Added by: Andrea Blomqvist
Abstract: Hermeneutic phenomenology is absent in 4 EAC literature (embedded, embodied, enactive, extended and affective cognition). The aim of this article is to show that hermeneutic phenomenology as elaborated in the work of Heidegger is relevant to 4 EAC research. In the first part of the article I describe the hermeneutic turn Heidegger performs in tandem with his ontological turn of transcendental phenomenology, and the hermeneutic account of cognition resulting from it. I explicate the main thesis of the hermeneutic account, namely that cognition is interaction with the world, followed by a discussion of the modes of cognition distinguished in the hermeneutic account. In the second part of the article I discuss the implications of this account with respect to the status and meaning of first, second and third person perspective of cognition. The article concludes with the draft and discussion of an exploratory model of hermeneutic cognition.
Comment: The text gives a very concise overview and interpretation of Heidegger's account of hermeneutics, relating it to 4E debates in the philosophy of mind and cognition. It could be interesting as advanced reading in courses in the philosophy of mind, or more introductory reading in hermeneutic phenomenology and the work of Heidegger.Export citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format
Vasterling, Veronica. Heidegger’s hermeneutic account of cognition
2015, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14(4): 1145-1163.
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