I argue that the continued focus on the possibility question – whether feminist logic can exist as a respectable practice – has several harmful consequences. First, it in-vites the association of feminist logic with substantial positions in the philosophy of logic, which unnecessarily leaves room for dismissing the field a priori. Second, it invites a systematic reading of feminist logicians as arguing in isolation from their logical practice, which can hide some genuine possibilities for the field. To avoid these issues, I propose a very broad characterization of feminist logic as a kind of practice which addresses some harmful aspect of dominant practices by focusing on their interaction with logical practices. This characterization trivializes the possibil-ity question, enforces no particular conception of logic to the exclusion of others, yet leaves room for both conservative and radical approaches.
The Logic of Kant’s Categorical “Imperative”
Introduction: In Kant’s moral philosophy, the imperative is perched precariously between two realms governed by the indicative form of speech. In the Critique of Pure Reason, it reminds us of an intelligible, rational realm beyond that governed by descriptive causal explanation. But in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, it reminds us of the sensible pull of causality that frequently leads us to violate its intelligible principles. Correspondingly, Kant approaches the moral law from two directions in the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. When he is explaining moral motivation, he describes and refers to the moral law as an imperative, because this is the form it takes for causally enmeshed human beings. But when he is analyzing its rational formal structure and situating it within his broader analysis of reason, he formulates the moral law in the indicative mood, because this is the form it takes for perfectly rational beings. The vast majority of Kant’s actual formulations of the moral law in the Groundwork are not in the imperative. Of 47 formulations to be found in the text, only four are in the strict imperative. Of those four, only the first receives extended analysis. Of the remaining 43, 31 are expressed in the indicative mood. So two-thirds of Kant’s formulations of the moral law in the Groundwork are descriptive rather than prescriptive. These serve to buttress his repeated reminder that for agents as members of the intelligible world, the “I ought” becomes an “I will”. In the Groundwork, Kant usually addresses us as members of that world.
“That’s Above My Paygrade”: Woke Excuses for Ignorance
Standpoint theorists have long been clear that marginalization does not make better understanding a given. They have been less clear, though, that social dominance does not make ignorance a given. Indeed, many standpoint theorists have implicitly committed themselves to what I call the strong epistemic disadvantage thesis. According to this thesis, there are strong, substantive limits on what the socially dominant can know about oppression that they do not personally experience. I argue that this thesis is not just implausible but politically pernicious; it is an excuse for ignorance and silence that stifles our ability to address many injustices. Moreover, I argue that if we are to avoid lending support to the SEDT while working within a standpoint theory framework, we must hold that the socially dominant can achieve marginalized standpoints. So, we must hold that men can achieve feminist standpoints, that white women (and men) can achieve black feminist standpoints, and so on.
Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What Is “Strong Objectivity”?
In this paper, Harding demonstrates how starting inquiry from the lives of the marginalized is a prerequisite to what she calls “Strong objectivity”. She outlines the central arguments for feminist standpoint theories and contrasts them with the objectivist ideals of traditional science, who, she argues, are only able to achieve weak objectivity.
Eurocentrism as disease: a pathology between King and Qing
Reviving Confucianism with evolutionary and medical conceptual tools in the British Straits Settlements before the Pacific War, the Straits Chinese philosopher, physician, reformer, and revolutionary Lim Boon Keng (1869–1957) pathologized Eurocentrism as a disease under his innovative but also troubling system of medical Confucianism. According to Lim, Eurocentrism was caused by certain (Christian) metaphysical pathogens—speciesism and dualism in human nature—and its pathogenesis involves insensitivity and maladaptation to one’s environment at individual, national, and even ‘racial’ levels. For Lim, the signs and symptoms of individuals, nations, or ‘races’ suffering from Eurocentrism manifest as immoralities and injustices (commonly understood by contemporaneous theorists of evolution as atavism)—such as unjust wars—and degeneration in traits, physical or otherwise—such as indolence. In his attempt to overcome Eurocentrism in fin-de-siècle philosophical theories and practices, Lim’s medical Confucianism presents to us one of the earliest, systematic examples of a comprehensive Anglo-Chinese hybrid philosophy, attempting to tread a thin line between Eurocentrism and Sinocentrism by creating a new centre at imperial peripheries. However, Lim’s problematic, inherited conceptions of race and eugenics also present a cautionary tale of a doctor relying too much on his master’s tools in diagnostics and treatment.
The Cycles of Heaven and History: Some Notes on Approaching Historical Immortality and the Project of Reconciliation from a Look at Nineteenth Century Straits Chinese Philosophy
The pluralism of The Shadow of God invites us to also consider ‘non-Western’ ways of ‘coming to terms with the world’ in historical immortality and the project of reconciliation. I offer two methodological notes for any such undertaking. The first note elaborates on Rosen’s point that ‘“non-Western’ cultures have been heavily influenced by Western ones—even in their opposition to the West” by examining the forgotten Straits Chinese philosopher, Tan Teck Soon, in the context of fin-de-siècle British colonial Singapore. The second note concerns a commitment to anthropocentrism in such considerations and how it might condition our search for ‘non-Western’ ways out of the ‘spiritual situation of the West’, even if we are to find ‘non-Western’ cultures uninfluenced by ‘the West’ such as the early Daoist text of the Zhuangzi, which Tan based his version of historical immortality and attempt at the project of reconciliation upon
From Standpoint Epistemology to Epistemic Oppression
Standpoint epistemology is committed to a cluster of views that pays special attention to the role of social identity in knowledge-acquisition. Of particular interest here is the situated knowledge thesis. This thesis holds that for certain propositions p, whether an epistemic agent is in a position to know that p depends on some nonepistemic facts related to the epistemic agent’s social identity. In this article, I examine two possible ways to interpret this thesis. My first goal here is to clarify existing interpretations of this thesis that appear in the litera- ture but that are undeveloped and often mistakenly conflated. In so doing, I aim to make clear the different versions of standpoint epistemology that one might accept and defend.This project is of significance, I argue, because standpoint epistemology provides helpful tools for understanding a phenomenon of recent interest: epistemic oppression. My second goal is to provide an analysis that makes clear how each of the readings I put forth can be used to illuminate forms of epistemic oppression.
What Ignorance Really Is. Examining the Foundations of Epistemology of Ignorance
Recent years have seen a surge in publications about the epistemology of ignorance. In this article, I examine the proliferation of the concept ignorance that has come with the increased interest in the topic. I identify three conceptions of ignorance in the current literature: (1) ignorance as lack of knowledge/true belief, (2) ignorance as actively upheld false outlooks and (3) ignorance as substantive epistemic prac- tice. These different conceptions of ignorance are as of yet unacknowledged but are bound to impede epistemology of ignorance and, therefore, need to be uncovered. After discussing three unsuccessful ways of dealing with these varying conceptions, I put forward an integrated conception of ignorance that is more adequate for serving as the foundation of epistemology of ignorance. Introducing an alternative conception of ignorance provides us with a foundation for both epistemological and more broadly philosophical work on ignorance.
Fiction, Non-fiction and Deceptive Photographic Representation
In this article, I explore some issues regarding the fictional capacity of photographs and their classification as fiction or nonfiction. In particular, I address the debate on the purported “fictional incompetence” of photography, whether photographs can or cannot represent ficta. In this debate, I side with theorists who defend the view that photographs can indeed represent fictive entities or ficta, but I offer an alternative argument: I claim that photographs can indeed represent ficta by photographic means, something that most theorists have denied. Then I consider some possible objections to my view and try to offer responses. Finally, I question whether representing fictive entities or events is all that is needed for a photograph to be fictional. In this context, I suggest what I take to be the correct way to classify deceptive photographs.
Old Wives’ Tales and Philosophical Delusions: On ‘the Problem of Women and African Philosophy’
This article represents a response to ‘the problem of women and African philosophy’, which refers mainly to the absence of strong women’s and feminist voices within the discipline of African philosophy. I investigate the possibility that African women are not so much excluded from the institutionalized discipline of philosophy, as preferring fiction as a genre for intellectual expression. This hypothesis can be supported by some feminists who read the absolute prioritisation of abstraction and generalization over the concrete and the particular as a masculine and western oppressive strategy. Attention to the concrete and the unique which is made possible by literature more readily than by philosophy, could thus operate as a form of political resistance in certain contexts. If fiction is currently the preferred form of intellectual expression of African women, it is crucial that the community of professional philosophers in a context like South Africa should come to terms with the relevance of such a preference for philosophy’s self-conception, and it should work to make these intellectual contributions philosophically fruitful. In the process, we may entertain the hope that philosophy itself will move closer to its root or source as ‘love of wisdom’.