In Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, and elsewhere, Wittgenstein made some general statements about mathematical proof which can only be described as paradoxical. What he says is directed to proofs for which there is no general method of solution such as there is for statements of the form a x b = c where a simple calculation is sufficient. His concern is with propositions for which one cannot in advance of proof describe any procedure which will demonstrate them… In an earlier study,’ ‘Proof and the Theorem Proved’, I singled out a group of propositions for which his account of proof seemed correct, and not paradoxical…. But I did not succeed in making his account of deductions of connections between established concepts paradox-free. I should like to return to his account as applied to such demonstrations, with the aim of explaining what justification there is for it, and what his account comes to.
Proof and the Theorem Proved
There is something curiously opaque about Wittgenstein’s assertions concerning the connection between proof of a proposition p, sense of the sentence ” p “, and understanding ” p “. The difficulties inherent in his account are apparent, and he has
himself mentioned them, while leaving their resolution obscure. I shall now detail them, so that it will be clear what difficulties must be got round and what clarification is required.
Perennial Idealism: A Mystical Solution to the Mind-Body Problem
Each well-known proposed solution to the mind-body problem encounters an impasse. These take the form of an explanatory gap, such as the one between mental and physical, or between micro-subjects and macro-subject. The dialectical pressure to bridge these gaps is generating positions in which consciousness is becoming increasingly foundational. The most recent of these, cosmopsychism, typically casts the entire cosmos as a perspectival subject whose mind grounds those of more limited subjects like ourselves. I review the dialectic from materialism and dualism through to panpsychism, suggesting that explanatory gaps in the latter stem from assuming foundational consciousness to be perspectival. Its renunciation may yield the notion of an aperspectival, universal, “non-dual” consciousness that grounds all manifestation and is unstructured by subject, object or any differentia. Not only is such consciousness suggestive of a natural successor to cosmopsychism, but it has also been reported to be the direct experience of mystics who claim to have transcended the individual perspective. Their purported insight — that our aperspectival conscious nature is identical to the ground of all being — has been termed “the Perennial Philosophy”. Believing this Perennial Philosophy to offer the most promising way forward in the mind-body problem, I construct from it the foundations of a metaphysical system that I call “Perennial Idealism”. This attempts to account for manifestation in terms of dispositional, imagery-bound subjects. I then address an age-old “Parmenidean” conundrum that I refer to as “the problem of the one and the many”: How can an undifferentiated substratum ground differentia without the ground itself differentiating? The proposed solution takes its cue from mystico-philosophical writings in the Advaita Vedānta tradition, known as the ajāta doctrine.
Language as Thought
How have human beings expressed the consciousness and ideas hidden deep within the individual in order to overcome the regional and particular characteristics of language and attain universality as thought? Taking up the issues that have emerged since the “linguistic turn,” this work reflects on the linguistic experiences with which philosophers, thinkers, and writers from across time and cultures—including Zhuangzi and Laozi, Kūkai, Motoori Norinaga, and Natsume Sōseki—have grappled, going beyond the confines of modern Western cultural spheres.
Attentional discrimination and victim testimony
Sometimes, a form of discrimination is hard to register,
understand, and articulate. A rich precedent demonstrates
how victim testimonies have been key in uncovering such
“hidden” forms of discrimination, from sexual harassment to
microaggressions. I reflect on how this plausibly goes too for
“attentional discrimination”, referring to cases where the
more meaningful attributes of one social group are made
salient in attention in contrast to the less meaningful attributes
of another. Victim testimonies understandably dominate
the “context-of-discovery” stage of research into these
initially opaque forms of discrimination; a victim’s encounter
with the gap between their experience and dominant conceptual
frameworks for understanding it is what provides an
initial foothold for analysis to begin. Some object, however,
to this methodology continuing to dominate the later “context-of-justification”
stage, where the hypothesis is rigorously
challenged. I argue that this objection underestimates not
just how other methodologies are more likely to inherit the
various mechanisms of invisibility hiding the discrimination
in question, but also how victim testimonies are distinctively
well-suited to recognize and challenge those mechanisms.
Victim testimonies, then, ought to continue playing
a dominant role into these later stages of research regarding
hidden forms of discrimination.
The Colonizer and the Colonized
A Jew born in Tunisia, Memmi (1920–2020) rose to fame with The Colonizer and The Colonized, prefaced by Sartre. Educated in Tunisia, Algeria, and France, he settled in Paris, where he wrote novels and essays alike. His main topics include colonialism, the Jewish condition, and Tunisia.
An early theorist of decolonization, he used a sociological approach, getting to psycho-sociology, working through portraits—the original title of the book is Portrait of the Colonized, Preceded by Portrait of the Colonizer—trying to describe “rendings of the spirit” as “introjections of social conflicts“, according to Sartre in his preface.
Published in 1957, this work aims to show the interweaving of the colonizer’s and the colonized’s mind, clearly sketched out by the binary structure of the essay.
Memmi starts with the economic aspect of colonization, describing how the fundamental inequality of colonization gives the colonizer a much more favorable material situation. One of his key theses is the interdependence of the colonizer and the colonized, trying to go beyond Marxism and psychoanalysis. He characterizes the consciousness of the colonizer through three discoveries: “profit, privilege, and usurpation“. To this duality, he adds several third parties: nationals of other countries, assimilated minorities, Jews, colonized participating in the colonial administration, etc, giving a vivid account of the entanglement between both subjectivity and objective structures, and colonizer and colonized.
Responsibility for Justice
When the noted political philosopher Iris Marion Young died in 2006, her death was mourned as the passing of “one of the most important political philosophers of the past quarter-century” (Cass Sunstein) and as an important and innovative thinker working at the conjunction of a number of important topics: global justice; democracy and difference; continental political theory; ethics and international affairs; and gender, race and public policy. This book discusses our responsibilities to address “structural” injustices in which we among many are implicated (but for which we are not to blame), often by virtue of participating in a market, such as buying goods produced in sweatshops, or participating in booming housing markets that leave many homeless. The book argues that addressing these structural injustices requires a new model of responsibility, which it calls the “social connection” model. The book develops this idea by clarifying the nature of structural injustice; developing the notion of political responsibility for injustice and how it differs from older ideas of blame and guilt; and finally how we can then use this model to describe our responsibilities to others no matter who we are and where we live.
Considerations on Logical Consequence and Natural Language
In a recent article, “Logical Consequence and Natural Language”, Michael Glanzberg claims that there is no relation of logical consequence in natural language (2015). The present paper counters that claim. I shall discuss Glanzberg’s arguments and show why they don’t hold. I further show how Glanzberg’s claims may be used to rather support the existence of logical consequence in natural language.
Structures of Matter and Patterns in Science
Inspired by the work and life of Dorothy Wrinch, 1894-1976. The proceedings of a symposium held at Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts, September 28-30, 1977 and selected papers of Dorothy Wrinch, from the Sophia Smith Collection.
On the Structure of Scientific Inquiry
The object of this paper is the study, in some of its aspects, of the structure of scientific inquiry. The subject is a large one and covers the major part of the field of scientific methodology. We shall confine our attention more particularly to the consideration of those problems of scientific structure which occur in the case of more advanced sciences and merely outline the corresponding problems which occur primarily in sciences in the more elementary stage