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Karlström, Anna, , . Authenticity
2015, In Heritage Keywords, edited by Kathryn Lafrenz Samuels and Trinidad Rico. USA: University Press of Colorado.
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Added by: Erich Hatala Matthes, Contributed by:

Summary: This text offers a brief overview of some approaches to the concept of authenticity in international heritage management. Focusing on a case study of Buddhist sites in Laos, Karlström then argues that culturally specific understandings of authenticity pose problems for the universal application of a preservationist approach to heritage management. It concludes with some open-ended questions about how we should pursue alternative approaches.

Comment: This is a good text for instructors who want to discuses authenticity in the context of a reasonably in-depth look at a particular non-Western cultural context. While the article itself is light on conceptual/ philosophical work, if offers useful material for philosophical analysis and discussion. It would pair well with the theoretical framework provided in Yuriko Saito’s “Why Restore Works of Art?”, or the alternative approach to authenticity captured in Carolyn Korsmeyer’s “Real Old Things.”

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Kleinschmidt, Shieva, , . Many-One Identity and the Trinity
2012, Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion (J. Kvanvig (ed.)) Vol. 4: 84-96.
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Added by: Emily Paul, Contributed by:

Abstract: Trinitarians claim there are three Divine persons each of which is God, and yet there is only one God. It seems they want three to equal one. It just so happens, some metaphysicians claim exactly that. They accept Composition as Identity: each fusion is identical to the plurality of its parts. I evaluate Composition as Identity’s application to the doctrine of the Trinity, and argue that it fails to give the Trinitairan any options he or she didn’t already have. Further, while Composition as Identity does give us a new way to assert polytheism, its help requires us to endorse a claim that undercuts any Trinitarian motivation for the view.

Comment: An excellent paper for an advanced UG/Masters course on the metaphysics of theism, as this draws upon metaphysical issues (composition) as well as issues in the philosophy of religion. Provides a great overview of problems facing an orthodox metaphysics of the trinity. NB: this is of course focused on metaphysics of Christianity, so if for a general metaphysics of theism course, it would be important to include metaphysical issues facing other religions.

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Lewis, David, , Stephanie Lewis. Holes
1970,
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by:

Abstract: Argle. I believe in nothing but concrete material objects. Bargle. There are many of your opinions I applaud; but one of your less pleasing characteristics is your fondness for the doctrines of nominalism and materialism. Every time you get started on any such topic, I know we are in for a long argument. Where shall we start this time: numbers, colors, lengths, sets, force-fields, sensations, or what? Argle. Fictions alll I’ve thought hard about every one of them. Bargle. A long evening’s work. Before we start, let me find you a snack. Will you have some crackers and cheese? Argle. Thank you. What spendid Gruyrrel Bargle. You know, there are remarkably many holes in this piece. Argle. There are. Bargle. Got you!

Comment: [This is a stub entry. Please add your comments to help us expand it]

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Megan Wallace, , . Composition as Identity
2011, Philosophy Compass 6 (11): 804–827
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Added by: Björn Freter, Contributed by: Eric de Araujo

Abstract: Many of us think that ordinary objects – such as tables and chairs – exist. We also think that ordinary objects have parts: my chair has a seat and some legs as parts, for example. But once we are committed to the thesis that ordinary objects are composed of parts, we then open ourselves up to a whole host of philosophical problems, most of which center on what exactly the composition relation is. Composition as Identity is the view that the composition relation is the identity relation. While such a view has some advantages, there are many arguments against it. In this essay, I will briefly canvass three different varieties of Composition as Identity, and suggest why one of them should be preferred over the others. Then I will outline several versions of the most common objection against CI. I will suggest how a CI theorist can respond to these charges by maintaining that some of the arguments are invalid.

Comment: This introduction (in two articles) to the Composition as Identity debate can either stand alone among a collection of topics in metaphysics, or as an entry into more readings. It presents a range of Composition as Identity positions and helpfully organizes objections to the view.

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Shumener, Erica, , . The Metaphysics of Identity: Is Identity Fundamental?
2017, Philosophy Compass 12 (1)
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Added by: Bjoern Freter, Contributed by: Zach Thornton

Abstract: Identity and distinctness facts are ones like “The Eiffel Tower is identical to the Eiffel Tower,” and “The Eiffel Tower is distinct from the Louvre.” This paper concerns one question in the metaphysics of identity: Are identity and distinctness facts metaphysically fundamental or are they nonfundamental? I provide an overview of answers to this question.

Comment: This is an introductory text on the topic of grounding identity and distinctness facts. This topic is connected to the literature on Leibniz’s Law and the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. This paper provides an overview of arguments for and against the view that identity and distinctness facts are fundamental, ultimately favoring the view that they are not.

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Thomasson, Amie L., , . The controversy over the existence of ordinary objects
2010, Philosophy Compass 5 (7):591-601.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Naomi Osorio-Kupferblum

Abstract: The basic philosophical controversy regarding ordinary objects is: Do tables and chairs, sticks and stones, exist? This paper aims to do two things: first, to explain why how this can be a controversy at all, and second, to explain why this controversy has arisen so late in the history of philosophy. Section 1 begins by discussing why the ‘obvious’ sensory evidence in favor of ordinary objects is not taken to be decisive. It goes on to review the standard arguments against the existence of ordinary objects – including those based on problems with causal redundancy, parsimony, co-location, sorites arguments, and the special composition question. Section 2 goes on to address what it is about the contemporary approach to metaphysics that invites and sustains this kind of controversy, and helps make evident why debates about ordinary objects lead so readily to debates in metametaphysics about the nature of metaphysics itself.

Comment: This is an excellent overview of arguments for and against the existence of ordinary objects.
[This is a stub entry. Please add your comments to help us expand it]

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Yuriko Saito, , . Why Restore Works of Art?
1985, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 44(2):141-151.
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Added by: Erich Hatala Matthes, Contributed by:

Summary: Saito examines arguments concerning why artworks should be restored, which are couched in terms of a debate between “purist” and “integral/conservator” restoration. Purists believe artworks should only be cleaned, emphasizing the integrity of the material object, whereas integral restorationists are open to adding material to the work, emphasizing the integrity of the original aesthetic experience. Rather than embracing a particular side in this debate, Saito’s discussion reveals how cultural/historical considerations can be as important to the debate over restoration as aesthetic considerations.

Comment: This article offers a useful philosophical framework for thinking about the relationship among preservation, restoration, and authenticity. Using it alongside the following readings might be particularly good in inspiring further discussion: Coleman, Elizabeth Burns. “Aboriginal Painting: Identity and Authenticity.” Jeffers, Chike. “The Ethics and Politics of Cultural Preservation.” Young, James O. “Art, Authenticity and Appropriation.” Korsmeyer, Carolyn. “Real Old Things.” Karlström, Anna. “Authenticity.”

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