Langton, Rae & Lewis, David. Defining ‘Intrinsic’
1998, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58(2): 333-345.
Added by: Emily PaulSummary: Something could be round even if it were the only thing in the universe, unaccompanied by anything distinct from itself. Jaegwon Kim once suggested that we define an intrinsic property as one that can belong to something unaccompanied. Wrong: unaccompaniment itself is not intrinsic, yet it can belong to something unaccompanied. But there is a better Kim-style definition. Say that P is independent of accompaniment iff four different cases are possible: something accompanied may have P or lack P, something unaccompanied may have P or lack P. P is basic intrinsic iff (1) P and not-P are nondisjunctive and contingent, and (2) P is independent of accompaniment. Two things (actual or possible) are duplicates iff they have exactly the same basic intrinsic properties. P is intrinsic iff no two duplicates differ with respect to P.Export citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format
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Comment: This would be a suitable further reading for a unit on intrinsic and extrinsic properties (e.g. something that students could use for essay research). This is because it delves deeper into our concept of 'intrinsic', and students would first need to discuss a 'standard' definition as a core text and in the lecture.