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Adrian Piper. Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume II: A Kantian Conception
2008 2008, APRA Foundation Berlin
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Added by: Sara Peppe
Publisher’s Note:

Adrian Piper argues that the Humean conception can be made to work only if it is placed in the context of a wider and genuinely universal conception of the self, whose origins are to be found in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. This conception comprises the basic canons of classical logic, which provide both a model of motivation and a model of rationality. These supply necessary conditions both for the coherence and integrity of the self and also for unified agency. The Kantian conception solves certain intractable problems in decision theory by integrating it into classical predicate logic, and provides answers to longstanding controversies in metaethics concerning moral motivation, rational final ends, and moral justification that the Humean conception engenders. In addition, it sheds light on certain kinds of moral behavior – for example, the whistleblower – that the Humean conception is at a loss to explain.

Comment: Best discussed alongside Kantian and Humean texts. In particular, the work considered requires prior knowledge of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Hume's conception of the self.

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Adrian Piper. Rationality and the Structure of the Self: Reply to Guyer and Bradley
2018 2018, Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin
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Abstract:

These two sets of comments on Volume II of my Rationality and the Structure of the Self (henceforth RSS II), from the two leading philosophers in their respective areas of specialization – Kant scholarship and decision theory – are the very first to appear from any quarter within academic philosophy. My gratitude to Paul Guyer and Richard Bradley for the seriousness, thoroughness and respect with which they treat RSS – and my admiration for their readiness to acknowledge the existence of books that in fact have been in wide circulation for a long time – know no bounds. Their comments and criticisms, though sharp, are always constructive. I take my role here to be to incorporate those comments and criticisms where they hit the mark, and, where they go astray, to further articulate my view to meet the standard of clarity they demand. While Guyer’s and Bradley’s comments both pertain to the substantive view elaborated in RSS II, my responses often refer back to the critical background it presupposes that I offer in RSS Volume I: The Humean Conception (henceforth RSS I). I address Guyer’s more exegetically oriented remarks first, in order to provide a general philosophical framework within which to then discuss the decision-theoretic core of the project that is the focus of Bradley’s comments.

Comment: This text offers the responses of the author to critiques of her work Rationality and the Structure of the Self (Volume II). To be used to deepen the ideas treated in the second volume of Rationality and the Structure of the Self and have a clearer picture of this work, including potential critiques and how to address them.

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Adrian Piper. The Money Pump Is Necessarily Diachronic
2014 2014, Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin/Philosophy
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In “The Irrelevance of the Diachronic Money-Pump Argument for Acyclicity,” The Journal of Philosophy CX, 8 (August 2013), 460-464, Johan E. Gustafsson contends that if Davidson, McKinsey and Suppes’ diachronic money-pump argument in their "Outlines of a Formal Theory of Value, I," Philosophy of Science 22 (1955), 140-160 is valid, so is the synchronic argument Gustafsson himself offers. He concludes that the latter renders irrelevant diachronic choice considerations in general, and the two best-known diachronic solutions to the money pump problem in particular. I argue here that this reasoning is incorrect, and that Gustafsson’s synchronic argument is faulty on independent grounds. Specifically, it is based on a false analogy between the derivation of a synchronic ordinal ranking from a transitive series of pairwise comparisons, and the putative derivation of such a ranking from an intransitive series. The latter is not possible under the assumption of revealed preference theory, and is highly improbable even if that assumption is rejected. Moreover, Gustafsson’s argument raises issues of fidelity to the historical texts that must be addressed. I conclude that the money pump, and cyclical choice more generally, are necessarily diachronic; and therefore that the two best-known diachronic solutions to the money pump problem remain relevant.

Comment: Necessarily requires prior knowlege of the money-pump argument and Johan E. Gustafsson's article considered in the work.

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Adrian Piper. Xenophobia and Kantian Rationalism
1993 1993, Philosophical Forum 24 (1-3):188-232
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Added by: Sara Peppe
Abstract:

The purpose of this discussion is twofold. First, I want to shed some light on Kant's concept of personhood as rational agency, by situating it in the context of the first Critique's conception of the self as defined by its rational dispositions. I hope to suggest that this concept of personhood cannot be simply grafted onto an essentially Humean conception of the self that is inherently inimical to it, as I believe Rawls, Gewirth, and others have tried to do. Instead I will try to show how deeply embedded this concept of personhood is in Kant's conception of the self as rationally unified consciousness. Second, I want to deploy this embedded concept of personhood as the basis for an analysis of the phenomenon of xenophobia.

Comment: Requires prior knowledge of the works written by Kant, especially the first Critique and the concept of personhood. To be used after having developed knowledge on the above mentioned philosophical themes.

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Alcoff, Linda. Is the Feminist Critique of Reason Rational?
1995 1995, Philosophical Topics, 23 (2): 1-26
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Added by: Franci Mangraviti and Viviane Fairbank
Abstract: Recent criticism of feminist philosophy poses a dilemma. Feminism is taken to be a substantive set of empirical claims and political commitments, whereas philosophy is taken to be a discipline of thought organized by the pursuit of truth, but uncommitted to any particular truth. This paper responds to this dilemma, and defends the project of feminist philosophy.The first task toward understanding the feminist critique of reason, Alcoff argues, is to historically situate it within the rather long tradition of critiquing reason that has existed within the mainstream of philosophy itself.

Comment: available in this Blueprint

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Buchak, Lara. Can it be Rational to Have Faith?
2012 2012, in Jake Chandler & Victoria Harrison (eds.) Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press: 225-247.
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Added by: Emily Paul
Abstract: This paper provides an account of what it is to have faith in a proposition p, in both religious and mundane contexts. It is argued that faith in p doesn't require adopting a degree of belief that isn't supported by one's evidence but rather it requires terminating one's search for further evidence and acting on the supposition that p. It is then shown, by responding to a formal result due to I.J. Good, that doing so can be rational in a number of circumstances. If expected utility theory is the correct account of practical rationality, then having faith can be both epistemically and practically rational if the costs associated with gathering further evidence or postponing the decision are high. If a more permissive framework is adopted, then having faith can be rational even when there are no costs associated with gathering further evidence

Comment: A great paper for an intermediate philosophy of religion course, especially because many arguments from students are to the contrary: it's irrational to believe in God when we don't have satisfactory evidence. It could be nice to set up a debate centering around this paper. It could work particularly well towards the end of the course.

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De Toffoli, Silvia. Groundwork for a Fallibilist Account of Mathematics
2021 2021, The Philosophical Quarterly, 71(4).
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Added by: Fenner Stanley Tanswell
Abstract: According to the received view, genuine mathematical justification derives from proofs. In this article, I challenge this view. First, I sketch a notion of proof that cannot be reduced to deduction from the axioms but rather is tailored to human agents. Secondly, I identify a tension between the received view and mathematical practice. In some cases, cognitively diligent, well-functioning mathematicians go wrong. In these cases, it is plausible to think that proof sets the bar for justification too high. I then propose a fallibilist account of mathematical justification. I show that the main function of mathematical justification is to guarantee that the mathematical community can correct the errors that inevitably arise from our fallible practices.

Comment (from this Blueprint): De Toffoli makes a strong case for the importance of mathematical practice in addressing important issues about mathematics. In this paper, she looks at proof and justification, with an emphasis on the fact that mathematicians are fallible. With this in mind, she argues that there are circumstances under which we can have mathematical justification, despite a possibility of being wrong. This paper touches on many cases and questions that will reappear later across the Blueprint, such as collaboration, testimony, computer proofs, and diagrams.

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Elgin, Z. Catherine. Non-foundationalist epistemology: Holism, coherence, and tenability
2005 2005, in Steup, Matthias and Sosa, Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Boston: Blackwell, 2005, pp. 156-167
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Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Summary: In this paper, the author argues that epistemic justification is explained out by coherentism. Although coherence is not the ground of truth, it is the source of epistemic justification.

Comment: This can be used as secondary/further reading for a postgraduate course in epistemology, focusing on the foundationalism/coherentism debate on epistemic justification.

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Goodship, Laura. On Dialethism
1996 1996, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):153 – 161
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Added by: Franci Mangraviti
Abstract:

The paper discusses two problems with Graham Priest's version of dialetheism: the thesis that one cannot be rationally obliged to both accept and reject something, and the use of a Contraction-less conditional in dealing with Curry paradoxes. Some solutions are suggested.

Comment: A useful supplement to any discussion of dialetheism, as the origin of what is now known in the literature as the "Goodship project". Some familiarity with Priest's account is required for context.

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Howard-Snyder, Frances. Divine Freedom
2017 2017, Topoi 36(4): 651-656.
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Abstract: In 'Divine Freedom,' I argue that morally significant incompatibilist freedom is a great good. So God possesses morally incompatibilist freedom. So, God can do wrong or at least can do worse than the best action He can do. So, God is not essentially morally perfect. After careful consideration of numerous objections, I conclude that this argument is undefeated.

Comment: Useful for a unit on divine freedom with an intermediate level Philosophy of Religion course - would suit as the primary reading for this, as it gives a great overview and is relatively short, and also presents the central arguments in the debate over divine freedom: the alleged tension between incompatibilist freedom, and the thought that God always chooses the best possible action. It could be good to spend a whole seminar discussing how this tension is created, why it's problematic, and whether it can be resolved.

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Jenkins, Carrie. Entitlement and rationality
2007 2007, Synthese 157 (1): 25-45.
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Added by: Jie Gao
Abstract: This paper takes the form of a critical discussion of Crispin Wright's notion of entitlement of cognitive project. I examine various strategies for defending the claim that entitlement can make acceptance of a proposition epistemically rational, including one which appeals to epistemic consequentialism. Ultimately, I argue, none of these strategies is successful, but the attempt to isolate points of disagreement with Wright issues in some positive proposals as to how an epistemic consequentialist should characterize epistemic rationality.

Comment: This paper critically examines Wright's notion of entitlement, therefore it is natural to use it as a further disucssion material on Wright's paper (On epistemic entitlement: Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free?), 2004). Suitable for a senior undergraduate course on epistemology for topics on entitlement and epistemic rationality.

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Kochiras, Hilarie. Belief Contexts and Epistemic possibility
2006 2006, Principia 10(1): 1-20.
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Added by: Laura Jimenez
Abstract: Although epistemic possibility figures in several debates, those debates have had relatively little contact with one another. G. E. Moore focused squarely upon analyzing epistemic uses of the phrase, 'It's possible that p', and in doing so he made two fundamental assumptions. First, he assumed that epistemic possibility statements always express the epistemic position of a community, as opposed to that of an individual speaker. Second, he assumed that all epistemic uses of 'It's possible that p' are analyzable in terms of knowledge, not belief. A number of later theorists, including Keith DeRose, provide alternative accounts of epistemic possibility, while retaining Moore's two assumptions. Neither assumption has been explicitly challenged, but Jaakko Hintikka's analysis provides a basis for doing so. Drawing upon Hintikka's analysis, I argue that some epistemic possibility statements express only the speaker's individual epistemic state, and that contra DeRose, they are not degenerate community statements but a class in their own right. I further argue that some linguistic contexts are belief- rather than knowledge-based, and in such contexts, what is possible for a speaker depends not upon what she knows, but upon what she believes.

Comment: Useful as a further reading for postgraduate courses in epistemology. Previous knowledge of the Moorean account and David Lewis' work on shifting contexts is required for a better understanding of this paper.

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Longino, Helen. Circles of Reason: Some Feminist Reflections on Reason and Rationality
2005 2005, Episteme, 2 (1): 79-88
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Added by: Franci Mangraviti and Viviane Fairbank
Abstract: Rationality and reason are topics so fraught for feminists that any useful reflection on them requires some prior exploration of the difficulties they have caused. One of those difficulties for feminists and, I suspect, for others in the margins of modernity, is the rhetoric of reason - the ways reason is bandied about as a qualification differentially bestowed on different types of person. Rhetorically, it functions in different ways depending on whether it is being denied or affirmed. In this paper, I want to explore these rhetorics of reason as they are considered in the work of two feminist philosophers. I shall draw on their work for some suggestions about how to think about rationality, and begin to use those suggestions to develop a constructive account that withstands the rhetorical temptations.

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Nelkin, Dana. The lottery paradox, knowledge and rationality
2000 2000, Philosophical Review: 109 (3): 373-409.
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Added by: Jie Gao
Summary: The knowledge version of the paradox arises because it appears that we know our lottery ticket (which is not relevantly different from any other) will lose, but we know that one of the tickets sold will win. The rationality version of the paradox arises because it appears that it is rational to believe of each single ticket in, say, a million-ticket lottery that it will not win, and that it is simultaneously rational to believe that one such ticket will win. It seems, then, that we are committed to attributing two rational beliefs to a single agent at a single time, beliefs that, together with a few background assumptions, are inconsistent and can be seen by the agent to be so. This has seemed to many to be a paradoxical result: an agent in possession of two rational beliefs that she sees to be inconsistent. In my paper, I offer a novel solution to the paradox in both its rationality and knowledge versions that emphasizes a special feature of the lottery case, namely, the statistical nature of the evidence available to the agent. On my view, it is neither true that one knows nor that it is rational to believe that a particular ticket will lose. While this might seem surprising at first, it has a natural explanation and lacks the serious disadvantages of competing solutions.

Comment: The lottery paradox is one of the most central paradox in epistemology and philosophy of probability. Nelkin's paper is a milestone in the literature on this topic after which discussions on the lottery paradox flourish. It is thus a must-have introductory paper on the lottery paradox for teachings on paradoxes of belief, justification theory, rationality, etc.

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Nussbaum, Martha. Twelve Feminists and Philosophy
2012 2012, In Philosophical Interventions: Reviews 1986-2011. New York
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Added by: Franci Mangraviti and Viviane Fairbank
Abstract: This chapter reviews the book A Mind of One's Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity (1993), by Louise B. Antony and Charlotte Witt. The appeal to reason and objectivity amounts to a request that the observer refuses to be intimidated by habit, and look for cogent arguments based on evidence that has been carefully sifted for bias. In our own society the arguments of feminists make such appeals to reason and objectivity all the time, and in a manner that closely resembles Platonic arguments. And yet today reason and objectivity are on the defensive in some feminist circles. We are frequently told that reason and objectivity are norms created by "patriarchy," and that to appeal to them is to succumb to the blandishments of the oppressor. We are told that systems of reasoning are systems of domination, and that to adopt the traditional one is thus to be co-opted. A Mind of One's Own is a collection of essays by women who are prominent in philosophy today and who wish to confront recent feminist criticisms of philosophy. Most of the contributors are under fifty and widely respected; most grew up with strong political ties to feminism.

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