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Langton, Rae. Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts
1993, Philosophy and Public Affairs 22(4): 293-330.

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Added by: Emily Paul
Summary: Considers the idea of construing Pornography as a speech act - what this would mean, and the implications that follow from this. Examines arguments that pornography can i) subordinate and ii) silence women.
Comment: Great paper for a feminist philosophy course - in particular, for a unit on Pornography. It could be good to set seminar questions asking (for example) how, according to Langton, pornography silences women. It could also be good to get students to be clear on Langton's three different types of speech act, and to give their own examples of these. (The 3 being illocutionary, perlocutionary and locutionary).
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Lawson, Bill E.. The Value of Environmental Justice
2008, Environmental Justice 1 (3): 155-158.

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Added by: Rochelle DuFord
Abstract: Environmental justice, at least, entails preserving the environment as a global entity, but also making those persons who feel, have felt, have been, or are victims of environmental crimes and atrocities feel as if they are part of the solution as full members of the human community and not just the environmental dumping ground for the well-off.
Comment: This text is a quick introduction to the problem of responsibility for environmental injustices. It makes a good conversation starter for why some individuals do not feel responsible for environmental atrocities, specifically in the context of environmental racism. It would fit well in a class that discussed justice, environmental justice (racism or NIMBY more generally), or collective responsibility.
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Lehan, Vanessa. Reducing Stereotype Threat in First-Year Logic Classes
2015, Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 1 (2):1-13.

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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Matthew Clemens
Abstract: In this paper I examine some research on how to diminish or eliminate stereotype threat in mathematics. Some of the successful strategies include: informing our students about stereotype threat, challenging the idea that logical intelligence is an 'innate' ability, making students In threatened groups feel welcomed, and introducing counter-stereotypical role models. The purpose of this paper is to take these strategies that have proven successful and come up with specific ways to incorporate them into introductory logic classes. For example, the possible benefit of presenting logic to our undergraduate students by concentrating on aspects of logic that do not result in a clash of schemas.
Comment: A very accessible paper, requiring virtually no previous knowledge of logic or feminist philosophy. It is particularly appropriate for the "logic" session of a course on teaching philosophy. It can also be proposed as a preliminary reading for an intro to Logic course, insofar as knowledge of the interaction between stereotype threat and logic performance can have a positive effect on the performance of those potentially affected (as argued in the paper itself).
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Leslie, Sarah-Jane. Carving up the Social World with Generics
2014, in: T. Lombrozo, J. Knobe, and S. Nichols (eds.) Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy Volume 1, Oxford University Press.

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Added by: Simon Fokt
Summary (Diversifying Syllabi): Leslie argues that generic language has an effect on social cognition. Specifically, generic language plays a role in the way small children develop concepts related to abilities, which facilitates the transmission and development of social prejudices.
Comment: This text can support classes on social cognition, the social nature of language, and essentialism (including social and psychological essentialism). It will also serve well as an introduction to generics in philosophy of language. In philosophy of gender and race classes it can offers a good illustration of how stereotypes are created.
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Liao, Shen-yi, Vanessa Carbonell. Materialized Oppression in Medical Tools and Technologies
2023, American Journal of Bioethics 23(4), pp. 9-23

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Added by: Maria Jimena Clavel Vazquez
Abstract:
It is well-known that racism is encoded into the social practices and institutions of medicine. Less well-known is that racism is encoded into the material artifacts of medicine. We argue that many medical devices are not merely biased, but materialize oppression. An oppressive device exhibits a harmful bias that reflects and perpetuates unjust power relations. Using pulse oximeters and spirometers as case studies, we show how medical devices can materialize oppression along various axes of social difference, including race, gender, class, and ability. Our account uses political philosophy and cognitive science to give a theoretical basis for understanding materialized oppression, explaining how artifacts encode and carry oppressive ideas from the past to the present and future. Oppressive medical devices present a moral aggregation problem. To remedy this problem, we suggest redundantly layered solutions that are coordinated to disrupt reciprocal causal connections between the attitudes, practices, and artifacts of oppressive systems.
Comment: available in this Blueprint
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Liberto, Hallie. The Problem with Sexual Promises
2017, Ethics, 127(2): 383-414.

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Added by: Emma Holmes, David MacDonald, Yichi Zhang, and Samuel Dando-Moore
Abstract:
I first distinguish promises with positive sexual content (e.g., promises to perform sexual acts) and promises with negative sexual content (e.g., promises to refrain from sexual acts—as one does when making monogamy promises). I argue that sexual content—even positive sexual content—does not cause a promise to misfire. However, the content of some successful promises is such that a promisee ought not to accept the promise, and, if she does accept, she ought then to release her promisor from the promise. I argue that both positive and negative sexual promises have content of this kind.
Comment (from this Blueprint): Liberto argues that promises to have sex, and promises not to have sex, are a special type of promise that it is morally wrong to make. She does this by first arguing why promises to have sex are “overextensive”. This means that sexual promises promise something too important: sex. After she concludes that promises to have sex are overextensive she spends the second half of the paper arguing why promises not to have sex (i.e. monogmany promises) are not disanalogous to promises to have sex, and thus are also overextensive.
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Lintott, Sheila. Sublime Hunger: A Consideration of Eating Disorders Beyond Beauty
2003, Hypatia 18 (4):65-86.

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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Christy Mag Uidhir
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that one of the most intense ways women are encouraged to enjoy sublime experiences is via attempts to control their bodies through excessive dieting. If this is so, then the societal-cultural contributions to the problem of eating disorders exceed the perpetuation of a certain beauty ideal to include the almost universal encouragement women receive to diet, coupled with the relative shortage of opportunities women are afforded to experience the sublime.
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Little, Margaret Olivia. Why a feminist approach to bioethics?
1996, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 6 (1):1-18.

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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: Many have asked how and why feminist theory makes a distinctive contribution to bioethics. In this essay, I outline two ways in which feminist reflection can enrich bioethical studies. First, feminist theory may expose certain themes of androcentric reasoning that can affect, in sometimes crude but often subtle ways, the substantive analysis of topics in bioethics; second, it can unearth the gendered nature of certain basic philosophical concepts that form the working tools of ethical theory.
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Llanera, Tracy. The Brown Babe’s Burden
2019, Hypatia, 34 (2): 374–83.

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Added by: Rebecca Buxton
Abstract:
In this paper Tracy Llanera relects on her experience as a non-white academic in an Australian university, recounting personal experiences. Many of these highlight the importance of an intersectional approach to the inclusion of women in philosophy. Llanera highlights the ongoing importance of mentorship and representation concluding that there is much more work to be done.
Comment (from this Blueprint): Tracy Llanera discusses her personal experience as a non-white woman in philosophy. There is much to learn from this piece, most importantly the need for an intersectional approach. Focusing on the personal experience of women (as we also see in other pieces) is necessary to understand the whole picture of contemporary exclusion.
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Lloyd, Elisabeth A.. The Case of the Female Orgasm: Bias in the Science of Evolution
2007, Hypatia 22 (3):218-222.

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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Carl Hoefer
Abstract: Why women evolved to have orgasms - when most of their primate relatives don't - is a persistent mystery among evolutionary biologists. In pursuing this mystery, Elisabeth Lloyd arrives at another: How could anything as inadequate as the evolutionary explanations of the female orgasm have passed muster as science? A judicious and revealing look at all twenty evolutionary accounts of the trait of human female orgasm, Lloyd's book is at the same time a case study of how certain biases steer science astray. Over the past fifteen years, the effect of sexist or male-centered approaches to science has been hotly debated. Drawing especially on data from nonhuman primates and human sexology over eighty years, Lloyd shows what damage such bias does in the study of female orgasm. She also exposes a second pernicious form of bias that permeates the literature on female orgasms: a bias toward adaptationism. Here Lloyd's critique comes alive, demonstrating how most of the evolutionary accounts either are in conflict with, or lack, certain types of evidence necessary to make their cases - how they simply assume that female orgasm must exist because it helped females in the past reproduce. As she weighs the evidence, Lloyd takes on nearly everyone who has written on the subject: evolutionists, animal behaviorists, and feminists alike. Her clearly and cogently written book is at once a convincing case study of bias in science and a sweeping summary and analysis of what is known about the evolution of the intriguing trait of female orgasm.
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