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Added by: Sonja Dobroski and Quentin PharrPublisher’s Note: The word Wasáse is the Kanienkeha (Mohawk) word for the ancient war dance ceremony of unity, strength, and commitment to action. The author notes, "This book traces the journey of those Indigenous people who have found a way to transcend the colonial identities which are the legacy of our history and live as Onkwehonwe, original people. It is dialogue and reflection on the process of transcending colonialism in a personal and collective sense: making meaningful change in our lives and transforming society by recreating our personalities, regenerating our cultures, and surging against forces that keep us bound to our colonial past."
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Added by: Björn Freter
Abstract: The question of freedom is the most interesting question we could examine, since one can say that all of morality depends on this single question. Something so interesting justifies departing from my subject a little bit in order to enter this discussion, and to put here in front of the reader’s eyes the main objections that people make against freedom, so that he can judge for himself their soundness.
Comment: This is an English translation of Emilie Du Châtelet's "Sur la liberté." This 18th century text discusses freedom of the will, determinism, and divine foreknowledge.
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Added by: Simon FoktIntroduction: Dworkin puts forth two main arguments to justify adhering to the wishes the patient expressed before becoming demented. As he sees it, this course of action both promotes the patient’s well-being and is required in order to respect the patient’s autonomy. In each argument, while I consider most of the ideas well-founded, I challenge the crucial premise. In the argument focused on the patient’s well-being, I dispute the claim that demented patients are no longer capable of generating what Dworkin calls “critical interests.” In the argument concerning autonomy, I question the premise that demented patients no longer possess the “capacity for autonomy.”7 In each case, I will trace how the problematic premise arises within Dworkin’s argument and then develop an alternative account of the relevant capacity.
Comment: Jaworska asks: 'Should we, in our efforts to best respect a patient with dementia, give priority to the preferences and attitudes this person held before becoming demented, or should we follow the person’s present preferences?' (p. 108). The article offers a useful critical overview of the views expressed by Rebecca Dresser and Ronald Dworkin. It is best used as a primary reading in ethics classes focusing directly on medical ethics or autonomy, or as further reading in general ethics teaching on autonomy.
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Added by: Emily PaulPublisher's note: Rae Langton here draws together her ground-breaking and contentious work on pornography and objectification. She shows how women come to be objectified -- made subordinate and treated as things -- and she argues for the controversial feminist conclusions that pornography subordinates and silences women, and women have rights against pornography.
Comment: Any of these chapters would be really useful for a feminist philosophy or ethics course, and can be studied in a 'stand alone' sense. In particular, the 'sexual solipsism' chapter itself contains numerous discussion points. It could be good for different groups of students to each be assigned a different chapter, and then to present to the class as a whole.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Corbin CovingtonAbstract: This paper strengthens the theoretical ground of feminist analyses of anger by explaining how the angers of the oppressed are ways of knowing. Relying on insights created through the juxtaposition of Latina feminism and Zen Buddhism, I argue that these angers are special kinds of embodied perceptions that surface when there is a profound lack of fit between a particular bodily orientation and its framing world of sense. As openings to alternative sensibilities, these angers are transformative, liberatory, and deeply epistemological.
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
This paper explores a neglected normative dimension of algorithmic opacity in the workplace and the labor market. It argues that explanations of algorithms and algorithmic decisions are of noninstrumental value. That is because explanations of the structure and function of parts of the social world form the basis for reflective clarification of our practical orientation toward the institutions that play a central role in our life. Using this account of the noninstrumental value of explanations, the paper diagnoses distinctive normative defects in the workplace and economic institutions which a reliance on AI can encourage, and which lead to alienation.
Comment: This paper offers a novel approach to the exploration of alienation at work (i.e., what makes work bad) from an algorithmic ethics perspective. It relies on the noninstrumental value of explanation to make its central argument, and grounds this value in the role that explanation plays in our ability to form a practical orientation towards our scoial world. In this sense, it examines an interesting, and somewhat underexplored, connection between algorithmic ethics, justice, the future of work, and social capabilities. As such, it could be useful in a wide range of course contexts. This being said, the central argument is fairly complex, and relies on some previous understanding of analytic political philosophy and philosophy of AI. It also employs technical language from these domains, and therefore would be best utilised for masters-level or other advanced philosophical courses and study.
Comment: available in this Blueprint