Lim, Désirée. Iris Marion Young
2020, In: The Philosopher Queens: The Lives and Legacies of Philosophy's Unsung Women. Rebecca Buxton and Lisa Whiting (eds.). Unbound.
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Added by: Rebecca BuxtonAbstract:
Linda Zagzesbki. Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge.1996, Cambridge University Press.-
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Added by: Rie Iizuka, Contributed by: Wayne RiggsPublisher’s Note:
lmost all theories of knowledge and justified belief employ moral concepts and forms of argument borrowed from moral theories, but none of them pay attention to the current renaissance in virtue ethics. This remarkable book is the first attempt to establish a theory of knowledge based on the model of virtue theory in ethics. The book develops the concept of an intellectual virtue, and then shows how the concept can be used to give an account of the major concepts in epistemology, including the concept of knowledge. This highly original work of philosophy for professionals will also provide students with an excellent introduction to epistemology, virtue theory, and the relationship between ethics and epistemology.Comment: This book is highly original, cutting edge work, suitable for students at all levels. By introducing the notion of intellectual virtues in an Aristotelian model, Linda Zagzesbki developed a whole new field of epistemology, now known as virtue responsibilism. In this book, she not only tries to explain the notion of intellectual virtues but also define knowledge by way of intellectual virtues.
Lintott, Sheila. Sublime Hunger: A Consideration of Eating Disorders Beyond Beauty2003, Hypatia 18 (4):65-86.-
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Christy Mag Uidhir
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that one of the most intense ways women are encouraged to enjoy sublime experiences is via attempts to control their bodies through excessive dieting. If this is so, then the societal-cultural contributions to the problem of eating disorders exceed the perpetuation of a certain beauty ideal to include the almost universal encouragement women receive to diet, coupled with the relative shortage of opportunities women are afforded to experience the sublime.Comment:
Lintott, Sheila. Toward Eco-Friendly Aesthetics2006, Environmental Ethics 28 (1):57-76.-
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Christy Mag Uidhir
Abstract: Environmentalists can make individuals more eco-friendly by dispelling many of the myths and misconceptions about the natural world. By learning what in nature is and is not dangerous, and in what contexts the danger is real, individuals can come to aesthetically appreciate seemingly unappreciable nature. Since aesthetic attraction can be an extremely valuable tool for environmentalists, with potential beyond that of scientific education, the quest for an eco-friendly is neither unnecessary nor redundant. Rather, an eco-friendly aesthetic ought to be pursued in conjunction with other efforts to protect natureComment:
Lipscomb, Benjamin J.B.. The Women are Up To Something2021, Oxford University Press-
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Added by: Rebecca BuxtonPublisher’s Note:
The story of four remarkable women who shaped the intellectual history of the 20th century: Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley, and Iris Murdoch. On the cusp of the Second World War, four women went to Oxford to begin their studies: a fiercely brilliant Catholic convert; a daughter of privilege longing to escape her stifling upbringing; an ardent Communist and aspiring novelist with a list of would-be lovers as long as her arm; and a quiet, messy lover of newts and mice who would become a great public intellectual of our time. They became lifelong friends. At the time, only a handful of women had ever made lives in philosophy. But when Oxford's men were drafted in the war, everything changed. As Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley, and Iris Murdoch labored to make a place for themselves in a male-dominated world, as they made friendships and families, and as they drifted toward and away from each other, they never stopped insisting that some lives are better than others. They argued that courage and discernment and justice—and love—are the heart of a good life. This book presents the first sustained engagement with these women's contributions: with the critique and the alternative they framed. Drawing on a cluster of recently opened archives and extensive correspondence and interviews with those who knew them best, Benjamin Lipscomb traces the lives and ideas of four friends who gave us a better way to think about ethics, and ourselves.Comment (from this Blueprint): This text discusses the lives and work of four women philosophers in mid-20th century England: Mary Midgley, Phillipa Foot, Elizabeth Anscombe, and Iris Murdoch. As such it is relevant to discussions of the challenges that women face in academic settings, but it can also serve as historical background on contemporary ethics, as these four philosophers developped ideas that revolutionised the field.
Little, Margaret Olivia. Abortion2008, In R. G. Frey & Christopher Wellman (eds.), A companion to applied ethics. Malden: Wiley. pp. 313-325.-
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon Fokt
Introduction: It is often noted that public discussion of the moral status of abortion is disappointingly crude. The positions staked out and the reasoning proffered seem to reflect little of the subtlety and nuance - not to mention ambivalence - that mark more private reflections on the subject. Despite attempts by various parties to find middle ground, the debate remains largely polarized: at its most dramatic, with extreme conservatives claiming abortion to be the moral equivalent of murder, even as extreme liberals think it devoid of moral import.To some extent, this polarization is due to the legal battle that continues to shadow moral discussions. Admission of ethical nuance, it is feared, will play as concession on the deeply contested question of whether abortion should be a legally protected option for women. But, to some extent, blame for the continued crudeness can be laid at the doorstep of moral theory itself.Comment:
Little, Margaret Olivia. Abortion, intimacy, and the duty to gestate1999, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):295-312.-
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: In this article, I urge that mainstream discussions of abortion are dissatisfying in large part because they proceed in polite abstraction from the distinctive circumstances and meanings of gestation. Such discussions, in fact, apply to abortion conceptual tools that were designed on the premiss that people are physically demarcated, even as gestation is marked by a thorough-going intertwinement. We cannot fully appreciate what is normatively at stake with legally forcing continued gestation, or again how to discuss moral responsibilities to continue gestating, until we appreciate in their own terms the goods and evils distinctive of gestational connection. To underscore the need to explore further the meanings of gestation, I provide two examples of the difference it might make to legal and moral discussions of abortion if we appreciate more fully that gestation is an intimacy.Comment:
Little, Margaret Olivia. The Moral Permissibility of Abortion2014, In Andrew I. Cohen & Christopher Wellman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics. Chichester: Wiley & Sons.. pp. 51-62.-
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: When a woman or girl finds herself pregnant, is it morally permissible for her to end that pregnancy? One dominant tradition says 'no'; its close cousin says 'rarely' - exceptions may be made where the burdens on the individual girl or woman are exceptionally dire, or, for some, when the pregnancy results from rape. On both views, though, there is an enormous presumption against aborting, for abortion involves the destruction of something we have no right to destroy. Those who reject this claim, it is said, do so by denying the dignity of early human life - and imperiling their own. I think these views are deeply flawed. They are, I believe, based on a problematic conception of how we should value early human life; more than that, they are based on a profoundly misleading view of gestation and a deontically crude picture of morality. I believe that early abortion is fully permissible, widely decent, and, indeed, can be honorable. This is not, though, because I regard burgeoning human life as 'mere tissue': on the contrary, I think it has a value worthy of special respect. It is, rather, because I believe that the right way to value early human life, and the right way to value what is involved in and at stake with its development, lead to a view that regards abortion as both morally sober and morally permissible. Abortion at later stages of pregnancy becomes, for reasons I shall outline, multiply more complicated; but it is early abortions - say, abortions in the first half of pregnancy - that are most at stake for women.Comment:
Little, Margaret Olivia. Why a feminist approach to bioethics?1996, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 6 (1):1-18.-
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: Many have asked how and why feminist theory makes a distinctive contribution to bioethics. In this essay, I outline two ways in which feminist reflection can enrich bioethical studies. First, feminist theory may expose certain themes of androcentric reasoning that can affect, in sometimes crude but often subtle ways, the substantive analysis of topics in bioethics; second, it can unearth the gendered nature of certain basic philosophical concepts that form the working tools of ethical theory.Comment:
Little, Margaret Olivia. Abortion and the Margins of Personhood2008, Living on the edge: the margins of legal personhood: symposium 2; 331-348.-
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon Fokt
Publisher's Note: When a woman is pregnant, how should we understand the moral status of the life within her? How should we understand its status as conceptus, as embryo, when an early or again matured fetus? According to some, human life in all of these forms is inviolable: early human life has a moral status equivalent to a person from the moment of conception. According to others, such life has no intrinsic status, even late in pregnancy. According to still others, moral status emerges when sentience does. Until the fetus is conscious - a point somewhere at the end of the second trimester, it has no moral status at all; after it is conscious, it does.Comment:
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Comment (from this Blueprint): In this chapter, Lim recounts Young's childhood and educational background as a way to inform our understanding of her philosophical and political practice. In this sense, this text should deeply enhance students' comprehension of Young's feminist political thought and would serve as uselful introduction to some of her writings on structural injustices and minority rights.