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Scheman, Naomi. Individualism and the Objects of Psychology
1983, in Hardin, S. and Hintikka, Merrill, B. (eds) Discovering Reality. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company, pp. 225-44
Abstract:
Scheman argues against individualism, the thesis that psychological states are intrinsic objects that can exist independently from the context in which the individual lives. Scheman argues that while individualism is taken as de facto theory about the ontology of psychological objects given its alignment with physicalism, individualism is an ideological position rooted in a patriarchal system. According to Scheman, individualism prevents us from wholly considering psychological objects in relation to socially embedded norms. Scheman advocates for an anti-individualist position by examining how individualist approaches arise as a result of an embedment of liberal individualism and patriarchal culture.

Comment (from this Blueprint): This is one of the seminal articles linking feminist philosophies to work in philosophy of mind. In here, Scheman offers a nuanced examination of how a popular doctrine in philosophy of mind, individualism, has the widespread acceptance it has if we consider its background assumptions: the need to individualise psychological states to commit to a physicalist theory of the mind. Scheman also provides a critical analysis of why individualism should be rejected from a feminist standpoint since it does not take into account the socially embedded norms in which psychological objects exist. The article is a bit difficult to follow, but reading it together with Antony's quite aid comprehension.

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