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Cartwright, Nancy. The Truth Doesn’t Explain Much
1980, American Philosophical Quarterly 17(2): 159 - 163.
Topics: Physical Sciences; Truth and Truthmaking
Keywords: explanatory power; science; truth
Traditions: Analytic; North American
Languages: English

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Added by: Nick Novelli

Summary: It has sometimes been argued that the covering law model in philosophy of science is too permissive about what gets to count as an explanation. This paper, by contrast, argues that it lets in too little, since there are far too few covering laws to account for all of our explanations. In fact, we rely on ceteris paribus laws that are literally false. Though these are not a true description of nature, they do a good job of allowing us to explain phenomena, so we should be careful to keep those two functions of science separate.
Comment : This relatively brief article offers a good illustration of how, contrary to some preconceptions, science does not always aim at absolute or universal truths, and instead allows pragmatic considerations to play a large role. Useful as part of an examination of what scientific laws really are and what their role is.
Difficulty: Easy
Recommended use: Specialised
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Harp, Randall, Kareem Khalifa. Why Pursue Unification? A Social-Epistemological Puzzle
2015, Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 30(3): 431-447.
Topics: Formal Epistemology; Physical Sciences; Social Epistemology
Keywords: decision theory; theory pursuit; unification
Traditions: Analytic; Formal; North American
Languages: English

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Added by: Nick Novelli

Abstract: Many have argued that unified theories ought to be pursued wherever possible. We deny this on the basis of social-epistemological and game-theoretic considerations. Consequently, those seeking a more ubiquitous role for unification must either attend to the scientific community's social structure in greater detail than has been the case, and/or radically revise their conception of unification.
Comment : An interesting argument about how scientific practice influences the rationality of theory choice. Would be suited to any course where these issues are discussed.
Difficulty: Intermediate
Recommended use: Specialised
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Vredenburg, Kate. A Unificationist Defense of Revealed Preferences
2019, Economics & Philosophy 36.1, 149-169
Topics: Economics; Logic and Mathematics; Theoretical Epistemology
Keywords: explanation; revealed preference; unification
Traditions: Analytic; North American
Languages: English

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Added by: Björn Freter

Abstract: Revealed preference approaches to modelling agents’ choices face two seemingly devastating explanatory objections. The no self-explanation objection imputes a problematic explanatory circularity to revealed preference approaches, while the causal explanation objection argues that, all things equal, a scientific theory should provide causal explanations, but revealed preference approaches decidedly do not. Both objections assume a view of explanation, the constraint-based view, that the revealed preference theorist ought to reject. Instead, the revealed preference theorist should adopt a unificationist account of explanation, allowing her to escape the two explanatory problems discussed in this paper.

Comment : An ingenious and clear defense of the revealed preference interpretation, probably the best one that's possible. A nice opportunity to discuss with students the intellectual gymnastics required in order to defend theoretical commitments of the contemporary economy.
Difficulty: Advanced
Recommended use: Specialised
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