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, Contributed by: I Xuan ChongPublisher’s Note:
The Laozi is a key text in Daoism/Taoism (a school in Classical Chinese Philosophy), and is also the single most frequently translated Chinese classic. This edition features a translation "as interpreted by Wang Bi" (a highly influential ancient commentator). This approach aligns closely with common practice in the Chinese-speaking world.Lavelle, J Suilin, Kenny Smith. Do our modern skulls house stone-age minds?2014, in M. Massimi (ed.), Philosophy and the Sciences for Everyone. Routledge-
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Added by: Laura Jimenez
Summary: This is the fifth chapter of the book Philosophy and the Sciences for Everyone. The chapter explores scientific interpretations of how our minds evolved, and some of the methodologies used in forming these interpretations. It relates evolutionary debates to a core issue in the philosophy of mind, namely, whether all knowledge comes from experience, or whether we have 'inborn' knowledge about certain aspects of our world.Comment: Good introduction to evolutionary psychology and the debate about nativism for undergraduate students. It looks at examples coming from ecology such as beaver colonies to understand how the human mind might have adapted to solve specific tasks that our ancestors faced. It is the first chapter of the book dedicated to the philosophy of cognitive sciences. Useful in philosophy of science or philosophy of mind courses.
Lavelle, Jane Suilin. Theory-Theory and the Direct Perception of Mental States2012, Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3(2): 213-230.-
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Added by: Nick Novelli
Abstract: Philosophers and psychologists have often maintained that in order to attribute mental states to other people one must have a 'theory of mind'. This theory facilitates our grasp of other people's mental states. Debate has then focussed on the form this theory should take. Recently a new approach has been suggested, which I call the 'Direct Perception approach to social cognition'. This approach maintains that we can directly perceive other people's mental states. It opposes traditional views on two counts: by claiming that mental states are observable and by claiming that we can attribute them to others without the need for a theory of mind. This paper argues that there are two readings of the direct perception claims: a strong and a weak one. The Theory-theory is compatible with the weak version but not the strong one. The paper argues that the strong version of direct perception is untenable, drawing on evidence from the mirror neuron literature and arguments from the philosophy of science and perception to support this claim. It suggests that one traditional 'theory of mind' view, the 'Theory-theory' view, is compatible with the claim that mental states are observable, and concludes that direct perception views do not offer a viable alternative to theory of mind approaches to social cognition.Comment: A good argument against direct perception as an alternative to theory theory. Since the direct perception theory is somewhat trendy, this paper would be a useful counterpoint in philosophy of mind courses.
Lawson, Bill E.. The Value of Environmental Justice2008, Environmental Justice 1 (3): 155-158.-
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Added by: Rochelle DuFord
Abstract: Environmental justice, at least, entails preserving the environment as a global entity, but also making those persons who feel, have felt, have been, or are victims of environmental crimes and atrocities feel as if they are part of the solution as full members of the human community and not just the environmental dumping ground for the well-off.Comment: This text is a quick introduction to the problem of responsibility for environmental injustices. It makes a good conversation starter for why some individuals do not feel responsible for environmental atrocities, specifically in the context of environmental racism. It would fit well in a class that discussed justice, environmental justice (racism or NIMBY more generally), or collective responsibility.
Le Doeuff, Michele. Hipparchia’s Choice: An Essay Concerning Women, Philosophy, Etc2007, Columbia University Press.-
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa
Abstract: A work of rare insight and irreverence, Hipparchia's Choice boldly recasts the history of philosophy from the pre-Socratics to the post-Derrideans as one of masculine texts and male problems. The position of women, therefore, is less the result of a hypothetical "femininity" and more the fault of exclusion by men. Nevertheless, women have been and continue to be drawn to "the exercise of thought." So how does a female philosopher become a conceptually adventurous woman? Focusing on the work of Sartre and Beauvoir (specifically, his sexism and her relation to it), Michele Le Doeuff shows how women philosophers can reclaim a place for feminist concerns. Is The Second Sex a work of philosophy, and, if so, what can it teach us about the relation of philosophy to experience? Now with a new epilogue, Hipparchia's Choice points the way toward a discipline that is accountable to history, feminism, and society.Comment:
Leech, Jessica. Potentiality2017, Leech, Jessica. Potentiality. Analysis 77 (2):457-467.-
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Added by: Christopher MastermanAbstract:
Vetter's Potentiality is an exposition and development of a new account of possibility and necessity, given in terms of potentialities. In this critical notice, I give an outline of some of the key claims of the book. I then raise some issues for the extent to which Vetter's view can accommodate genuine de re modalities, especially those of possible existence and non-existence.
Comment: Would work excellently in conjunction with Vetter's Potentiality (OUP), particularly in any undergraduate or masters course on modality which incorporates discussion of dispositionalist views of modality.
Lehan, Vanessa. Reducing Stereotype Threat in First-Year Logic Classes2015, Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 1 (2):1-13.-
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Matthew Clemens
Abstract: In this paper I examine some research on how to diminish or eliminate stereotype threat in mathematics. Some of the successful strategies include: informing our students about stereotype threat, challenging the idea that logical intelligence is an 'innate' ability, making students In threatened groups feel welcomed, and introducing counter-stereotypical role models. The purpose of this paper is to take these strategies that have proven successful and come up with specific ways to incorporate them into introductory logic classes. For example, the possible benefit of presenting logic to our undergraduate students by concentrating on aspects of logic that do not result in a clash of schemas.Comment: A very accessible paper, requiring virtually no previous knowledge of logic or feminist philosophy. It is particularly appropriate for the "logic" session of a course on teaching philosophy. It can also be proposed as a preliminary reading for an intro to Logic course, insofar as knowledge of the interaction between stereotype threat and logic performance can have a positive effect on the performance of those potentially affected (as argued in the paper itself).
Leng, Mary. “Algebraic” Approaches to Mathematics2009, In Otávio Bueno & Øystein Linnebo (eds.). New Waves in Philosophy of Mathematics. Palgrave Macmillan.-
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Added by: Jamie Collin
Summary: Surveys the opposition between views of mathematics which take mathematics to represent a independent mathematical reality and views which take mathematical axioms to define or circumscribe their subject matter; and defends the latter view against influential objections.Comment: A very clear and useful survey text for advanced undergraduate or postgraduate courses on metaphysics or philosophy of mathematics.
Leng, Mary. Mathematics and Reality2010, Oxford University Press, USA.-
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Added by: Jamie Collin
Publisher's Note: Mary Leng offers a defense of mathematical fictionalism, according to which we have no reason to believe that there are any mathematical objects. Perhaps the most pressing challenge to mathematical fictionalism is the indispensability argument for the truth of our mathematical theories (and therefore for the existence of the mathematical objects posited by those theories). According to this argument, if we have reason to believe anything, we have reason to believe that the claims of our best empirical theories are (at least approximately) true. But since claims whose truth would require the existence of mathematical objects are indispensable in formulating our best empirical theories, it follows that we have good reason to believe in the mathematical objects posited by those mathematical theories used in empirical science, and therefore to believe that the mathematical theories utilized in empirical science are true. Previous responses to the indispensability argument have focussed on arguing that mathematical assumptions can be dispensed with in formulating our empirical theories. Leng, by contrast, offers an account of the role of mathematics in empirical science according to which the successful use of mathematics in formulating our empirical theories need not rely on the truth of the mathematics utilized.Comment: This book presents the most developed account of mathematical fictionalism. The book, or chapters from it, would provide useful further reading in advanced undergraduate or postgraduate courses on metaphysics or philosophy of mathematics.
Leng, Mary. What’s there to know?2007, In M. Leng, A. Paseau, and M. Potter (eds.), Mathematical Knowledge. OUP-
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Added by: Jamie Collin
Summary: Defends an account of mathematical knowledge in which mathematical knowledge is a kind of modal knowledge. Leng argues that nominalists should take mathematical knowledge to consist in knowledge of the consistency of mathematical axiomatic systems, and knowledge of what necessarily follows from those axioms. She defends this view against objections that modal knowledge requires knowledge of abstract objects, and argues that we should understand possibility and necessity in a primative way.Comment: This would be useful in an advanced undergraduate course on metaphysics, epistemology or philosophy of logic and mathematics. This is not an easy paper, but Leng does an excellent job of making clear some difficult ideas. The view defended is an important one in both philosophy of logic and philosophy of mathematics. Any reasonably comprehensive treatment of nominalism should include this paper.
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Laozi, trans. Richard John Lynn. The Classic of the Way and Virtue: A New Translation of the Tao-te ching of Laozi as Interpreted by Wang Bi
1999, Columbia University Press
Comment: This is essential primary reading on Daoism that is sensitive to the Laozi's ancient reception.