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Bobzien, Susanne. Stoic Syllogistic
1996, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 14: 133-92.
Topics: Logic and Mathematics
Keywords: antilogism; cut rule; relevant logic; stoic indemonstrables; stoic logic; stoic themata; syllogistic; tableau method; theories of deduction
Traditions: Analytic; European; Formal; Historical
Languages: Ancient Greek; Ancient Latin; English

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Added by: Berta Grimau, Contributed by: Giada Fratantonio

Abstract: For the Stoics, a syllogism is a formally valid argument; the primary function of their syllogistic is to establish such formal validity. Stoic syllogistic is a system of formal logic that relies on two types of argumental rules: (i) 5 rules (the accounts of the indemonstrables) which determine whether any given argument is an indemonstrable argument, i.e. an elementary syllogism the validity of which is not in need of further demonstration; (ii) one unary and three binary argumental rules which establish the formal validity of non-indemonstrable arguments by analysing them in one or more steps into one or more indemonstrable arguments (cut type rules and antilogism). The function of these rules is to reduce given non-indemonstrable arguments to indemonstrable syllogisms. Moreover, the Stoic method of deduction differs from standard modern ones in that the direction is reversed (similar to tableau methods). The Stoic system may hence be called an argumental reductive system of deduction. In this paper, a reconstruction of this system of logic is presented, and similarities to relevance logic are pointed out.
Comment : This paper can be used as specialised/further reading for an advanced undergrad or postgraduate course on ancient logic or as a primary reading in an advanced undergrad or postgraduate course on Stoic logic. Alternatively, given that the text argues that there are important parallels between Stoic logic and Relevance logic, it could be used in a course on Relevance logic as well. It requires prior knowledge of logic (in particular, proof theory).
Difficulty: Advanced, Intermediate
Recommended use: Specialised
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Chakravartty, Anjan. Introduction: Ancient Skepticism, Voluntarism, and Science
2015, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (2):73-79
Topics: Causation; Ontology and Metaontology; Physical Sciences; Theoretical Epistemology
Keywords: ancient skepticism; contemporary epistemology; epistemology of science; pyrrhonism; scientific antirealism; scientific realism
Traditions: Analytic; Historical; North American; South Asian
Languages: Ancient Greek; Classical Sanskrit; English

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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Matthew Watts

Abstract: In this introduction, I motivate the project of examining certain resonances between ancient skeptical positions, especially Pyrrhonism, and positions in contemporary epistemology, with special attention to recent work in the epistemology of science. One such resonance concerns the idea of suspension of judgment or belief in certain contexts or domains of inquiry, and the reasons for (or processes eventuating in) suspension. Another concerns the question of whether suspension of belief in such circumstances is voluntary, in any of the senses discussed in current work on voluntarism in epistemology, which informs recent discussions of how voluntarism regarding epistemic stances may shed light on positions like scientific realism and antirealism. The aim of this special issue is thus to explore certain analogies and disanalogies between ancient and contemporary debates about skepticism, and to consider whether and to what extent the former can provide insight into the latter.
Comment : This text offers motivation for examining ancient skeptical positions in relation to contemporary epistemology, especially epistemology of science.
Difficulty: Intermediate
Recommended use: Introductory
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Olkowski, Dorothea. Words of Power and the Logic of Sense
2002, In Falmagne, R.J. and Hass, M. eds. Representing Reason: Feminist Theory and Formal Logic. Rowman & Littlefield
Topics: Ethics and Socio-Politics of Language; Logic and Mathematics
Keywords: Deleuze; Merleau-Ponty; Stoics; feminist logic; language; reason
Traditions: Critical; European; Formal
Languages: English
Figures: Gilles Deleuze; Maurice Merleau-Ponty

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Added by: Franci Mangraviti

From the Introduction: "Dorothea Olkowski’s chapter offers an analysis of the need to develop a logic of sense. Drawing on the work of Gilles Deleuze, Olkowski defends formal logic against feminist theorists who have urged that we organize thinking around the principles of embodiment. She warns us against the complete merging of bodily functions and sense-making activities. In Olkowski’s view, feminists need to acknowledge the usefulness of logical analyses at the same time that they must insist on formal systems that reflect and are tempered by human and humane values."

Comment : available in this Blueprint
Difficulty: Advanced
Recommended use: Specialised
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