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Summary: The use of models to scientifically represent and study reality is widely recognized with good reasons as indispensable for the practice of science. Because models, unlikely pure verbal representation, are justifiably regarded as vehicles of representation that are not truth-apt, philosophical questions are natural raised concerning the nature of such vehicles and how they represent. A sizeable literature generated in recent years explores the possibility that ”scientific models are works of fiction”. Idealization and other similar strategies are often taken to be the means by which models are made. Arguing against this last claim, the thesis of this article is that most models in science are not fictional. The author argues against the idea that idealization is the means by which models of typically unobservable systems or mechanisms are made.
Comment: Interesting paper about scientific modeling and scientific representation. Useful for undergraduates and postgraduates courses in philosophy of science.Export citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format
Chuang, Liu. Models, fiction and fictional models
2014, In Guichun Guo, Chuang Liu (eds.) Scientific Explanation and Methodology in Science, World Scientific Publishing Co.