Abstract: This chapter investigates what we disagree about when we disagree about logic, on the assumption that judgments of logical validity are normative. If logic is normative, then the popular anti-realist thesis that there are no normative facts or properties generalizes—it entails that there are no logical facts or properties. When faced with this anti-realism, it is tempting to endorse a pluralist thesis, according to which two people who disagree about the validity of an argument can both say something true. This chapter explores the limitations of three prominent forms of pluralism: contextualism, relativism, and expressivism. It argues that none of these forms of pluralism gives an adequate account of what we disagree about when we disagree about logic.
Hattiangadi, Anandi. Logical Disagreement
2018, In C. McHugh, J. Way, and D. Whiting, eds., Metaepistemology. Oxford University Press, pp. 88-106.
Added by: Viviane Fairbank
Comment: This text is useful for anyone interested in thinking about the normativity of logic and logical pluralism. It is notable for its direct comparison of approaches in meta-ethics and in the philosophy of logic. Although explanations are clear, the paper assumes some background knowledge about both meta-ethics and logic, and so it is best suited for students who are already familiar with the basic concepts.