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Anscombe, G. Elizabeth M., , . The First Person
1981, In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language. Oxford University Press 45-65.
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Added by: Giada Fratantonio, Contributed by:

Summary: In this paper, the author argues that the “I” that we often use to refer to ourselves, actually does not refer to an object, it does not refer to a non-physical mind, and it does not even refer to a physical body. Ascombe’s conclusion will be that the “I” fails to be a referring expression at all.

Comment: This can be used as secondary reading in a postgraduate course on philosophy of language. Otherwise, it can also be used as primary reading for a postgraduate course on philosophy of language focusing on indexicals.

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Hall, Alison, , . Free enrichment or hidden indexicals?
2008, Mind and Language 23 (4):426-456.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Thomas Hodgson

Abstract: A current debate in semantics and pragmatics is whether all contextual effects on truth-conditional content can be traced to logical form, or ‘unarticulated constituents’ can be supplied by the pragmatic process of free enrichment. In this paper, I defend the latter position. The main objection to this view is that free enrichment appears to overgenerate, not predicting where context cannot affect truth conditions, so that a systematic account is unlikely (Stanley, 2002a). I first examine the semantic alternative proposed by Stanley and others, which assumes extensive hidden structure acting as a linguistic trigger for pragmatic processes, so that all truth-conditional effects of context turn out to be instances of saturation. I show that there are cases of optional pragmatic contributions to the proposition expressed that cannot plausibly be accounted for in this way, and that advocates of this approach will therefore also have to appeal to free enrichment. The final section starts to address the question of how free enrichment is constrained: I argue that it involves only local development or adjustment of parts of logical form, any global developments being excluded by the requirement for the proposition expressed to provide an inferential warrant for the intended implications of the utterance.

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