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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Eline Gerritsen
Abstract: The decline of civility has increasingly become the subject of lament both in popular media and in daily conversation. Civility forestalls the potential unpleasantness of a life with other people. Without it, daily social exchanges can turn nasty and sometimes hazardous. Civility thus seems to be a basic virtue of social life. Moral philosophers, however, do not typically mention civility in their catalogues or examples of virtue. In what follows, I want to suggest that civility is a particularly interesting virtue for moral philosophers because giving an adequate account of the virtue of civility requires us to rethink the relationship between moral virtue and compliance with social norms.
Comment: This paper has a clear argumentative structure, gives many examples and does not require prior knowledge of the topic. It can be used on its own in a discussion of virtue ethics, e.g. to illustrate how you can argue that something is a virtue and how to differentiate virtues. It can also be used in a discussion of the relation between morality and social norms.
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Added by: Björn Freter
Abstract: It is commonly believed that it is difficult to be happy, and there is much reason for such a belief; but it would be much easier for men to be happy if reflecting on and planning conduct preceded action. One is carried along by circumstances and indulges in hopes that never yield half of what one expects. Finally, one clearly perceives the means to be happy only when age and self- imposed fetters put obstacles in one’s way.
Comment: This accessible 18th century text lays out a hedonistic theory of happiness with interesting parallels to Epicureanism.
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Added by: Clotilde TorregrossaPublisher's Note: In Realism and Imagination in Ethics, author Sabina Lovibond explores the non-cognitive theory of ethics along with its objections and the alternative of moral realism. Delving into expressivism, perception, moral sense theory, objectivity, and more, this book pulls from Wittgenstein, Hegel, Bradley, Nietzsche and others to explore the many facets of ethics and perception. The discussion analyzes the language, theories, and criteria surrounding ethical action, and describes the faults and fallacies of traditional schools of thought.
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Added by: Jimena ClavelPublisher’s Note:
The Space Between argues that empathy makes us less, not more, biased, contrary to what many seem to think. How? The fact is that a person sits in the center of a web of relationships with her body, her environment, her interests, and other people. These relationships shape how she thinks about herself and the world around her, what she needs, what she wants, and what she values. This is a perspective. We each have one. It represents the significance of the world to us. At the same time, it ignores what matters to others and how or what we are to them. Taking another person’s perspective is a way of reorienting that egocentric image so that it centers on someone else. Relying on empirical evidence from psychology and neuroscience, philosopher Heidi Maibom argues that although a perspective is unique to a person in some ways, it nonetheless possesses characteristics common to all perspectives. This commonality enables us to use our own first-person perspective to represent what matters to others, by imagining that we are at the center of their web of relationships. It also helps reveal who we actually are. It is this form of shifting perspectives that is at the core of impartiality, Maibom argues, and not the cold, scientific eye of so-called objectivity. Why? Because perspectives are ineliminable. A point of view is always a point of view, only an “objective” one leaves out many of the things that matter to human beings.Comment: This book discusses what empathy is, as well as its value in the face of a series of criticisms that have been advanced against it. It can be used in a course on moral psychology, philosophy of imagination, or philosophy of emotions to discuss empathy.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon FoktPublisher's Note: We say we can no longer trust our public services, institutions or the people who run them. The professionals we have to rely on - politicians, doctors, scientists, businessmen and many others - are treated with suspicion. Their word is doubted, their motives questioned. Whether real or perceived, this crisis of trust has a debilitating impact on society and democracy. Can trust be restored by making people and institutions more accountable? Or do complex systems of accountability and control themselves damage trust? Onora O'Neill challenges current approaches, investigates sources of deception in our society and re-examines questions of press freedom. 2002's Reith Lectures present a philosopher's view of trust and deception, and ask whether and how trust can be restored in a modern democracy.