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Shulman, Bonnie. What If We Change Our Axioms? A Feminist Inquiry into the Foundations of Mathematics
1996, Configurations, 4 (3): 427-451
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Added by: Franci Mangraviti and Viviane Fairbank

From the Introduction: "Modern mathematics is based on the axiomatic method. We choose axioms and a deductive system---rules for deducing theorems from the axioms. This methodology is designed to guarantee that we can proceed from "obviously" true premises to true conclusions, via inferences which are "obviously" truth-preserving. [...] New and interesting questions arise if we give up as myth the claim that our theorizing can ever be separated out from the complex dynamic of interwoven social/political/historical/cultural forces that shape our experiences and views. Considering mathematics as a set of stories produced according to strict rules one can read these stories for what they tell us about the very real human desires, ambitions, and values of the authors (who understands) and listen to the authors as spokespersons for their cultures (where and when). This paper is the self-respective and self-conscious attempt of a mathematician to retell a story of mathematics that attends to the relationships between who we are and what we know."

Comment: available in this Blueprint
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Shumener, Erica. The Metaphysics of Identity: Is Identity Fundamental?
2017, Philosophy Compass 12 (1)
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Added by: Bjoern Freter, Contributed by: Zach Thornton
Abstract: Identity and distinctness facts are ones like “The Eiffel Tower is identical to the Eiffel Tower,” and “The Eiffel Tower is distinct from the Louvre.” This paper concerns one question in the metaphysics of identity: Are identity and distinctness facts metaphysically fundamental or are they nonfundamental? I provide an overview of answers to this question.
Comment: This is an introductory text on the topic of grounding identity and distinctness facts. This topic is connected to the literature on Leibniz's Law and the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. This paper provides an overview of arguments for and against the view that identity and distinctness facts are fundamental, ultimately favoring the view that they are not.
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Shun, Kwong-loi. Studying Confucian and Comparative Ethics: Methodological Reflections
2009, Journal of Chinese Philosophy 36(3), pp. 455–478
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Added by: Lea Cantor
Abstract:

This article reflects on the challenges that arise in the study and practice of comparative philosophy, focusing on the case of 'Western'-Chinese comparative work in ethics. The paper more specifically highlights an 'asymmetry' worry in relation to much existing comparative engagement with Chinese ethics, whereby the frameworks of 'Western Philosophy' are taken as the unquestioned reference point by which to analyse (unilaterally) Chinese ethics.

Comment: The paper will be easy to follow for those with a basic understanding of Chinese philosophy (especially (neo-)Confucian ethics) and some understanding of contemporary debates in normative ethics and moral philosophy. It could easily be integrated into courses on normative ethics and moral philosophy, Chinese philosophy, and/or comparative philosophy.
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Shun, Kwong-Loi. Methodological Reflections on the Study of Chinese Thought
2009, in Tan, S-h. (ed.) The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Chinese Philosophy Methodologies. London: Bloomsbury, pp. 57–74.
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Added by: Lea Cantor
Abstract:

Methodology has to do with systematic reflections on the methods adopted in a certain kind of activity, including that of intellectual inquiry. But we cannot talk intelligibly about the method of a certain kind of activity without knowing more about the nature of the activity as well as the goals and interests behind it. For example, we cannot talk intelligibly about the method of writing without knowing what it is that we write and for what purpose and audience, nor about the method of building a house without knowing what kind of house and for what purpose. This is no less true of intellectual inquiry, and in our case, the study of Chinese thought. We cannot talk intelligibly about the method of studying Chinese thought without knowing more about the goals and interests behind such study.

Comment: This chapter offers useful insights into the methodology involved in engaging constructively with the history of philosophy, focusing on the specific challenges that arise in the study of Chinese texts. What is involved in textual analysis and philosophical exegesis? How do concerns about present-day relevance guide philosophical analysis and construction? How far is close reading of texts a precondition for productive engagement with Chinese philosophy? What are the specific challenges that arise in comparative studies involving Chinese texts and thinkers? Shun explores these questions in a nuanced and accessible way. No prior knowledge of Chinese philosophy is required to engage with the paper's main points.
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Siegel, Susanna. Which Properties are Represented in Perception?
2006, In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press: 481-503.
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Added by: Andrea Blomqvist
Abstract: In discussions of perception and its relation to knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver comes to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Siegel argues that high-level properties should be attributed to percception itself. That, high-level properties can be the content of perception.
Comment: This paper is interesting to consider in the cognition/perception debate, since high-level properties such as being a natural kind, or emotions and intentions, are normally taken to be features of cognition rather than perception. It raises interesting questions about the relationship between concepts, the content of perception and perceptual experience. It would be good in a third year module on perception.
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Siegel, Susanna. Do Experiences Have Contents?
2010, In Bence -Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press.
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Added by: Andrea Blomqvist, Contributed by: Will Hornett
Summary: This paper argues that despite the differences between perception and belief, perception involves states that are importantly similar to beliefs: conscious visual experiences. According to the Content View, these experiences have contents in the form of accuracy conditions. The paper develops and defends the Content View, discusses its significance, and argues that contrary to what is often supposed, the Content View is compatible with Naive Realist disjunctivism.
Comment: It is a fairly difficult paper because it has some technical sections and her main argument is rather dense. However, it is generally very clearly written, with numerous helpful examples, and a broad discussion of views on contemporary debate on perception. This paper could be used in a senior year or postgraduate course on the philosophy of perception as seminar reading since it is a detailed and controversial discussion of the metaphysics of perception. It has also been central to recent debates. It is is useful to teach alongside Thomas Raliegh's "Phenomenology Without Representation" (2013). It is a fairly difficult paper because it has some technical sections and her main argument is rather dense. However, it is generally very clearly written, with numerous helpful examples, and a broad discussion of views on contemporary debate on perception. This paper could be used in a senior year or postgraduate course on the philosophy of perception as seminar reading since it is a detailed and controversial discussion of the metaphysics of perception. It has also been central to recent debates. It is is useful to teach alongside Thomas Raliegh's "Phenomenology Without Representation" (2013).
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Siegel, Susanna. The Contents of Perception
2010, Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Summary: In this article, the author provides a great overview on the topic of perceptual content, by addressing the following main issues: i) what are perceptual experiences? ii) what can constitute the content of our experience? iii) what is the relation between the content and our experience? iv) in virtue of what experiences have content?
Comment: Great article to be used as background/overview reading for undergraduate course on the philosophy of perception.
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Siegel, Susanna. Affordances and the Contents of Perception
2014, in Brogaard, Berit (ed.) Does Perception have Content, OUP
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Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Summary: The author questions the centrality of representation in perceptual experience that comes from a specific class of experience, namely, those experiences of the environment that compels you to act in a certain way.
Comment: This could work as secondary reading for a postgraduate course on philosophy of perception.
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Siegel, Susanna. The Content of Visual Experience
2010, Oxford University Press
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Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Abstract: properties. The book starts by analyzing the notion of the contents of experience, and by arguing that theorists of all stripes should accept that experiences have contents. It then introduces a method for discovering the contents of experience: the method of phenomenal contrast. This method relies only minimally on introspection, and allows rigorous support for claims about experience. It then applies the method to make the case that we are conscious of many kind properties, of all sorts of causal properties, and of many other complex properties. The book goes on to use the method to help analyze difficult questions about our consciousness of objects and their role in the contents of experience, and to reconceptualize the distinction between perception and sensation. The book's results are important for many areas of philosophy, including the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and the philosophy of science. They are also important for the psychology and cognitive neuroscience of vision.
Comment: Good as further reading for a postgraduate course on epistemology of percpetion.
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Siegel, Susanna. Do Visual Experiences have contents?
2010, in Nanay, Bence (eds.) Perceiving the World, Oxford University Press
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Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Abstract: This paper argues that despite the differences between perception and belief, perception involves states that are importantly similar to beliefs: conscious visual experiences. According to the Content View, these experiences have contents in the form of accuracy conditions. The paper develops and defends the Content View, discusses its significance, and argues that contrary to what is often supposed, the Content View is compatible with Naive Realist disjunctivism.
Comment: This can be used as background reading for a course on epistemology of perception, insofar as the author presents clearly the Content View and its main implications (especially section 1).
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