- Added by: Jie Gao, Contributed by:
Publisher’s Note: Does scepticism threaten our common sense picture of the world? Does it really undermine our deep-rooted certainties? This book offers an answer to these questions through a comparative study of the epistemological work of two key figures in the history of analytic philosophy: G. E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein. While historically accurate and engaging with scholarly work in this area, the book also puts forward novel interpretations of their works and brings out their relevance to present-day debates both in epistemology and philosophy of language.
Comment: This book is a useful and sustained examination of a variety of themes in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, the very late compilation of remarks inspired by G.E. Moore’s engagement with scepticism and idealism in “A Defence of Common Sense,” “Proof of an External World” and a few other papers. Among the topics considered are the strategies of Moore’s arguments, ordinary and philosophical uses of language, differing interpretations of Moore, externalism, internalism and contextualism, Wittgenstein’s objections to Moore, meaning and use, language games, Cartesian and Humean sceptical arguments, the epistemic and semantic status of so-called “hinge” propositions, epistemic relativism, and a comparison of Wittgenstein’s and Moore’s views with those of subsequent philosophers. It thus constitutes a very good reading or even central text for a course on Moore’s epistemology, Wittgenstein’s epistemology and external world skepticism.Export citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format
Coliva, Annalisa. Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty, and Common Sense
2010, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.