Wiseman, Rachael. Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Anscombe’s Intention
2016, Routledge.
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Added by: Andrea Blomqvist, Contributed by: Will HornettPublisher's Note: G. E. M. Anscombe’s Intention is a classic of twentieth-century philosophy. The work has been enormously influential despite being a dense and largely misunderstood text. It is a standard reference point for anyone engaging with philosophy of action and philosophy of psychology. In this Routledge Philosophy GuideBook, Rachael Wiseman situates Intention in relation to Anscombe’s moral philosophy and philosophy of mind considers the influence of Aquinas, Aristotle, Frege, and Wittgenstein on the method and content of Intention adopts a structure for assessing the text that shows how Anscombe unifies the three aspects of the concept of intention considers the influence and implications of the piece whilst distinguishing it from subsequent work in the philosophy of action Ideal for anyone wanting to understand and gain a perspective on Elizabeth Anscombe’s seminal work, this guide is an essential introduction, useful in the study of the philosophy of action, ethics, philosophy of psychology and related areas.Comment: Wiseman's guidebook is essential reading for a course directly on Anscombe's work and chapters or sections could be set alongside pieces by Anscombe. Early chapters could also be set for First Year introductory readings on Anscombe's approach to the philosophy of action and her place in the history of philosophy.Wiseman, Rachael, Cumhail, Clare. Re-writing C20th British Philosophy: an interview with Rachael Wiseman and Clare MacCumhail discussing the Warime Quartet2018, BBC Radio 3 Free Thinking; Women in Parenthesis website
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Added by: Anne-Marie McCallionAbstract:
The history of Analytic Philosophy we are familiar with is a story about men. It begins with Frege, Russell, Moore. Wittgenstein appears twice, once as the author of the Tractatus and then again later as the author of the Philosophical Investigations. Between Wittgenstein’s first and second appearance are Carnap and Ayer and the all-male Vienna Circle. Then come the post-second-world war Ordinary Language Philosophers – Ryle, and Austin. After that Strawson and Grice, Quine and Davidson.
The male dominance is not just in the names of the ‘star’ players. Michael Beaney’s 2013 Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy begins by listing the 150 most important analytic philosophers. 146 of them are men. For women who wish to join in this conversation, the odds seem formidably against one.
Today we will be speaking about two of the four women who warrant an entry in Beaney’s list – Elizabeth Anscombe and Philippa Foot. We will be talking about them alongside two other women Iris Murdoch and Mary Midgley. We think they should also be in the top 150, but our broader aims are more ambitious than increasing the proportion of important women from 2.7% to 4%.
Comment: available in this BlueprintWolf, Susan. Moral Saints1982, Journal of Philosophy 79 (8):419-439.
Reprinted in Crisp R. and Slote M. (eds.), Virtue ethics . Oxford: Oxford University Press.-
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Added by: Simon FoktContent: Wolf argues that "moral perfection, in the sense of moral saintliness, does not constitute a model of personal well-being toward which it would be particularly rational or good or desirable for a human being to strive."Comment: The text is written in an accessible, entertaining way and can provide an excellent introduction to a first year ethics module, or an inspiration to a thought-provoking discussion on the practical application of particular ethical theories.Wolf, Susan. Asymmetrical freedom1980, Journal of Philosophy 77(3): 151-166.
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Added by: Simon FoktDiversifying Syllabi: Thesis: interesting and sophisticated position compatibilist position in the debate about free will and determinism. Slogan: To be free is to be determined by the Good. The claim is that if we do the right thing for the right reasons, then we are free – in the sense that is required by moral responsibility – even if we are determined. But if we do the wrong thing, then we are free and morally responsible only if we are not determined (i.e. if we could have done otherwise).Comment: This text offers an interesting discussion of the issue of free will and determinism, and its relation to moral responsibility. It is best used in teaching metaphysics and moral philosophy classes on those topics. It offers some review of the debate, but is not general enough to be used as an introduction. It can also be used in more specific classes in ethics, focusing on moral luck or blameworthiness.Wolf, Susan. Moral Psychology and the Unity of the Virtues2007, Ratio 20 (2): 145–167.
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Added by: Simon FoktAbstract: The ancient Greeks subscribed to the thesis of the Unity of Virtue, according to which the possession of one virtue is closely related to the possession of all the others. Yet empirical observation seems to contradict this thesis at every turn. What could the Greeks have been thinking of? The paper offers an interpretation and a tentative defence of a qualified version of the thesis. It argues that, as the Greeks recognized, virtue essentially involves knowledge - specifically, evaluative knowledge of what matters. Furthermore, such knowledge is essentially holistic. Perfect and complete possession of one virtue thus requires the knowledge that is needed for the possession of every other virtue. The enterprise of trying to reconcile the normative view embodied in this conception of virtue with empirical observation also serves as a case study for the field of moral psychology in which empirical and normative claims are often deeply and confusingly intertwined.Comment: Useful as further reading in courses focusing on ancient and moral philosophy. Can be particularly useful in teaching on topics related to moral psychology and its relations with moral philosophy.Wolf, Susan. Two levels of pluralism1992, Ethics 102 (4):785-798.
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Jojanneke VanderveenAbstract: Pluralism in ethics, as I understand it, is the view that there is an irreducible plurality of values or principles that are relevant to moral judgment. While the utilitarian says that all morally significant con- siderations can be reduced to quantities of pleasure and pain, and the Kantian says that all moraljudgment can be reduced to a single principle having to do with respect for rationality and the bearers of rationality, the pluralist insists that morality is not at the fundamental level so simple. Moreover, as many use the term, and as I shall use it in this essay, the pluralist believes that the plurality of morally significant values is not subject to a complete rational ordering. Thus, it is held that no principle or decision procedure exists that can guarantee a unique and determinate answer to every moral question involving a choice among different fundamental moral values or principles. My aim in this article is not to argue for the truth of ethical pluralism but, rather, to explore some implications of its truth, or even of the self-conscious recognition of the possibility of its truth. Specifically, I shall argue that pluralism, or, indeed, even the possibility of pluralism, has implications for the way we understand issues concerning moral objectivity and moral relativism, as well as implications for the positions we take on them. I shall begin by sketching a common pattern of thought about these issues.Comment:Wolf, Susan. Freedom Within Reason1990, Oxford University Press
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Jojanneke VanderveenPublisher's Note: In Freedom Within Reason, Susan Wolf charts a course between incompatibilism, or the notion that freedom and responsibility require causal and metaphysical independence from the impersonal forces of nature, and compatibilism, or the notion that people are free and responsible as long as their actions are governed by their desires. Wolf argues that some of the forces which are beyond our control are friends to freedom rather than enemies of it, enabling us to see the world for what it is. The freedom we want is not independence from the world, but independence from the forces that prevent us from choosing how to live in the light of a sufficient appreciation of the world.Comment:Wolf, Susan. Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility1987, In Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press. pp. 46-62.
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Jojanneke VanderveenAbstract: My strategy is to examine a recent trend in philosophical discussions of responsibility, a trend that tries, but I think ultimately fails, to give an acceptable analysis of the conditions of responsibility. It fails due to what at first appear to be deep and irresolvable metaphysical problems. It is here that I suggest that the condition of sanity comes to the rescue. What at first appears to be an impossible requirement for responsibility---the requirement that the responsible agent have created her- or himself---turns out to be the vastly more mundane and non controversial requirement that the responsible agent must, in a fairly standard sense, be sane.Comment: Super great for metaethics/the responsibility debate. The book (Freedom Within Reason) is a more elaborated version of the same argument, and continues toward value pluralism.Womack, Katherine, Mulvaney-Day, Norah. Feminist Bioethics Meets Experimental Philosophy: Embracing the Qualitative and Experiential2012, International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics, 5 (1): 113-132
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Added by: Tomasz Zyglewicz, Shannon Brick, Michael GreerAbstract: Experimental philosophers advocate expansion of philosophical methods to include empirical investigation into the concepts used by ordinary people in reasoning and action. We propose also including methods of qualitative social science, which we argue serve both moral and epistemic goals. Philosophical analytical tools applied to interdisciplinary research designs can provide ways to extract rich contextual information from subjects. We argue that this approach has important implications for bioethics; it provides both epistemic and moral reasons to use the experiences and perspectives of diverse populations to better identify underlying concepts as well as to develop effective interventions within particular communities.Comment (from this Blueprint): Katherine Womack and Norah Mulvaney-Day identify some shortcomings of survey experiments, which are the dominant method of x-phi. They argue, from a feminist standpoint, that x-phi would benefit from the inclusion of qualitative methods.Wong, David. Zhuangzi and the Obsession with Being Right2005, History of Philosophy Quarterly 22(2), pp. 91-107.
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Added by: Lea CantorAbstract:
Since Zhuangzi laments the human obsesssion with being right, he would be highly amused at the scholarly obsession with being right on the meaning of his text, especially on the matter of whether he ultimately believed in a right versus wrong. The fact is that he invites our obsession by raising the question and then refusing to answer it. In chapter two, we are invited to take a stance above the debating Confucians and Mohists. What one shis 是 the other feis 非 (what is 'right' for one is 'not right' for the other); what one feis the other shis. Argument is powerless to declare a victor. Zhuangzi asks, "Are there really shi and fei, or really no shi and fei?".
Comment: This remains one of the best and most accessible articles on the philosophy of the classical Daoist text Zhuangzi. It offers one of the clearest accounts in anglophone literature of the text's sceptical stance, highlighting the ethical and political stakes of disputes (including among Confucian and Mohist philosophers) to which the Zhuangzi refers in different parts of the text. The article does not presuppose any knowledge of classical Chinese, of the Zhuangzi, or of Chinese philosophy. The article makes a strong case for reading the Zhuangzi as displaying a sophisticated sceptical stance, the character of which will be of interest to anyone interested in scepticism quite generally (both ancient and modern). The article might be easily integrated into a general course on scepticism, the history of philosophy, classical Chinese philosophy, and/or Daoist philosophy.Can’t find it?Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!
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