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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Joe Slater
Abstract: Justifications and excuses are defenses that exculpate. They are therefore much more like each other than like such defenses as diplomatic immunity, which does not exculpate. But they exculpate in different ways, and it has proven difficult to agree on just what that difference consists in. In this paper I take a step back from justification and excuse as concepts in criminal law, and look at the concepts as they arise in everyday life. To keep the task manageable, I focus primarily on excuses and excusing activities, distinguishing them from justifications as well as from other close relatives, in particular, forgiving and pardoning. I draw upon J.L. Austin-s classic 'A Plea for Excuses,' but expand on his account, suggesting that we offer excuses for reasons besides those he mentions. My hope is that my examination of excuses and excusing activities will help us rethink our views on just how justifications and excuses differ, views which often are worked out without much attention to how these concepts function in everyday life and to the connection between offers of excuses and justifications and the ‘'rules of civility.'Comment : Baron explains the typical distinction between justifications and excuses. Her examination of these concepts draws upon Austin's 'A Plea for Excuses', and use of the everyday concept, she presses for a rethink of how philosophers and legal theorists think about excuses.Bell, Macalester. Against Simple Removal: A Defence of Defacement as a Response to Racist Monuments, Journal of Applied Philosophy-
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Added by: Ten-Herng LaiAbstract:
In recent years, protesters around the world have been calling for the removal of commemorations honouring those who are, by contemporary standards, generally regarded as seriously morally compromised by their racism. According to one line of thought, leaving racist memorials in place is profoundly disrespectful, and doing so tacitly condones, and perhaps even celebrates, the racism of those honoured and memorialized. The best response is to remove the monuments altogether. In this article, I first argue against a prominent offense-based account of the wrong of simply leaving memorials in place, unaltered, before offering my own account of this wrong. In at least some cases, these memorials wrong insofar as they express and exemplify a morally objectionable attitude of race-based contempt. I go on to argue that the best way of answering this disrespect is through a process of expressively “dehonouring” the subject. Removal of these commemorations is ultimately misguided, in many cases, because removal, by itself, cannot adequately dishonour, and simple removal does not fully answer the ways in which these memorials wrong. I defend a more nuanced approach to answering the wrong posed by these monuments, and I argue that public expressions of contempt through defacement have an ineliminable role to play in an apt dishonouring process.Comment (from this Blueprint): Two things should be noted in this paper. First, many have discussed the importance of stopping or blocking the harm of objectionable commemorations. This paper goes a step further and discusses the importance of “answering” the wrong done by these monuments. Second, the paper engages with a “negative” emotion, namely, contempt, that is present at both racist monuments and the effort to confront them. It allows us to see the legitimate role this negative emotion may play in the struggle for equality: contempt can be apt towards inapt contempt expressed through racist monuments. It also nicely spells out the potential practical implications of taking this negative emotion seriously.Berninger, Anja. Commemorating Public Figures–In Favour of a Fictionalist Position2020, Journal of Applied Philosophy-
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Added by: Ten-Herng LaiAbstract:
In this article, I discuss the commemoration of public figures such as Nelson Mandela and Yitzhak Rabin. In many cases, our commemoration of such figures is based on the admiration we feel for them. However, closer inspection reveals that most (if not all) of those we currently honour do not qualify as fitting objects of admiration. Yet, we may still have the strong intuition that we ought to continue commemorating them in this way. I highlight two problems that arise here: the problem that the expressed admiration does not seem appropriate with respect to the object and the problem that continued commemorative practices lead to rationality issues. In response to these issues, I suggest taking a fictionalist position with respect to commemoration. This crucially involves sharply distinguishing between commemorative and other discourses, as well as understanding the objects of our commemorative practices as fictional objects.Comment (from this Blueprint): This is a persuasive article arguing for a somewhat counter-intutive conclusion. The fictionalist approach, that what we honour is not the historical figure, but some idealised version of them, seems to capture what we actually do in the real world, even if we think we are not doing this. Do compare the position on eliminativism with Frowe's paper.Dickie, Bonnie. Hollow Water2000, NFB. 48 min. Canada.-
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Added by: Sonja Dobroski and Quentin PharrAbstract:
This documentary profiles the tiny Ojibway community of Hollow Water on the shores of Lake Winnipeg as they deal with an epidemic of sexual abuse in their midst. The offenders have left a legacy of denial and pain, addiction and suicide. The Manitoba justice system was unsuccessful in ending the cycle of abuse, so the community of Hollow Water took matters into their own hands. The offenders were brought home to face justice in a community healing and sentencing circle. Based on traditional practices, this unique model of justice reunites families and heals both victims and offenders. The film is a powerful tribute to one community's ability to heal and create change.Comment : available in this BlueprintFrowe, Helen. The Duty to Remove Statues of Wrongdoers2019, Journal of Practical Ethics 7(3):1-31-
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Added by: Ten-Herng LaiAbstract:
This paper argues that public statues of persons typically express a positive evaluative attitude towards the subject. It also argues that states have duties to repudiate their own historical wrongdoing, and to condemn other people’s serious wrongdoing. Both duties are incompatible with retaining public statues of people who perpetrated serious rights violations. Hence, a person’s being a serious rights violator is a sufficient condition for a state’s having a duty to remove a public statue of that person. I argue that this applies no less in the case of the ‘morally ambiguous’ wrongdoer, who both accomplishes significant goods and perpetrates serious rights violations. The duty to remove a statue is a defeasible duty: like most duties, it can be defeated by lesser-evil considerations. If removing a statue would, for example, spark a violent riot that would risk unjust harm to lots of people, the duty to remove could be outweighed by the duty not to foreseeably cause unjust harm. This would provide a lesser-evil justification for keeping the statue. But it matters that the duty to remove is outweighed, rather than negated, by these consequences. Unlike when a duty is negated, one still owes something in cases of outweighing. And it especially matters that it is outweighed by the predicted consequences of wrongful behaviour by others.Comment (from this Blueprint): This paper highlights several important things. First, statues are blunt tools and express pro-attitudes to the persons they represent as a whole. Second, it sets out a clear standard for removal, and defends the conclusion that we should remove many or even most existing statues. Third, to the question “what if removal incites violence?” this paper provides a good answer. Fourth, a legitimate question is what we should do about statues of wrongdoers of the distant past? The discussion on this here is insightful.Gheaus, Anca. The Best Available Parent2021, Ethics 131 (3):431-459-
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
There is a broad philosophical consensus that both children’s and prospective parents’ interests are relevant to the justification of a right to parent. Against this view, I argue that it is impermissible to sacrifice children’s interests for the sake of advancing adults’ interest in childrearing. Therefore, the allocation of the moral right to parent should track the child’s, and not the potential parent’s, interest. This revisionary thesis is moderated by two additional qualifications. First, parents lack the moral right to exclude others from associating with the child. Second, children usually come into the world as part of a relationship with their gestational mother; often, this relationship deserves protection.
Comment : This paper takes a position counter to the general philosophical consensus on the right to parent, instead defending a child-centred answer to the question, 'How does one acquire the moral right to parent?' in which the childrens' interests take precedence over potential parents. It would therefore be interesting to read and discuss in the context parental duties and rights, as well as the rights of children.Gheaus, Anca. The Right to Parent One’s Biological Babies2011, Journal of Political Philosophy 20 (4):432-455-
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
This paper provides an answer to the question why birth parents have a moral right to keep and raise their biological babies. I start with a critical discussion of the parent-centred model of justifying parents’ rights, recently proposed by Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift. Their account successfully defends a fundamental moral right to parent in general but, because it does not provide an account of how individuals acquire the right to parent a particular baby, it is insufficient for addressing the question whether and why there is a right to parent one’s biological child. Such a right is important because, in its absence, fairness towards adequate prospective parents who are involuntarily childless would demand a ‘babies redistribution’; moreover, in societies with entrenched histories of injustice there may be reasons of fairness for shuffling babies amongst all recent parents. I supplement the Brighouse-Swift account of fundamental parental rights by an account of how adequate parents acquire the right to parent their biological babies. I advance two arguments to this conclusion: by the time of birth, the birth parents will have already shouldered various burdens in order to bring children into existence, and are likely to have formed an intimate relationship with the future baby. Denying birth parents who would make at least adequate parents the right to keep their baby would be unfair to them and would destroy already formed parent-baby relationships which, I assume, are intrinsically valuable.
Comment : This paper explores questions related to what makes parenting in general legitimate and how individuals acquire the right to parent a particular baby. The author builds on existing discussions in the literature to construct a parent-centric account of why parent's have a protected interest in being the one's to raise their biological offspring. The author's account is intended to complement, rather than compete with, with existing child-centred (fiduciary) arguments. It would therefore be interesting to read and discuss in the context of parental duties and rights, as well as the rights of children.Gheaus, Anca. Biological Parenthood: Gestational, Not Genetic2018, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):225-240-
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Abstract:
Common sense morality and legislations around the world ascribe normative relevance to biological connections between parents and children. Procreators who meet a modest standard of parental competence are believed to have a right to rear the children they brought into the world. I explore various attempts to justify this belief and find most of these attempts lacking. I distinguish between two kinds of biological connections between parents and children: the genetic link and the gestational link. I argue that the second can better justify a right to rear.
Comment : This paper explores questions concerning the biological relevance of connections between parents and their children, ultimately arguing that the most important connection is gestational rather than genetic. The author also explores the way in which these claims allow us to challenge the status quo in relation to parental and custodial rights. Further, the authors examines how these conclusions may help in the assessment and settling of the more complex cases that have arisen as a result of developments in technology and medicine which allow a child to have more than two 'biological' biological parents. It would therefore be useful as further reading in the context of philosophical discussions of parental rights, the rights of children, and whether such rights are moral or political, as well applied or interdisciplinary contexts in which related philosophical questions arise, such as bioethics, legal theory, politics, and sociology (of the family, for example).Gheaus, Anca. The Role of Solitude in the Politics of Sociability2022, In Kimberley Brownlee, David Jenkins & Adam Neal (eds.), Being Social: The Philosophy of Social Human Rights. Oxford University Press. pp. 234–251-
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
This chapter explores a so-far neglected way of avoiding the bads of loneliness: by learning to value solitude, where that is understood as a state of ‘keeping oneself company’, as J. David Velleman puts it. Unlike loneliness, solitude need not involve any deprivation, whether subjective or objective. This chapter considers the various goods to which solitude is constitutive or instrumental, with a focus on the promise that proper valuing of solitude holds for combating loneliness. The overall argument is this: If loneliness significantly detracts from individual wellbeing, and if the ability to value solitude protects against loneliness, then such an ability is obviously valuable to human flourishing. If, further, loneliness raises concerns of justice, then supporting people’s ability to value solitude is a way to implement a desideratum of justice. Individuals can cultivate their ability to value solitude, an ability that others can promote or hinder.
Comment : This chapter explores philosophical questions concerning the nature and value of solitude, and the various goods related to 'keeping oneself company'. As a somewhat neglected topic in contemporary analytic philosophy, it provides an unique and novel discussion of the relationships between solitude, loneliness, and isolation and their relation to justice and well-being. Might be useful as a replacement for a foundational text in basic social and political philosophy, especially if studied in concert with other texts exploring our basic social requirements and the demands that these place on social and political institutions. See work on social rights and ethics of sociability by Kimberley Brownlee.Hsin-wen, Lee. Does the death penalty only deter ‘rational’ people?2018, Delaware State News-
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Hsin-Wen Lee
Abstract: I argue that the death penalty has only limited deterrent effect. It cannot deter three types of offenders: (1) those who do not fear death; (2) those who are not rational and cannot take into consideration the consequences of their actions; (3) those who are confident that they won't be caught. Thus, in order to deter potential murderers, we must consider new ways to deter these three types of offenders.Comment : The article is written for for a general audience. It considers the deterrence argument in favor of the death penalty. It should be useful for GE courses that cover the topic of the death penalty.Can’t find it?Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!
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Baron. Excuses, Excuses
2007, Criminal Law and Philosophy 1 (1):21-39