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Finn, Suki. Limiting Logical Pluralism
2019, Synthese (198): 4905–4923

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Added by: Viviane Fairbank
Abstract:
In this paper I argue that pluralism at the level of logical systems requires a certain monism at the meta-logical level, and so, in a sense, there cannot be pluralism all the way down. The adequate alternative logical systems bottom out in a shared basic meta-logic, and as such, logical pluralism is limited. I argue that the content of this basic meta-logic must include the analogue of logical rules Modus Ponens and Universal Instantiation. I show this through a detailed analysis of the ‘adoption problem’, which manifests something special about MP and UI. It appears that MP and UI underwrite the very nature of a logical rule of inference, due to all rules of inference being conditional and universal in their structure. As such, all logical rules presuppose MP and UI, making MP and UI self-governing, basic, unadoptable, and required in the meta-logic for the adequacy of any logical system.
Comment : This is an accessible discussion to logical pluralism and its relation to foundational issues in the epistemology of logic—notably the Adoption Problem. As such it can be included in any syllabus focused on special topics in the philosophy of logic. It does not require much background knowledge of logic or formal systems.
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Hattiangadi, Anandi. Logical Disagreement
2018, In C. McHugh, J. Way, and D. Whiting, eds., Metaepistemology. Oxford University Press, pp. 88-106.

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Added by: Viviane Fairbank

Abstract: This chapter investigates what we disagree about when we disagree about logic, on the assumption that judgments of logical validity are normative. If logic is normative, then the popular anti-realist thesis that there are no normative facts or properties generalizes—it entails that there are no logical facts or properties. When faced with this anti-realism, it is tempting to endorse a pluralist thesis, according to which two people who disagree about the validity of an argument can both say something true. This chapter explores the limitations of three prominent forms of pluralism: contextualism, relativism, and expressivism. It argues that none of these forms of pluralism gives an adequate account of what we disagree about when we disagree about logic.

Comment : This text is useful for anyone interested in thinking about the normativity of logic and logical pluralism. It is notable for its direct comparison of approaches in meta-ethics and in the philosophy of logic. Although explanations are clear, the paper assumes some background knowledge about both meta-ethics and logic, and so it is best suited for students who are already familiar with the basic concepts.
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Keefe, Rosanna. What Logical Pluralism Cannot Be
2014, Synthese 191 (7):1375-1390

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Added by: Franci Mangraviti
Abstract:

Logical Pluralists maintain that there is more than one genuine/true logical consequence relation. This paper seeks to understand what the position could amount to and some of the challenges faced by its formulation and defence. I consider in detail Beall and Restall’s Logical Pluralism—which seeks to accommodate radically different logics by stressing the way that they each fit a general form, the Generalised Tarski Thesis (GTT)—arguing against the claim that different instances of GTT are admissible precisifications of logical consequence. I then consider what it is to endorse a logic within a pluralist framework and criticise the options Beall and Restall entertain. A case study involving many-valued logics is examined. I next turn to issues of the applications of different logics and questions of which logic a pluralist should use in particular contexts. A dilemma regarding the applicability of admissible logics is tackled and it is argued that application is a red herring in relation to both understanding and defending a plausible form of logical pluralism. In the final section, I consider other ways to be and not to be a logical pluralist by examining analogous positions in debates over religious pluralism: this, I maintain, illustrates further limitations and challenges for a very general logical pluralism. Certain less wide-ranging pluralist positions are more plausible in both cases, I suggest, but assessment of those positions needs to be undertaken on a case-by-case basis.

Comment : Makes for a nice counter in any course discussing Beall and Restall's pluralism. Given that the paper is a direct response, some previous familiarity with the topic is advised.
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Kouri Kissel, Teresa. Logical Pluralism from a Pragmatic Perspective
2018, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):578-591

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Added by: Franci Mangraviti
Abstract:

This paper presents a new view of logical pluralism. This pluralism takes into account how the logical connectives shift, depending on the context in which they occur. Using the Question-Under-Discussion Framework as formulated by Craige Roberts, I identify the contextual factor that is responsible for this shift. I then provide an account of the meanings of the logical connectives which can accommodate this factor. Finally, I suggest that this new pluralism has a certain Carnapian flavour. Questions about the meanings of the connectives or the best logic outside of a specified context are not legitimate questions.

Comment : Can serve as an example of logical pluralism in any philosophy of logic course. Familiarity with the pluralisms of Shapiro and Carnap is helpful for comparison, but is not technically required.
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Kouri Kissel, Teresa. Metalinguistic Negotiation and Logical Pluralism
2019, Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4801-4812

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Added by: Franci Mangraviti
Abstract:

Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one right logic. A particular version of the view, what is sometimes called domain-specific logical pluralism, has it that the right logic and connectives depend somehow on the domain of use, or context of use, or the linguistic framework. This type of view has a problem with cross-framework communication, though: it seems that all such communication turns into merely verbal disputes. If two people approach the same domain with different logics as their guide, then they may be using different connectives, and hence talking past each other. In this situation, if we think we are having a conversation about “ ¬ A”, but are using different “ ¬ ”s, then we are not really talking about the same thing. The communication problem prevents legitimate disagreements about logic, which is a bad result. In this paper I articulate a possible solution to this problem, without giving up pluralism, which requires adopting a notion of metalinguistic negotiation, and allows people to communicate and disagree across domains/contexts/frameworks.

Comment : Fit for any philosophy of logic course touching on either logical disagreement or logical pluralism. Given the short length, it may be naturally paired with a paper attacking logical pluralism as a mere verbal dispute. There are no particular prerequisites, although familiarity with at least one kind of domain-specific pluralism is helpful for context.
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Marin, Sonia, et al.. A Pure View of Ecumenical Modalities
2021, In Logic, Language, Information, and Computation. [Online]. Switzerland: Springer International Publishing AG. pp. 388–407

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Added by: Sophie Nagler
Abstract:

Recent works about ecumenical systems, where connectives from classical and intuitionistic logics can co-exist in peace, warmed the discussion on proof systems for combining logics. This discussion has been extended to alethic modalities using Simpson’s meta-logical characterization: necessity is independent of the viewer, while possibility can be either intuitionistic or classical. In this work, we propose a pure, label free calculus for ecumenical modalities, nEK, where exactly one logical operator figures in introduction rules and every basic object of the calculus can be read as a formula in the language of the ecumenical modal logic EK. We prove that nEK is sound and complete w.r.t. the ecumenical birelational semantics and discuss fragments and extensions.

Comment : Suitable for a specialist class on logical pluralism (if focussed on ecumenical systems) or alethic modalities
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Pimentel, Elaine, Luiz Carlos Pereira, Valeria de Paiva. An ecumenical notion of entailment
2021, Pimentel, E. et al. (2021) An ecumenical notion of entailment. Synthese (Dordrecht). [Online] 198 (Suppl 22), 5391–5413.

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Added by: Sophie Nagler, Contributed by: Sophie Nagler
Abstract:

Much has been said about intuitionistic and classical logical systems since Gentzen’s seminal work. Recently, Prawitz and others have been discussing how to put together Gentzen’s systems for classical and intuitionistic logic in a single unified system. We call Prawitz’ proposal the Ecumenical System, following the terminology introduced by Pereira and Rodriguez. In this work we present an Ecumenical sequent calculus, as opposed to the original natural deduction version, and state some proof theoretical properties of the system. We reason that sequent calculi are more amenable to extensive investigation using the tools of proof theory, such as cut-elimination and rule invertibility, hence allowing a full analysis of the notion of Ecumenical entailment. We then present some extensions of the Ecumenical sequent system and show that interesting systems arise when restricting such calculi to specific fragments. This approach of a unified system enabling both classical and intuitionistic features sheds some light not only on the logics themselves, but also on their semantical interpretations as well as on the proof theoretical properties that can arise from combining logical systems.

Comment : A relatively light-touch and philosophically focussed introduction to ecumenical proof systems, i.e. sequent calculi that combine aspects of different logics. Suitable for discussion in a class on philosophy of logic class or on proof theory if more philosophically focussed. Also potentially usable for a class on logical pluralism.
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Russell, Gillian. Logical Pluralism
2013, Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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Added by: Giada Fratantonio and Berta Grimau
Abstract:
Description: Survey article on logical pluralism. The article is divided into three main parts: i) in the first one the author presents the main arguments for logical pluralism with respect to logical consequence; ii) in the second part, the author considers the relation between logical pluralism and Carnap's linguistic pluralism; iii) in the last section, the author considers further kinds of logical pluralism.
Comment : This article could be used as background or overview reading on logical pluralism. Suitable for a specialised, perhaps master's level course on logical pluralism or for a more general course on philosophy of logic touching on the topic.
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Russell, Gillian. Logical Nihilism: Could there be no Logic?
2018, Philosophical Issues, 28: 308-324

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Added by: Franci Mangraviti
Abstract:

Logical nihilism can be understood as the view that there are no laws of logic. This paper presents both a counterexample-based argument in favor of logical nihilism, and a way to resist it by using Lakatos' method of lemma incorporation. The price to pay is the loss of absolute generality.

Comment : The paper is appropriate for any course discussing the monism vs pluralism vs nihilism debate in logic (or maybe even focusing on varieties of logical nihilism). On a technical level it requires no more than an introduction to formal logic; some familiarity with monist and pluralist positions is helpful for context.
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Russell, Gillian. Logic isn’t Normative
2020, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):371-388

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Added by: Franci Mangraviti
Abstract:

Some writers object to logical pluralism on the grounds that logic is normative. The rough idea is that the relation of logical consequence has consequences for what we ought to think and how we ought to reason, so that pluralism about the consequence relation would result in an incoherent or unattractive pluralism about those things. In this paper I argue that logic isn’t normative. I distinguish three different ways in which a theory – such as a logical theory – can be entangled with the normative and argue that logic is only entangled in the weakest of these ways, one which requires it to have no normativity of its own. I use this view to show what is wrong with three different arguments for the conclusion that logic is normative.

Comment : Appropriate for any course touching on the normativity of logic question. Familiarity with the question and with logical pluralism is helpful, but not required. Could be paired with a defense of normativity for discussion.
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