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Thomson, Judith Jarvis. Goodness and Utilitarianism
1994, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 67(4): 5-21.
Added by: Chris Howard
Summary: This article argues that there is no property of being good simpliciter, that all goodness is goodness-in-a-way. It draws out the (damaging) implications of this result for consequentialism.

Comment: This article offers a famous objection to ulitiltarianism/consequentialism, namely that the property of being good (simpliciter) to which consquentialism appeals does not exist; 'good' is incomplete. It would be a great addition to a contemporary normative ethics course, in a unit on consequentialism's most famous critiques.

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