Adeel, M. Ashraf. Evolution of Quine’s Thinking on the Thesis of Underdetermination and Scott Soames’s Accusation of Paradoxicality
2015, HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 5(1): 56-69.
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Added by: Laura JimenezAbstract: Scott Soames argues that interpreted in the light of Quine's holistic verificationism, Quine's thesis of underdetermination leads to a contradiction. It is contended here that if we pay proper attention to the evolution of Quine's thinking on the subject, particularly his criterion of theory individuation, Quine's thesis of underdetermination escapes Soames' charge of paradoxicality.Comment: Good as a secondary reading for those who are confident with Quine's thesis of underdetermination. Recomended for postgraduate courses in philosophy of science.Hesse, Mary. The Hunt for Scientific Reason1980, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980: 3-22.
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Added by: Laura JimenezAbstract: The thesis of underdetermination of theory by evidence has led to an opposition between realism and relationism in philosophy of science. Various forms of the thesis are examined, and it is concluded that it is true in at least a weak form that brings realism into doubt. Realists therefore need, among other things, a theory of degrees of confirmation to support rational theory choice. Recent such theories due to Glymour and Friedman are examined, and it is argued that their criterion of "unification" for good theories is better formulated in Bayesian terms. Bayesian confirmation does, however, have consequences that tell against realism. It is concluded that the prospects are dim for scientific realism as usually understood.Comment: Good article to study in depth the concepts of realism, underdetermination, confirmation and Bayesian theory. It will be most useful for postgraduate students in philosophy of science.Ivanova, Milena. Pierre Duhem’s Good Sense as a Guide to Theory Choice2010, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science part A 41(1): 58-64.
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Added by: Laura Jimenez, Contributed by: Ivanova, MilenaAbstract: This paper examines Duhem's concept of good sense as an attempt to support a non rule-governed account of rationality in theory choice. Faced with the underdetermination of theory by evidence thesis and the continuity thesis, Duhem tried to account for the ability of scientists to choose theories that continuously grow to a natural classification. The author examines the concept of good sense and the problems that stem from it. The paper presents a recent attempt by David Stump to link good sense to virtue epistemology. It is argued that even though this approach can be useful for the better comprehension of the concept of good sense, there are some substantial differences between virtue epistemologists and Duhem. The athor proposes a possible way to interpret the concept of good sense, which overcomes the noted problems and fits better with Duhem's views on scientific method and motivation in developing the concept of good sense.Comment: Interesting article that could serve as further reading in both epistemology courses and philosophy of science classes. Really good as an in-depth study of Duhem's views on scientific method. Recommendable for postgraduates or senior undergraduates.Tulodziecki, Dana. Underdetermination, methodological practices, and realism2013, Synthese 190(17): 3731-3750.
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Added by: Laura JimenezAbstract: In this paper, the author argues (i) that there are certain methodological practices that are epistemically significant, and (ii) that we can test for the success of these practices empirically by examining case-studies in the history of science. Analysing a particular episode from the history of medicine, she explains how this can help us resolve specific cases of underdetermination. She concludes that, while the anti-realist is (more or less legitimately) able to construct underdetermination scenarios on a case-by-case basis, he will have to abandon the strategy of using algorithms to do so, thus losing the much needed guarantee that there will always be rival cases of the required kind.Comment: Using the case study of the origin and pathology of cholera, this article argues for an expanded conception of epistemic criteria besides the empirical evidence. A really useful reading for studying realism and under-determination. It is suitable for both postgraduate and undergraduate courses in philosophy of science.Can’t find it?Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!
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