Jackson, Jennifer. Truth, trust and medicine
Publisher: Truth, Trust and Medicine investigates the notion of trust and honesty in medicine, and questions whether honesty and openness are of equal importance in maintaining the trust necessary in doctor-patient relationships. Jackson begins with the premise that those in the medical profession have a basic duty to be worthy of the trust their patients place in them. Yet questions of the ethics of withholding information and consent and covert surveillance in care units persist. This book boldly addresses these questions which disturb our very modern notions of a patient’s autonomy, self-determination and informed consent.
Comment: This text is best used as a further reading in medical, professional and applied ethics courses. It is very detailed and thorough in its approach, but some chapters can be used as more introductory standalone texts. In particular, chapters 3 and 4 offer a good discussion on 'Why truthfulness matters' and 'What truthfulness requires', and chapters 2 and 9 look critically at lying or withholding information for the benefit of the patient.
Sreenivasan, Gopal. A Human Right to Health? Some Inconclusive Scepticism
Abstract: This paper offers four arguments against a moral human right to health, two denying that the right exists and two denying that it would be very useful (even if it did exist). One of my sceptical arguments is familiar, while the other is not.The unfamiliar argument is an argument from the nature of health. Given a realistic view of health production, a dilemma arises for the human right to health. Either a state’s moral duty to preserve the health of its citizens is not justifiably aligned in relation to the causes of health or it does not correlate with the human right to health. It follows that no one holds a justified moral human right to health against the state.Education and herd immunity against infectious disease both illustrate this dilemma. In the former case, the state’s moral duty correlates with the human right to health only if it demands too much from a cause of health; and in the latter, only if it demands nothing from a cause of health (that is, too little).
Comment: Useful in teaching on distributive justice in medicine or medical ethics in general. Can also be used as further reading in political and moral philosophy modules on human rights.