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Added by: Chris Howard
Summary: This article argues that there is no property of being good simpliciter, that all goodness is goodness-in-a-way. It draws out the (damaging) implications of this result for consequentialism.Thomson, Judith Jarvis. McTaggart on Time2001, Noûs 35(s15): 229-252.-
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Added by: Nick Novelli
Introduction: McTaggart's argument for the conclusion that time does not exist is notoriously hard to understand. C. D. Broad says that when properly interpreted, its main part can be seen to be "a philosophical 'howler'." Others see things in it that they regard as true and important, or if not true, then anyway important. But I have not seen any interpretation of it that seems to me to get it exactly right. And I think that it pays to get it right: there are lessons to be learned from consideration of what goes on in it. By way of reminder, McTaggart's argument has two parts. The first part aims at the conclusion that time does not exist unless the A series exists. The second part aims at the conclusion that the A series does not exist. It follows that time does not existComment: One of the clearest statements of McTaggart's argument about time; the interpretation is well-argued for. Very helpful as an aid to comprehension if McTaggart's argument is taught, as it usually would be in any examination of philosophy of time.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. Self-defense1991, Philosophy and Public Affairs 20 (4):283-310.-
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Added by: Simon Fokt
Introduction: But what if in order to save one’s life one has to kill another person? In some cases that is obviously permissible. In a case I will call Villainous Aggressor, you are standing in a meadow, innocently minding your own business, and a truck suddenly heads toward you. You try to sidestep the truck, but it turns as you turn. Now you can see the driver: he is a man you know has long hated you. What to do? You cannot outrun the truck. Fortunately, this is not pure nightmare: you just happen to have an antitank gun with you, and can blow up the truck. Of course, if you do this you will kill the driver, but that does not matter; it is morally permissible for you to blow up the truck, driver and all, in defense of your life.Comment: The text discusses permissible and excusable self-defence reactions towards different types of aggressors. It is useful in teaching on issues involving the doctrine of double effect.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. Physician-Assisted Suicide: Two Moral Arguments1999, Ethics 109 (3):497-518.-
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Added by: Simon Fokt
Introduction: What I will discuss are two of the moral arguments that have been put forward as reasons for objecting to the legalization of physician-assisted suicide. They have been taken seriously by a great many people and have had a powerful impact on the state of American law in this area. I will argue that they are bad arguments. I should say at the outset, however, that even if these are bad arguments, there may be others that are better. Many people oppose the legalizing of physician-assisted suicide on the ground that (as they think) there is no way of constraining the practice so as to provide adequate protections for the poor and the weak. They may be right, and if they are, then all bets are off. Alternatively, they may be wrong. I will simply bypass this issue.Comment: The two arguments focus on the distinction between killing and letting die, and the doctrine of double effect. The arguments offered are central to the discussion on the moral permissibility of euthanasia and assisted suicide, which makes this text very useful in teaching applied ethics. It can be also useful in more general teaching on the doctrine of double effect.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. A Defense of Abortion1971, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1):47-66.-
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Added by: Simon Fokt
Content: Thomson aims to see if abortion can be defended even if the anti-abortion theorist is granted their key premise, i.e. that the foetus has the status of a person. Thomson argues that this is, in fact, irrelevant since we do not owe it to others to let them use our body in order to survive.Comment: This text offers one of the central arguments in favour of moral permissibility of abortion and features the 'famous violinist' thought experiment. It is a central reading for any module in applied ethics focusing on abortion.
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Thomson, Judith Jarvis. Goodness and Utilitarianism
1994, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 67(4): 5-21.
Comment: This article offers a famous objection to ulitiltarianism/consequentialism, namely that the property of being good (simpliciter) to which consquentialism appeals does not exist; 'good' is incomplete. It would be a great addition to a contemporary normative ethics course, in a unit on consequentialism's most famous critiques.