Mackenzie, Catriona. Embodied agents, narrative selves
2014, Philosophical Explorations 17 (2), pp. 154-171
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Added by: Maria Jimena Clavel VazquezAbstract:
Recent work on diachronic agency has challenged the predominantly structural or synchronic approach to agency that is characteristic of much of the literature in contemporary philosophical moral psychology. However, the embodied dimensions of diachronic agency continue to be neglected in the literature. This article draws on phenomenological perspectives on embodiment and narrative conceptions of the self to argue that diachronic agency and selfhood are anchored in embodiment. In doing so, the article also responds to Diana Meyers' recent work on corporeal selfhood.Comment: available in this Blueprint
Maiese, Michelle. Mindshaping, Enactivism, and Ideological Oppression
2021, Topoi 41 (2), pp. 341-354
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Added by: Maria Jimena Clavel VazquezAbstract:
One of humans' distinctive cognitive abilities is that they develop an array of capacities through an enculturation process. In "Cognition as a Social Skill", Sally points to one of the dangers associated with enculturation: ideological oppression. To conceptualize how such oppression takes root, Haslanager appeals to notions of mindshaping and social coordination, whereby people participate in oppressive social practices unthinkingly or even willingly. Arguably, an appeal to mindshaping provides a new kind of argument, grounded in philosophy of mind, which supports the claims that feminist and anti-racist want to defend. However, some theorists worry that Haslanger's account does not shed much light on how individuals could exert their agency to resist oppression. I argue that enactivist conceptions of mindshaping and habit can help us to make sense of the power of social influences and how they have the potential to both enable and undermine cognition and agency. This moves us toward increased understanding of the workings of social oppression - distinguishing between constructive and enabling forms of heteronomy, and overdetermining and pernicious modes that lead to atrophied moral cognition and a narrowing of the field of affordances.Comment: available in this Blueprint
Pitts-Taylor, Victoria. The Mind in the Body: Feminist and Neurocognitive Perspectives on Embodiment
2014, In Sigrid Schmitz & Grit Höppner (ed.), Gendered Neurocultures: Feminist and Queer Perspectives on Current Brain Discourses. Zaglossus, pp. 187-202
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Added by: Maria Jimena Clavel VazquezAbstract:
From the introduction: The body's epistemic significance is a shared preoccupation for both feminist theory and neurophilosophy, two fields that rarely interact. Neurocognitive theories of embodied mind seek to identify the features of embodiment that inform cognition and consciousness. They share with feminist epistemologies a view that consciousness is inextricably linked to lived embodiment and situated in the environment, and they each offer powerful challenges to the disembodied, abstract Cartesian subject. This convergence bears deeper consideration. In this chapter I address claims of their compatibility, and also how feminist concerns trouble neurophilosophical interpretations of the embodied mind. I begin with a brief introduction to neurobiologically informed views of mind that embrace reductive physicalism, and then I describe the non-reductive physicalism of embodied mind theories. Later, I take up feminist epistemology and its parallels and tensions with this subfield of neurophilosophy. I raise the question of epistemic difference as an opening for critical engagement. (p. 1 - online version)Comment: available in this Blueprint
Solomon, Miriam. Situated cognition
2006, In Paul Thagard (ed.) Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier, pp. 413-428
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Added by: Maria Jimena Clavel VazquezAbstract:
This chapter provides a structured overview of work on situated cognition. The main fields in which situated cognition is studied - cognitive science, feminist epistemology, and science studies - are unnecessarily isolated from one another. Cognition is always situated. It is always concretely instantiated in one way or another. There are no disembodied cognitive achievements. The situated cognition literature details the ways in which cognition can be instantiated and, instead of abstracting what is in common to all cognition, explores the epistemic significance of particular routes to cognitive accomplishment. The phenomena of situated cognition have been described in several disciplines. Cognitive scientists have described the ways in which representation of the world, learning, memory, planning, action, and linguistic meaning are embedded in the environment, tools, social arrangements, and configurations of the human body. The situated cognition approaches have in common the rejection of the ideas that cognition is individualistic, general, abstract, symbolic, explicit, language based, and located in the brain as mediator between sensory input and action output.Comment: available in this Blueprint
1991, MIT Press, pp. 147-184
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Added by: Maria Jimena Clavel VazquezAbstract:
The Embodied Mind provides a unique, sophisticated treatment of the spontaneous and reflective dimension of human experience. The authors argue that only by having a sense of common ground between mind in Science and mind in experience can our understanding of cognition be more complete. Toward that end, they develop a dialogue between cognitive science and Buddhist meditative psychology and situate it in relation to other traditions such as phenomenology and psychoanalysis.Comment: available in this Blueprint
Ward, David, Mog Stapleton. Es are Good. Cognition as enacted, embodied, embedded, affective and extended
2012, In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in Interaction: The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins Publishing, pp. 89-104
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Added by: Maria Jimena Clavel VazquezAbstract:
We present a specific elaboration and partial defense of the claims that cognition is enactive, embodied, embedded, affective and (potentially) extended. According to the view we will defend, the enactivist claim that perception and cognition essentially depend upon the cognizer's interactions with their environment is fundamental. If a particular instance of this kind of dependence obtains, we will argue, then it follows that cognition is essentially embodied and embedded, that the underpinnings of cognition are inextricable from those of affect, that the phenomenon of cognition itself is essentially bound up with affect, and that the possibility of cognitive extension depends upon the instantiation of a specific mode of skillful interrelation between cognizer and environment. Thus, if cognition is enactive then it is also embodied, embedded, affective and potentially extended.Comment: available in this Blueprint
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