Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one right logic. A particular version of the view, what is sometimes called domain-speciﬁc logical pluralism, has it that the right logic and connectives depend somehow on the domain of use, or context of use, or the linguistic framework. This type of view has a problem with cross-framework communication, though: it seems that all such communication turns into merely verbal disputes. If two people approach the same domain with different logics as their guide, then they may be using different connectives, and hence talking past each other. In this situation, if we think we are having a conversation about “ ¬ A”, but are using different “ ¬ ”s, then we are not really talking about the same thing. The communication problem prevents legitimate disagreements about logic, which is a bad result. In this paper I articulate a possible solution to this problem, without giving up pluralism, which requires adopting a notion of metalinguistic negotiation, and allows people to communicate and disagree across domains/contexts/frameworks.
Comment: Fit for any philosophy of logic course touching on either logical disagreement or logical pluralism. Given the short length, it may be naturally paired with a paper attacking logical pluralism as a mere verbal dispute. There are no particular prerequisites, although familiarity with at least one kind of domain-specific pluralism is helpful for context.