Sex, What Is It Good For?
Funded by: The School of Philosophical, Anthropological and Film Studies, University of St Andrews
Introduction
This Blueprint is about the ethics of sex and the place of sex in our lives. We explore consent, desire, love, and responsibility. We hope it will help participants to delve deeper into well-known concepts, like consent, as well as to explore issues relating to sex they might not have considered before.
How to use this Blueprint?
This Blueprint features one main reading per week, accompanied by some further readings. The questions refer to the main readings, but your understanding will be enriched by exploring the other sources.
We suggest you spend a session before you start reading, having some preliminary discussions. This would include:
- General content warnings for the group, which include discussions of unwanted and forced sexual interactions, personal identity where relevant for sexual consent (e.g. trauma experience, mental health, LGBT+ membership, ethnic or racial identity).
- Making sure everyone is aware of the available support at your university/school/community in case the discussion causes emotional difficulties of any sort.
- Collectively setting rules for how the discussions should go.
- Researching the university/school/community’s policies about sex as well as the laws where you are.
- Discussion of meaning of morally charged terminology such as “rape”, and how giving definitions might be complicated.
- Discussion of what participants already know and hope to learn from the group.
Contents
- What is “wanting” to have sex (in the sense that is relevant for consent)? Is it a desire, impulse, decision, or something else?
- Is it possible to consent to sex while communicating to your partner that you don’t consent?
- Is it possible to lie about whether you consent (or don’t consent) to sex?
- If consent is an attitude, do we always know whether we consent to sex?
- Is communication necessary for consent? Does the fact that Jane and Jim don’t talk at all about whether Jim can come to the party undermine their view that he comes to the party with Jane’s consent?
- What is “wanting” to have sex (in the sense that is relevant for consent)? Is it a desire, impulse, decision, or something else?
- Is it possible to consent to sex while communicating to your partner that you don’t consent?
- Is it possible to lie about whether you consent (or don’t consent) to sex?
- If consent is an attitude, do we always know whether we consent to sex?
- Is communication necessary for consent? Does the fact that Jane and Jim don’t talk at all about whether Jim can come to the party undermine their view that he comes to the party with Jane’s consent?
- Can sexual deception ever be innocuous? What sort of lies seem alright?
- Stealthing is the practice of one partner secretly removing the condom from their penis without telling their partner during sex. Brosky (2017) asks: is stealthing only as bad as secretly putting on a condom when someone has said they don’t want to use one? If it is not as bad as stealthing, does this tell us that what is really going wrong in deception cases is the harm?
- Are there things that we ought to disclose before having sex just in case it is a deal-breaker for someone? Is it only if the “deal-breaker” has been made explicit?
- What are the difficulties in a legal response to consent and deceit? 5. What if I know someone will lie to me and I want to have sex with them anyway? Is that sex non-consensual?
- Is it really true that having sex with an unconscious person and deceiving someone into sex are wrong “for the same reason”, as Dougherty claims?
- Fischel (2019) documents how trans people have been prosecuted in the UK for failing to disclose to sexual partners that they are transgender. Are these cases different to the others (such as stealthing), as Fischel claims they are?
- Fischel replies that in these cases what is lied about is “bullshit” – questions like “are you a man?” are “bullshit questions” because of the differing social meanings these terms can have. Are these “bullshit questions”? Are there any “bullshit questions” when it comes to sexual consent?
- Can sexual deception ever be innocuous? What sort of lies seem alright?
- Stealthing is the practice of one partner secretly removing the condom from their penis without telling their partner during sex. Brosky (2017) asks: is stealthing only as bad as secretly putting on a condom when someone has said they don’t want to use one? If it is not as bad as stealthing, does this tell us that what is really going wrong in deception cases is the harm?
- Are there things that we ought to disclose before having sex just in case it is a deal-breaker for someone? Is it only if the “deal-breaker” has been made explicit?
- What are the difficulties in a legal response to consent and deceit? 5. What if I know someone will lie to me and I want to have sex with them anyway? Is that sex non-consensual?
- Is it really true that having sex with an unconscious person and deceiving someone into sex are wrong “for the same reason”, as Dougherty claims?
- Fischel (2019) documents how trans people have been prosecuted in the UK for failing to disclose to sexual partners that they are transgender. Are these cases different to the others (such as stealthing), as Fischel claims they are?
- Fischel replies that in these cases what is lied about is “bullshit” – questions like “are you a man?” are “bullshit questions” because of the differing social meanings these terms can have. Are these “bullshit questions”? Are there any “bullshit questions” when it comes to sexual consent?
- Is there anything wrong with having masochistic sexual desires? Does it depend on who has them and their social context? Does sadomasochism challenge or reinforce any sexual norms? (Does it create new sexual norms?)
- Are there unobjectionable sexual desires?
- Should we only be concerned with reality and not with fantasy?
- Is consent legitimate if your desires have been shaped by an oppressive society?
- Can you really be an advocate of sexual freedom while morally critiqueing sexual desires as Bartky does?
- Are there other “bad” desires (e.g. racial fetishes, sadistic desires, restrictive beauty conventions,…)?
- Can people change their desires generally? Can they change their sexual desires?
- Is there anything worrying about a movement calling for people to change their sexual preferences?
- Are getting rid of the desire and getting rid of the shame our only two options, as Bartky claims?
- Is there anything wrong with having masochistic sexual desires? Does it depend on who has them and their social context? Does sadomasochism challenge or reinforce any sexual norms? (Does it create new sexual norms?)
- Are there unobjectionable sexual desires?
- Should we only be concerned with reality and not with fantasy?
- Is consent legitimate if your desires have been shaped by an oppressive society?
- Can you really be an advocate of sexual freedom while morally critiqueing sexual desires as Bartky does?
- Are there other “bad” desires (e.g. racial fetishes, sadistic desires, restrictive beauty conventions,…)?
- Can people change their desires generally? Can they change their sexual desires?
- Is there anything worrying about a movement calling for people to change their sexual preferences?
- Are getting rid of the desire and getting rid of the shame our only two options, as Bartky claims?
- Can you think of any important ethical effects of jealousy? What does the novel have to say about the potential ethical upshots of jealousy?
- How does sexual desire function in the narrator’s relationship in the chapter?
- How do you feel about the same portrayal with different mediums, one with words (the novel), and the other with body movement (the dance)?
- How do we write about and analyse the subjective experience of desire and love?
- What is the relationship between love and sex?
- Does the interconnectedness of sex, love, and desire have implications for the morality of some types of sexual interaction? Is it harder or easier to work out if sex is consensual when love is also present?
- Can you think of any important ethical effects of jealousy? What does the novel have to say about the potential ethical upshots of jealousy?
- How does sexual desire function in the narrator’s relationship in the chapter?
- How do you feel about the same portrayal with different mediums, one with words (the novel), and the other with body movement (the dance)?
- How do we write about and analyse the subjective experience of desire and love?
- What is the relationship between love and sex?
- Does the interconnectedness of sex, love, and desire have implications for the morality of some types of sexual interaction? Is it harder or easier to work out if sex is consensual when love is also present?
- How would mental illhealth (e.g. disability: ADHD, or Dementia; Illness: Anxiety, Depression, trauma experience or PTSD) affect one’s ability to consent to sex freely and how, if possible, could one skaffold the consent of a mentally ill partner?
- What do you think about Kukla’s example of sex in residential care for elderly people? Is it possible to have morally good sex in this situation?
- Is it possible to scaffold an unknown persons’s consent enough to be sure the sex is consensual on a one-night-stand under Kukla’s view?
- Does Kukla’s “relational” view of consent or Dougherty’s “Intentional” view explain sexual consent better?
- Does a requirement for an “enthusiastic Yes” that many university sexual consent campaigns focus on cover the issues in Kukla’s paper sufficiently?
- How would mental illhealth (e.g. disability: ADHD, or Dementia; Illness: Anxiety, Depression, trauma experience or PTSD) affect one’s ability to consent to sex freely and how, if possible, could one skaffold the consent of a mentally ill partner?
- What do you think about Kukla’s example of sex in residential care for elderly people? Is it possible to have morally good sex in this situation?
- Is it possible to scaffold an unknown persons’s consent enough to be sure the sex is consensual on a one-night-stand under Kukla’s view?
- Does Kukla’s “relational” view of consent or Dougherty’s “Intentional” view explain sexual consent better?
- Does a requirement for an “enthusiastic Yes” that many university sexual consent campaigns focus on cover the issues in Kukla’s paper sufficiently?
- What is the social impact or function of sex work? What is the difference between it, concubinage, and marriage? How did it change over time?
- “Sex workers stress the possibility of finding tenderness and sexual pleasure for herself or himself.” What do we think of the possibility of transactional and intimate sex (or generally non-romantic sex)? Does this have any implications for whether sex work can be fulfilling or non-exploitative work?
- “In Guyana, the Dominican Republic, Belize, and Cartagena, various parts of the body are defined as off-limits to the client, commonly a woman’s breasts and lips.” They’re reserved for a romantic partner or spouse. Are there any aspects of sex which we find inappropriate for a transactional interaction? Does the fact that the intimate parts are “off limit” affect what you think of the sex work?
- What counts as sex work as opposed to merely someone having sex for materialistic benefit? What is the difference between paying for sex and giving a “gift” for sex? Can we describe ‘mistresses’ as prostitutes, when their primary motivation for being in the arrangement is to gain materialistic benefits?
- How do gender and race affect the definition and social effects of sex work?
- What is the social impact or function of sex work? What is the difference between it, concubinage, and marriage? How did it change over time?
- “Sex workers stress the possibility of finding tenderness and sexual pleasure for herself or himself.” What do we think of the possibility of transactional and intimate sex (or generally non-romantic sex)? Does this have any implications for whether sex work can be fulfilling or non-exploitative work?
- “In Guyana, the Dominican Republic, Belize, and Cartagena, various parts of the body are defined as off-limits to the client, commonly a woman’s breasts and lips.” They’re reserved for a romantic partner or spouse. Are there any aspects of sex which we find inappropriate for a transactional interaction? Does the fact that the intimate parts are “off limit” affect what you think of the sex work?
- What counts as sex work as opposed to merely someone having sex for materialistic benefit? What is the difference between paying for sex and giving a “gift” for sex? Can we describe ‘mistresses’ as prostitutes, when their primary motivation for being in the arrangement is to gain materialistic benefits?
- How do gender and race affect the definition and social effects of sex work?
- Can promises to have, or not have, sex ever be morally binding?
- Is Jane obliged to have sex with John if he wins the football game?
- Is it permissible to hold your partner to being monogamous?
- Is there an important difference between making a binding plan to have sex and making a binding promise to have sex?
- Can promises to have, or not have, sex ever be morally binding?
- Is Jane obliged to have sex with John if he wins the football game?
- Is it permissible to hold your partner to being monogamous?
- Is there an important difference between making a binding plan to have sex and making a binding promise to have sex?
Week 1. Consent
This week tackles a core question: what is consent? This is an important building block for most of the topics we will go on to cover and a central concept in ethical and legal discussions of sex.
Study Questions
Week 2. Lies and Disclosure
This topic investigates the relationship between consent and lying or deceiving. We will ask when a lie renders sex non-consensual, or otherwise unethical, and why. We aim to build on the understanding of consent built in the previous week and use it to work out difficult questions about deceit and consent.
Study Questions
Week 3. 'Bad' Desires
This week concerns whether fantasies, desires, or sexual preferences can be morally or politically ‘bad’ and, if so, what someone can and should do when they have such a desire. In the reading for this week, Bartky is focused on masochistic sexual desires, which she thinks are sometimes at odds with feminist beliefs. Other examples might be: sadistic desires; racial fetishes or preferences (only or especially being attracted to people of a certain race); only finding certain conventionally beautiful bodies attractive; and so on. Is there anything troubling about these desires? If there is, what is to be done?
Study Questions
Week 4. Sex, Desire and Love
Proust’s The Captive and The Fugitive explore the complex relationship between sex, desire, and love in intimate relationships and shows how the boundary between sexual and romantic desire is often unclear. This session seeks to use the novel to explore questions about love, sex, and jealousy; as well as how the use of different artistic mediums affects our understanding of these issues.
Study Questions
Week 5. Responsibility
This week seeks to explore an alternative view of how consent works in sexual morality: the relational view. Focusing on Quill Kukla’s 2021 paper, the intended outcome of this session is to allow participants to discuss how much care and attention one owes one’s sexual partners. This revolves around questions of how an individual’s characteristics affect how they consent, and how much others will need to construct a positive environment for this consent to function best. Example included in the paper are women’s ability to consent to sex with men being undermined by sexism, and people with memory loss’s ability to consent being undermined by their own capabilities, or lack thereof. The aim of this week is to ask what people can do to ensure other’s consent is looked after, and when (if ever) we can say that an individual cannot consent to sex at all.
Study Questions
Week 6. Sex Work and a Caribbean Case Study
This week aims to use research about the history of sex work and its perceptions in the Caribbean to explore questions of what counts as sex work, how sex work is viewed, what sex work is like, and the ethics of sex work in light of our discussions in previous weeks.
Study Questions
Week 7. Sexual Planning and Sexual Promises
This week aims to use previous weeks’ analysis of the general conditions under which sex is morally permissible and apply it to a specific case. The case of promising challenges our intuitions about communication, responsibility for others, and other consent concepts. This leads to asking whether sex is fundamentally different from other actions, and if it is what the previous moral and social concepts discussed mean for whether sexual promises can be permissibly made.
Comment: The authors argue that consent is an attitude, rather than an act of communication. They give two examples to support this view where the communication of consent doesn’t occur or goes wrong somehow, but nonetheless (they claim) it is intuitively a consensual interaction.