Deprecated: wp_make_content_images_responsive is deprecated since version 5.5.0! Use wp_filter_content_tags() instead. in /home/diversityreading/public_html/wp-includes/functions.php on line 4859
- Expand entry
- Added by: Laura Jimenez, Contributed by:
Abstract: The idea that dispositions are an intrinsic matter has been popular among contemporary philosophers of dispositions. This paper first states this idea as exactly as possible. Then it examines whether it poses any threat to the two current versions of the conditional analysis of dispositions, namely, the simple and reformed conditional analysis of dispositions. The upshot is that the intrinsic nature of dispositions, when properly understood, doesn’t spell trouble for either of the two versions of the conditional analysis of dispositions. Along the way,the author proposes an extensionally correct and practically useful criterion for identifying nomically intrinsic dispositions and criticizes one objection raised by Lewis against the simple conditional analysis of dispositions.
Comment: The article explains the different views about the connection between dispositions and counterfactual conditionals. It could be useful for senior undergraduates or for postgraduates interested in the metaphysics of conditional analyses.Export citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format