Kittay, Eva Feder. When Caring Is Just and Justice is Caring: Justice and Mental Retardation
2001, Public Culture 13(3): 557-580
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Added by: Jamie RobertsonSummary: In this paper, Kittay advances a conception of justice that 'begins with an acknowledgement of dependency and seeks to organise society so that our well-being is not inversely related to our need for care or to care' (576). Her motivation for advancing this view is that ideals of citizenship in liberal society, including independence and productivity, perpetuate the victimisation, social exclusion, or stigmatisation of people with mental retardation and their carers. This is because liberal definitions of personhood do not provide resources for responding in a morally adequate way to the mutual dependence of people with mental retardation and their carers/advocates. People with mental retardation are inescapably dependent because of their central need for attentive care. And, carers' work is so deeply other-directed that they also do not fit the liberal model of the rationally self-interested actor. Thus, both carers and their charges are vulnerable and need to be advocated for so that they can be seen as having important entitlements to public resources and claims to justice. To this end, Kittay proposes a conception of personhood that is based on relationships. Although those with mental retardation are inherently dependent, they still count as persons because they are able to participate in relationships. This makes them entitled to the satisfactions that make life worth living. To achieve the twin goal of achieving justice for familial or paid carers, Kittay advances a new principle of justice, doulia, which calls for larger society to support those who care for the inexorably dependent. Kittay takes her relational conception of personhood and her principle of doulia to ensure that appropriate forms of social organization exist to support all those who become dependent. She claims her view is needed because principles of charity and beneficence are not adequate since they are consistent with the continued stigmatization of mental retardation and care work, and ground only low-priority social obligations.Comment: This paper, with it's helpful discussions of the elements of the liberal tradition with which Kittay specifically takes issue and the inadequacies of the Americans with Disabilities Act, would be an appropriate reading for courses about the philosophy of disability or about liberal political theory.Kleingeld, Pauline. Moral consciousness and the ‘fact of reason’2010, In Andrews Reath & Jens Timmermann (eds.), Kant's Critique of Practical Reason: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press.
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Charlotte SabourinAbstract: At the heart of the argument of the Critique of Practical Reason, one finds Kant's puzzling and much-criticized claim that the consciousness of the moral law can be called a 'fact of reason'. In this essay, I clarify the meaning and the importance of this claim. I correct misunderstandings of the term 'Factum', situate the relevant passages within their argumentative context, and argue that Kant's argument can be given a consistent reading on the basis of which the main questions and criticisms can be answered.Comment:Kleingeld, Pauline. Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship2011, Cambridge University Press.
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Charlotte SabourinPublisher's Note: This is the first comprehensive account of Kant's cosmopolitanism, highlighting its moral, political, legal, economic, cultural, and psychological aspects. Contrasting Kant's views with those of his German contemporaries, and relating them to current debates, Pauline Kleingeld sheds new light on texts that have been hitherto neglected or underestimated. In clear and carefully argued discussions, she shows that Kant's philosophical cosmopolitanism underwent a radical transformation in the mid 1790s and that the resulting theory is philosophically stronger than is usually thought. Using the work of figures such as Fichte, Cloots, Forster, Hegewisch, Wieland, and Novalis, Kleingeld analyzes Kant's arguments regarding the relationship between cosmopolitanism and patriotism, the importance of states, the ideal of an international federation, cultural pluralism, race, global economic justice, and the psychological feasibility of the cosmopolitan ideal. In doing so, she reveals a broad spectrum of positions in cosmopolitan theory that are relevant to current discussions of cosmopolitanism.Comment:Kleinschmidt, Shieva. The Experiential Problem of Petitionary Prayer2018, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 83(3): 219-229.
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Added by: Emily PaulAbstract: Sometimes we petition God for things through prayer. This is puzzling, because if God always does what is best, it is not clear how our prayers can make a difference to what God does. Difference-Making accounts of petitionary prayer attempt to explain how our prayers can nonetheless influence what God does. I argue that, insofar as one is motivated to endorse such an account due to wanting to respect widespread intuitions about this feature of petitionary prayer, they should also be motivated to endorse an account of prayer that respects widespread intuitions about other central features of petitionary prayer. I describe three problematic cases and the intuitions we have about them, and show how these intuitions restrict any Difference-Making account of petitionary prayer.Comment: Useful in an advanced UG or masters philosophy of religion course, as it can be discussed as a more complex version of a contradiction within God's alleged attributes - and it could be good as a task to get students to boil this down. Could also of course be very useful for a unit on petitionary prayer.Kleinschmidt, Shieva. Many-One Identity and the Trinity2012, Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion (J. Kvanvig (ed.)) Vol. 4: 84-96.
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Added by: Emily PaulAbstract: Trinitarians claim there are three Divine persons each of which is God, and yet there is only one God. It seems they want three to equal one. It just so happens, some metaphysicians claim exactly that. They accept Composition as Identity: each fusion is identical to the plurality of its parts. I evaluate Composition as Identity's application to the doctrine of the Trinity, and argue that it fails to give the Trinitairan any options he or she didn't already have. Further, while Composition as Identity does give us a new way to assert polytheism, its help requires us to endorse a claim that undercuts any Trinitarian motivation for the view.Comment: An excellent paper for an advanced UG/Masters course on the metaphysics of theism, as this draws upon metaphysical issues (composition) as well as issues in the philosophy of religion. Provides a great overview of problems facing an orthodox metaphysics of the trinity. NB: this is of course focused on metaphysics of Christianity, so if for a general metaphysics of theism course, it would be important to include metaphysical issues facing other religions.Kleinschmidt, Shieva. Refining Four-Dimensionalism2017, Synthese 194(11): 4623-4640.
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Added by: Emily PaulAbstract: Current formulations of Four-Dimensionalism may be objected to on grounds that they are too inflexible: the formulations do not seem to allow for enough variety in the views they are paired with. For instance, Kit Fine has noted that formulations of Four-Dimensionalism in terms of instantaneous parts may be too demanding for Four-Dimensionalists who believe nothing is instantaneous. And Trenton Merricks has argued that one can think something persists four-dimensionally without taking it to have proper temporal parts, and claims that our formulation of Four-Dimensionalism should be revised to allow for this. I will add my own worries to those of Fine and Merricks. I will note that current formulations of Four-Dimensionalism are not sufficiently neutral with respect to the structure of time, with respect to how liberally objects decompose into parts, and with respect to whether objects and the regions they fill match in mereological structure. I will show that we can formulate Four-Dimensionalism in a sufficiently neutral way, while still producing a view that can do the work we typically require of Four-Dimensionalism.Comment: A great further reading for a unit on persistence through time - a little too specialised to be a core reading - unless for a masters course, because it requires that readers have a prior (good) understanding of traditional four-dimensionalism. If one's students do have this grasp (e.g. in an MA course) then it could be good to set them the task of reading this paper, and outlining how they think four-dimensionalism entails certain commitments - e.g. not being neutral regarding theories of time.Kleinsschmidt, Shieva. Reasoning without the principle of sufficient reason2013, In Tyron Goldschmidt (ed.), The Philosophy of Existence: Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing? Routledge. 64-79.
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Added by: Laura JimenezAbstract: According to Principles of Sufficient Reason, every truth (in some relevant group) has an explanation. One of the most popular defenses of Principles of Sufficient Reason has been the presupposition of reason defense, which takes endorsement of the defended PSR to play a crucial role in our theory selection. According to recent presentations of this defense, our method of theory selection often depends on the assumption that, if a given proposition is true, then it has an explanation, and this will only be justified if we think this holds for all propositions in the relevant group. In this paper the author argues that this argument fails even when restricted to contingent propositions, and even if we grant that there is no non-arbitrary way to divide true propositions that have explanations from those that lack them. The author gives an alternate explanation of what justifies our selecting theories on the basis of explanatory features: the crucial role is not played by an endorsement of a PSR, but rather by our belief that, prima facie, we should prefer theories that exemplify explanatory power to greater degrees than their rivals.Comment: The text covers many topics in a level proper for undergraduates: The principle of sufficient reason, the inductive argument, the problem of the Many, explanatory power, etc. Even if the reader doesn't identify with the view of the author, this article could serve as a good practice to build confidence with philosophical concepts that are crucial for metaphysics and philosophy of science.Klenk, Virginia. Understanding Symbolic Logic2008, Pearson Prentice Hall.
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Added by: Berta GrimauPublisher’s Note: Description - This comprehensive introduction presents the fundamentals of symbolic logic clearly, systematically, and in a straightforward style accessible to readers. Each chapter, or unit, is divided into easily comprehended small bites that enable learners to master the material step-by-step, rather than being overwhelmed by masses of information covered too quickly. The book provides extremely detailed explanations of procedures and techniques, and was written in the conviction that anyone can thoroughly master its content. A four-part organization covers sentential logic, monadic predicate logic, relational predicate logic, and extra credit units that glimpse into alternative methods of logic and more advanced topics.Comment: This book is ideal for a first introduction course to formal logic. It doesn't presuppose any logical knowledge. It covers propositional and first-order logic (monadic and relational).Knobe, Joshua, Nichols, Shaun. An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto2018, In Knobe, J. & Nichols, S. (eds.), Experimental Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 3-14
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Added by: Tomasz Zyglewicz, Shannon Brick, Michael GreerAbstract: It used to be a commonplace that the discipline of philosophy was deeply concerned with questions about the human condition. Philosophers thought about human beings and how their minds worked. They took an interest in reason and passion, culture and innate ideas, the origins of people’s moral and religious beliefs. On this traditional conception, it wasn’t particularly important to keep philosophy clearly distinct from psychology, history, or political science...Comment (from this Blueprint): This paper was published as the opening chapter of the first ever edited volume devoted exclusively to experimental philosophy. It positions experimental philosophy vis-à-vis the traditional philosophical method of conceptual analysis. It discusses three ways in which experimental findings can have philosophical significance. Along the way, it also addresses three common objection to x-phi.Knobe, Joshua. Intentional Action and Side-Effects in Ordinary Language2003, Analysis 63 (3): 190-194
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Added by: Tomasz Zyglewicz, Shannon Brick, Michael GreerAbstract: There has been a long-standing dispute in the philosophical literature about the conditions under which a behavior counts as 'intentional.' Much of the debate turns on questions about the use of certain words and phrases in ordinary language. The present paper investigates these questions empirically, using experimental techniques to investigate people's use of the relevant words and phrases.Comment (from this Blueprint): According to what Michael Bratman has called “The simple view" of intentional action, an action φ is intentional only if the agent had an intention to φ. In this short paper, Joshua Knobe presents the results of two experiments that strongly suggests that ordinary people do not ascribe intentionality in accordance with the simple view. Rather, whether they judge a side-effect to be intentional seems to depend on whether the side-effect is good or bad. This effect came to be known as “the side-effect effect” or “the Knobe effect.” Subsequent experimental research has shown that moral considerations influence the folk ascriptions not only of intentionality, but also of other intuitively descriptive notions, such as knowledge or causation.Can’t find it?Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!
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