working: People Talk About What They Do All Day And How They Feel About What They Do1974, Pantheon Publishers-
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasPublisher’s Note: Perhaps Studs Terkel's best-known book, Working is a compelling look at jobs and the people who do them. Consisting of over one hundred interviews with everyone from a gravedigger to a studio head, from a policeman to a piano tuner, this book provides an enduring portrait of people's feelings about their working lives.Comment (from this Blueprint): Terkel's interviews are useful for a few reasons. They offer a firsthand account of how individuals relate to their particular types of work, and of the sorts of features that people tend to value in their work. Since many of these features align with Veltman's features of meaningfulness, i.e. mastery, a sense of purpose, socialisation, etc., the interviews serve as complementary material. They can help offer examples or cases to supplement discussion about Veltman's analysis.Terlazzo, Rosa. Conceptualizing Adaptive Preferences Respectfully: An Indirectly Substantive Account2016, The Journal of Political Philosophy 24(2): 206-226.
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Added by: Carl FoxAbstract: While the concept of adaptive preferences is an important tool for criticizing injustice, it is often claimed that using the concept involves showing disrespect for persons judged to have adaptive preferences. In this paper, I propose an account of adaptive preferences that does the relevant political work while still showing persons two centrally important kinds of respect. My account is based in what I call an indirect substantive account of autonomy, which places substantive requirements on the options available to a person, rather than on the option that she ultimately prefers. This allows us to pinpoint cases in which a person's circumstances have rendered her insufficiently autonomous, without saying that any conception of the good must be non-autonomous tout court.Comment: This article would make good recommended reading for a session taking an in-depth look at adaptive preferences, or further reading if the topic was autonomy and the session broached questions about preference formation.Thalos, Mariam. Nonreductive physics2006, Synthese 149(1): 133-178.
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Added by: Nick NovelliAbstract: This paper documents a wide range of nonreductive scientific treatments of phenomena in the domain of physics. These treatments strongly resist characterization as explanations of macrobehavior exclusively in terms of behavior of microconstituents. For they are treatments in which macroquantities are cast in the role of genuine and irreducible degrees of freedom.Comment: A good argument against reduction, grounded in scientific practice. Would be useful in a philosophy of science or a metaphysics context to explore and challenge the idea of reduction. Does a good job of explaining some fairly technical concepts as clearly as possible, but still best suited to graduate or upper-level undergraduate teaching.Thalos, Mariam. Explanation is a genus: An essay on the varieties of scientific explanation2002, Synthese 130(3): 317-354.
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Added by: Nick NovelliAbstract: I shall endeavor to show that every physical theory since Newton explainswithout drawing attention to causes-that, in other words, physical theories as physical theories aspire to explain under an ideal quite distinctfrom that of causal explanation. If I am right, then even if sometimes theexplanations achieved by a physical theory are not in violation ofthe standard of causal explanation, this is purely an accident. For physicaltheories, as I will show, do not, as such, aim at accommodating the goals oraspirations of causal explanation. This will serve as the founding insightfor a new theory of explanation, which will itself serve as the cornerstoneof a new theory of scientific method.Comment: A striking argument that science does not employ causal explanations. Since this is a commonly-held assumption, this would be interesting to present in the context of scientific methodology, or in an exploration of causation as part of a challenge to whether the idea of causation is actually useful or necessary. Provides good historical context to support its claims. Best taught at an advanced or graduate level.Thalos, Mariam. A modest proposal for interpreting structural explanations1998, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49(2): 279-295.
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Added by: Nick NovelliAbstract: Social sciences face a well-known problem, which is an instance of a general problem faced as well by psychological and biological sciences: the problem of establishing their legitimate existence alongside physics. This, as will become clear, is a problem in metaphysics. I will show how a new account of structural explanations, put forward by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, which is designed to solve this metaphysical problem with social sciences in mind, fails to treat the problem in any importantly new way. Then I will propose a more modest approach, and show how it does not deserve the criticism directed at a prototype by Jackson and PettitComment: An interesting argument for the value of structual explanations in sociology. Useful in the context of a discussion of reductionism or of the proper classification of social sciences as real science.Thalos, Mariam. Truth deserves to be believed2013, Philosophy 88(2): 179-196.
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Added by: Nick NovelliAbstract: Science seems generally to aim at truth. And governmental support of science is often premised on the instrumental value of truth in service of advancing our practical objectives, both as individuals and as communities, large and small. While there is some political expediency to this view, it is not correct. The value of truth is nowise that it helps us achieve our aims. In fact, just the contrary: truth deserves to be believed only on the condition that its claim upon us is orthogonal to any utility it might have in the service of (any and all) practical endsComment: A good anti-pragmatist argument, useful in an exploration of the aims of science, or a good introduction to truth and objectivity in science as an illustration of the reason that might matter. Suitable for both undergraduate and graduate teaching.Thomas, Angie. The Hate U Give2017, HarperCollins Publishers.
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Added by: Andrea Blomqvist, Contributed by: Nadia MehdiSummary: The Hate U Give is a young adult novel by Angie Thomas. It follows events in the life of a black 16-year-old girl, Starr Carter, who is drawn to activism after she witnesses the police shooting of a childhood friend.Comment: This book could be easily paired with a number of papers in the philosophy of race and racism including Charlies Mills' 'White Ignorance', or Kristie Dotson's 'Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing'. Concepts that are perhaps trickier for younger philosophers to wrap their heads around are elaborated in the film and book version of this piece.Can’t find it?Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!
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