Russell, Gillian. Logic isn’t Normative
2020, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):371-388
Added by: Franci Mangraviti
Some writers object to logical pluralism on the grounds that logic is normative. The rough idea is that the relation of logical consequence has consequences for what we ought to think and how we ought to reason, so that pluralism about the consequence relation would result in an incoherent or unattractive pluralism about those things. In this paper I argue that logic isn’t normative. I distinguish three diﬀerent ways in which a theory – such as a logical theory – can be entangled with the normative and argue that logic is only entangled in the weakest of these ways, one which requires it to have no normativity of its own. I use this view to show what is wrong with three diﬀerent arguments for the conclusion that logic is normative.
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Comment: Appropriate for any course touching on the normativity of logic question. Familiarity with the question and with logical pluralism is helpful, but not required. Could be paired with a defense of normativity for discussion.