Abstract: It is argued that it is important for cognitive scientists to understand both the precise nature of RTM, and the challenges to it. The biggest foundational challenge is to develop an adequate naturalistic theory of how representational content is determined. Philosophers have proposed several ingenious theory-sketches of content determination but none accounts for the full range of semantic features mental representations arguably have. Another major challenge is the existence of non-representational competitor research programs. A likely future scenario is that we will be able to explain certain ‘low-level’ aspects of cognition without resort to representations but that representational hypotheses will still be needed to account for the intentionality-based features of cognition and ‘representation hungry’ higher-level processes.
Von Eckardt, Barbara. The representational theory of mind
2012, In Keith Frankish & William Ramsey (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science. Cambridge University Press.
Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon Fokt
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