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Bennett, Karen. Proxy ”Actualism”
2006, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 129, No. 2, pp. 263-294.
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Added by: Christopher James Masterman
Abstract:

Bernard Linsky and Edward Zalta have recently proposed a new form of actualism. I characterize the general form of their view and the motivations behind it. I argue that it is not quite new – it bears interesting similarities to Alvin Plantinga’s view – and that it definitely isn’t actualist.

Comment: This article presupposes knowledge of actualism vs. possibilism debate, as well as some familiarity with quantified modal logic. It would be best to incorporate this text alongside Linsky and Zalta's 'In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic' (1994). It is a perfect text for a more advanced undergraduate course on modal metaphysics or a masters course, particularly if you were wanting to spend more than a single week on actualism vs. possibilism.

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Bennett, Karen. Two Axes of Actualism
2005, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 114, No. 3, pp. 297-326
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Added by: Christopher James Masterman
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Actualists routinely characterize their view by means of the slogan, “Everything is actual.” They say that there aren’t any things that exist but do not actually exist—there aren’t any “mere possibilia.” If there are any things that deserve the label ‘possible world’, they are just actually existing entities of some kind—maximally consistent sets of sentences, or maximal uninstantiated properties, or maximal possible states of affairs, or something along those lines. Possibilists, in contrast, do think that there are mere possibilia, that there are things that are not actual. They think that more exists than what actually exists. All I have done so far, though, is rephrase the slogan in various ways. To say that everything is actual is precisely to say that there are no things that do not actually exist, which is precisely to say that there are no mere possibilia, and which is also precisely to say that we cannot sep- arately quantify over what exists and what is actual. These claims all amount to the same thing. But what is that, exactly? What on earth does it mean to say that everything is actual, that there are no mere possibilia, and so on? What does the actualist slogan really come to? I think the literature is far from clear on this point, and that people work themselves into unnecessary muddles because of it. Indeed, certain confusions that I shall discuss in the first half of this article seem to be on the rise. It is high time to lay out the issues and the choice points as clearly as possible. There are two primary choices to be made; there are two axes along which versions of actualism can vary. One choice has to do with how to treat claims about things that merely could exist. The other choice has to do with the modal status of the view and of how we should think about the “actual” in actualism. I make no claim that the positions I will eventually endorse are star- tlingly new. I think that most people will agree with the decisions I make at both choice points and will in fact find some bits of this essay obvious. But not everyone agrees with my decisions, and it has been my experience that people differ remarkably about which bits they find obvious—a fact I find rather telling. My goal, then, is to show that the two axes are there and to clarify the consequences of the choices.

Comment: Although this is not intended primarily as an overview of actualism, it serves well to introduce the topic in a focused and clear way. It would be a good alternative to the SEP entry 'The Possible-Actualism Debate', for instance. It requires very little previous knowledge of actualism, possibilism, or modal metaphysics more broadly. It would be perfect for an introductory undergraduate course on modal metaphysics, or a broader metaphysics course which included metaphysics of modality.

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Einheuser, Iris. Inner and Outer Truth
2012, The Philosophers' Imprint, Vol. 12, pp. 1-22
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Added by: Christopher James Masterman
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Kit Fine and Robert Adams have independently introduced a distinction between two ways in which a proposition might be true with respect to a world. A proposition is true at a world if it correctly represents the world. A proposition is true in a world, if it exists in that world and correctly represents it. In this paper, I clarify this distinction between outer and inner truth, defend it against recent charges of unintelligibly and argue that outer truth tracks counterfactual possibility while inner truth tracks counter-actual possibility. This connection allows us to clarify the relationship between possibility, possible actuality and the thesis of serious actualism, which is the thesis that nothing could have had a property without existing. I show that this undermines serious actualists' scruples against reading sentences like `Even if Socrates had not existed, he might have' as expressing true and genuinely de re propositions about Socrates. More generally, the connection I draw provides the serious actualist with a justification for treating actually existing but contingent objects differently from how he treats merely possible objects

Comment: This text would be perfect for an advanced undergraduate or masters course on modal metaphysics and/or modal logic. It requires previous knowledge of actualism vs. possibilism debate, the literature on singular propositions, and possible worlds, as well as a familiarity with quantified modal logic. It works as a good replacement for Adams's Actualism and Thisness (1981), covering many of issues Adams covers often more accessibly.

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Yagisawa, Takashi. Possible Objects
2005, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E.N. Zalta. Online: Stanford University.
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Added by: Nick Novelli
Abstract: Deep theorizing about possibility requires theorizing about possible objects. One popular approach regards the notion of a possible object as intertwined with the notion of a possible world. There are two widely discussed types of theory concerning the nature of possible worlds: actualist representationism and possibilist realism. They support two opposing views about possible objects. Examination of the ways in which they do so reveals difficulties on both sides. There is another popular approach, which has been influenced by the philosophy of Alexius Meinong. The Meinongian approach is relevant to theorizing about possible objects because it attempts to construct a general theory of objects other than ordinary concrete existing objects. Independently of the debate about the nature of possible worlds or about Meinongianism, it is not always as straightforward as it may at first appear to determine whether putative possible objects are indeed possible. Another category of object similar to that of a possible object is the category of a fictional object. Although initially attractive, the idea that fictional objects are possible objects should not be accepted blindly. An important instance of theoretical usefulness of possible objects is their central role in the validation of two controversial theorems of a simple quantified modal logic.

Comment: A good introduction to the different positions on possible objects, including their impact on modal logic. Would be a good starting point for a discussion of these issues in a metaphysics course, or as an introduction to these positions for an ontology of art/fiction course.

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