Baker, Lynne Rudder. On a causal theory of content
1989, Philosophical Perspectives 3:165-186.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon FoktAbstract: The project of explaining intentional phenomena in terms of nonintentional phenomena has become a central task in the philosophy of mind.' Since intentional phenomena like believing, desiring, intending have content essentially, the project is one of showing how semantic properties like content can be reconciled with nonsemantic properties like cause. As Jerry A. Fodor put it, The worry about representation is above all that the semantic (and/or the intentional) will prove permanently recalcitrant to integration in the natural order; for example that the semantic/intentional properties of things will fail to supervene upon their physical properties.Comment: This paper provides a clear reconstruction and evaluation of Jerry Fodor's causal theory of content. It is helpful as primary and further reading in an undergraduate philosophy of mind course to discuss the problem of the naturalization of content.
Boden, Margaret A.. Intentionality and physical systems
1970, Philosophy of Science 32 (June):200-214.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon FoktAbstract: Intentionality is characteristic of many psychological phenomena. It is commonly held by philosophers that intentionality cannot be ascribed to purely physical systems. This view does not merely deny that psychological language can be reduced to physiological language. It also claims that the appropriateness of some psychological explanation excludes the possibility of any underlying physiological or causal account adequate to explain intentional behavior. This is a thesis which I do not accept. I shall argue that physical systems of a specific sort will show the characteristic features of intentionality. Psychological subjects are, under an alternative description, purely physical systems of a certain sort. The intentional description and the physical description are logically distinct, and are not intertranslatable. Nevertheless, the features of intentionality may be explained by a purely causal account, in the sense that they may be shown to be totally dependent upon physical processes.
Chen, Xunwu. The problem of mind in Confucianism
2016, Asian Philosophy 26 (2):166-181
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Added by: Xintong WeiAbstract:
This essay explores the Confucian theory of mind. Doing so, it first examines the early Confucian concept of the human mind as a substance that has both moral and cognitive functions and a universal nature. It then explores the neo-Confucian concept of the human mind, the original mind, and the relationships between the human mind and human nature, as well as between the human mind and the human body. Finally, it explores the Confucian concept of cultivation of the mind.Comment (from this Blueprint): During the Warring States period, the rulers of several powerful states began declaring themselves kings, a title traditionally reserved for the Zhou dynasty's ruler. The period culminated in 221 B.C.E. when the king of Qin unified China and declared himself the first emperor of the Qin Dynasty. This era was marked by constant conflict, with the general populace frequently facing threats of death and starvation. In their struggle for survival, state rulers sought out talented individuals and innovative solutions to address these problems. As a result, ancient Chinese philosophy emerged with a strong focus on solving social and political issues, leading to a flourishing of ideas and thoughts. One significant development during this time was the establishment of the Confucian School by Confucius, further advanced by thinkers like Mengzi (Mencius) and Xunzi. Confucianism, which emphasises pedagogy and includes several classical texts central to its study, became the dominant ideology during the Han dynasty (206 B.C.E.-220 C.E.). Confucians were concerned with restoring political order and achieving moral transformation in society through self-cultivation and the preservation of family relations. They advocated for top-down social reform, believing that the ruler should serve as a moral exemplar for the people. Socially and politically conservative, Confucians idealised the sage kings of antiquity and viewed history not as a progression but as a decline into degeneration and corruption. They believed the masses could be transformed through rites (codes of propriety that shape external behaviour) and music (which affects internal emotions and feelings). The ultimate goal was to cultivate the virtue of 'Ren' (humanity). The Confucian approach to the philosophy of mind must therefore be situated within this context of their broader concerns in cultivating moral virtues and transforming society. For Confucians, the human mind is primarily characterised not by cognitive or affective functions, but by aspects of the ‘original mind’ that are essential for making correct moral responses.
Hieronymi, Pamela. Controlling Attitudes
2006, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 87 (1):45-74
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Lizzy VenthamAbstract: I hope to show that, although belief is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, "believing at will" is impossible; one cannot believe in the way one ordinarily acts. Further, the same is true of intention: although intention is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than believe at will.Comment: I find this paper to be a valuable addition to classes on implicit biases, reasons, and moral psychology. It provides a good basis for discussion on how these topics relate to free will, and what sorts of control (and responsibilities) we have over our mental lives - including our desires, our beliefs, and other thoughts.
Li, Jingjing. Through the Mirror: The Account of Other Minds in Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism
2019, Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 18 (3):435-451
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Added by: Xintong WeiAbstract:
This article proposes a new reading of the mirror analogy presented in the doctrine of Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism. Clerics, such as Xuanzang 玄奘 and his protégé Kuiji 窺基, articulated this analogy to describe our experience of other minds. In contrast with existing interpretations of this analogy as figurative ways of expressing ideas of projecting and reproducing, I argue that this mirroring experience should be understood as revealing, whereby we perceive other minds through the second-person perspective. This mirroring experience, in its allusion to the collectivity of consciousness, yields the metaphysical explication of mutual interdependence and the prescription of norms for compassionate actions.
Comment: available in this Blueprint
Liu, JeeLoo. An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: From Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism
2006, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell
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Added by: Xintong WeiAbstract:
"An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy" unlocks the mystery of ancient Chinese philosophy and unravels the complexity of Chinese Buddhism by placing them in the contemporary context of discourse. Elucidates the central issues and debates in Chinese philosophy, its different schools of thought, and its major philosophers. Covers eight major philosophers in the ancient period, among them Confucius, Laozi, and Zhuangzi. Illuminates the links between different schools of philosophy. Opens the door to further study of the relationship between Chinese and Western philosophy.Comment: available in this Blueprint
Liu, JeeLoo. The metaphysical as the ethical: a pragmatist reading of Wang Yangming’s “The Mind Is the Principle”
2024, Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-29
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Added by: Xintong WeiAbstract:
This paper explores a late-Ming Chinese philosopher Wang Yangming’s (1472–1529) philosophical assertions showcasing the pivotal role that human mind plays in shaping our worldview. Wang Yangming’s view—especially his declaration that the Mind is the Principle—emphasizes that the human mind is the sole foundation of moral principles and that worldly affairs are identified with human ethical practices. This position has been contentious both in his times and among contemporary scholars. While some critics, notably Chen Lai, find Wang’s synthesis of the ethical and the metaphysical realm problematic, others like Wing-tsit Chan view Wang Yangming’s philosophy as verging on subjective idealism. Both Chen and Chan argue that Wang Yangming commits the fallacy of the conflation of fact and value. In this paper, I defend Wang Yangming’s ethics-oriented metaphysics against such criticisms. I will engage a comparative study between Wang Yangming’s perspective and pragmatist metaphysics—a modern philosophical stance which sees metaphysics as intertwining with human ethics and practices. Building upon this comparative study, this paper aims to highlight the intrinsic bond between metaphysics and ethics and to advocate for the centrality of ethics in shaping the very foundation of metaphysical thinking. The conclusion of this paper is that Wang Yangming’s metaphysics aligns with commonsense realism, rather than with subjective idealism. His metaphysics is not a confused worldview that conflates fact with value, nor is it subjective idealism. Instead, it is a metaphysics with the ethical grounding of human engagements and humanistic concerns.Comment: available in this Blueprint
Mengzi. Chapter Four: Mengzi (Mencius)
2023, In Ivanhoe, Philip and Van Norden, Bryan (eds.), Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, 3rd edition. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company
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Added by: Xintong WeiAbstract:
The third edition of Ivanhoe and Van Norden's acclaimed anthology builds on the strengths of previous editions with the addition of new selections for each chapter; selections from Shen Dao; a new translation of the writings of Han Feizi; selections from two texts, highly influential in later Chinese philosophy, the Great Learning and Mean ; and a complete translation of the recently discovered text Nature Comes from the Mandate . Each section of this volume begins with a brief Introduction and concludes with a lightly annotated Selective Bibliography. Also included are four appendices: Important Figures, Important Periods, Important Texts, and Important Terms.Comment: available in this Blueprint
Millikan, Ruth Garrett. Naturalizing intentionality
2000, In Bernard Elevitch (ed.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Philosopy Documentation Center. pp. 83-90.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon FoktAbstract: Brentano was surely mistaken, however, in thinking that bearing a relation to something nonexistent marks only the mental. Given any sort of purpose, it might not get fulfilled, hence might exhibit Brentano's relation, and there are many natural purposes, such as the purpose of one's stomach to digest food or the purpose of one's protective eye blink reflex to keep out the sand, that are not mental, nor derived from anything mental. Nor are stomachs and reflexes "of" or"about" anything. A reply might be, I suppose, that natural purposes are "purposes" only in an analogical sense hence "fail to be fulfilled" only in an analogical way. They bear an analogy to things that have been intentionally designed by purposive minds, hence can fail to accomplish the purposes they analogically have. As such they also have only analogical "intentionality". Such a response begs the question, however, for it assumes that natural purposes are not purposes in the full sense exactly because they are not
Millikan, Ruth Garrett. A common structure for concepts of individuals, stuffs, and real kinds: More Mama, more milk, and more mouse
1997, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):55-65.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Juan R. LoaizaAbstract: Concepts are highly theoretical entities. One cannot study them empirically without committing oneself to substantial preliminary assumptions. Among the competing theories of concepts and categorization developed by psychologists in the last thirty years, the implicit theoretical assumption that what falls under a concept is determined by description () has never been seriously challenged. I present a nondescriptionist theory of our most basic concepts, which include (1) stuffs (gold, milk), (2) real kinds (cat, chair), and (3) individuals (Mama, Bill Clinton, the Empire State Building). On the basis of something important that all three have in common, our earliest and most basic concepts of substances are identical in structure. The membership of the category like that of is a natural unit in nature, to which the concept does something like pointing, and continues to point despite large changes in the properties the thinker represents the unit as having. For example, large changes can occur in the way a child identifies cats and the things it is willing to call without affecting the extension of its word The difficulty is to cash in the metaphor of in this context. Having substance concepts need not depend on knowing words, but language interacts with substance concepts, completely transforming the conceptual repertoire. I will discuss how public language plays a crucial role in both the acquisition of substance concepts and their completed structure
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