Figure: Katherine Hawley
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Hawley, Katherine. Science as a guide to Metaphysics?
2006, Synthese 149(3): 451-470.

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Added by: Laura Jimenez
Abstract: Analytic metaphysics is in resurgence; there is renewed and vigorous interest in topics such as time, causation, persistence, parthood and possible worlds. Those who share this interest often pay lip-service to the idea that metaphysics should be informed by modern science; some take this duty very seriously. But there is also a widespread suspicion that science cannot really contribute to metaphysics, and that scientific findings grossly underdetermine metaphysical claims. Can science guide metaphysics? The author links this question to the the choice between Radical Pessimism on the one hand and either Moderate Pessimism or Optimism on the other.
Comment: This paper investigates the relevance of science to metaphysics and could be used as a reading for postgraduate courses in philosophy of science (or metaphysics). It is an especially useful resource for courses on the metaphysics of time and contains a nice discussion of the relationship between presentism and special relativity.
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Hawley, Katherine. How Things Persist
2004, Oxford University Press.
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Added by: Christopher Masterman
Publisher’s Note:

How do things persist? Are material objects spread out through time just as they are spread out through space? Or is temporal persistence quite different from spatial extension? This key question lies at the heart of any metaphysical exploration of the material world, and it plays a crucial part in debates about personal identity and survival. This book explores and compares three theories of persistence — endurance, perdurance, and stage theories — investigating the ways in which they attempt to account for the world around us. Having provided valuable clarification of its two main rivals, the book concludes by advocating stage theory. Such a basic issue about the nature of the physical world naturally has close ties with other central philosophical problems. This book includes discussions of change and parthood, of how we refer to material objects at different times, of the doctrine of Humean supervenience, and of the modal features of material things. In particular, it contains new accounts of the nature of worldly vagueness, and of what binds material things together over time, distinguishing the career of a natural object from an arbitrary sequence of events. Each chapter concludes with a reflection about the impact of these metaphysical debates upon questions about our personal identity and survival.

Comment: A modern classic, perfect for any introductory class on metaphysics which covers the metaphysics of material objects, particularly the nature change, their mereology, the possibility of vague objects, and modal properties of objects.
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Hawley, Katherine. Sameness and Difference
2001, In Hawley, K., How Things Persist. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa
Abstract:

In the center of stability is how things persist amidst varying state of changes from the casual process of daily routine and endurance of an object specifically explained in the example of a book still intact despite being spilled by coffee. This chapter considers the philosopher David Lewis's attack on properties as relations to times in his book ‘On the Plurality of Worlds’. Temporary processing of features is considered a phase on the ideal and it only shows that people change just as materials due over the course of time by refecting on an individual's differing state of mind in different moments. The immateriality of people accounts for the inescapable changes and theories of persistence may have something to do with the decision to change.

Comment: The first part of this chapter provides some background on the distinction between endurantism and perdurantism, and as such could be used an introductory class on the metaphysics of identity and change. However, the rest of the chapter develops a more technical argument against Lewis' objections to the view that properties are relations to times, and that instead properties such as shape are obviously intrinsic. As such, this text could be read alongside excerpts from Lewis' On the Plurality of Worlds. It can also be read for its defence of adverbialism, in a more advanced seminar.
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