Hattiangadi, Anandi. Logical Conventionalism and the Adoption Problem
2023, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 97(1), pp. 47–81
Added by: Viviane Fairbank
Abstract:
Abstract: In this paper, I take issue with a core commitment of logical conventionalism: that we impose a logic on ourselves by adopting general linguistic conventions governing our use of logical terms, thereby determining the meanings of the logical constants and which of our inferences are valid. Drawing on Kripke’s ‘adoption problem’, I argue that general logical principles cannot be adopted, either explicitly or implicitly. I go on to argue that the meanings of our logical terms, and the validity of our inferences, cannot depend on our adoption of logico-linguistic conventions.
Comment: Although this paper includes an argument against logical conventionalism (which is in itself interesting), it is also a helpfully clear overview of the so-called Adoption Problem in the philosophy of logic, and can be thus be featured as part of a course on contemporary issues in the epistemology of logic.