Bennett, Karen. Proxy ”Actualism”
2006, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 129, No. 2, pp. 263-294.
Added by: Christopher James Masterman
Bernard Linsky and Edward Zalta have recently proposed a new form of actualism. I characterize the general form of their view and the motivations behind it. I argue that it is not quite new – it bears interesting similarities to Alvin Plantinga’s view – and that it definitely isn’t actualist.
Export citation in BibTeX format
Export text citation
View this text on PhilPapers
Export citation in Reference Manager format
Export citation in EndNote format
Export citation in Zotero format
Comment: This article presupposes knowledge of actualism vs. possibilism debate, as well as some familiarity with quantified modal logic. It would be best to incorporate this text alongside Linsky and Zalta's 'In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic' (1994). It is a perfect text for a more advanced undergraduate course on modal metaphysics or a masters course, particularly if you were wanting to spend more than a single week on actualism vs. possibilism.