Further – Diversity Reading List

Non-Ideal Foundations of Language

Posted on July 24, 2026July 24, 2026 by Veronica Cibotaru

This book argues that the major traditions in the philosophy of language have mistakenly focused on highly idealized linguistic contexts. Instead, it presents a non-ideal foundational theory of language that contends that the essential function of language is to direct attention for the purpose of achieving diverse social and political goals.

Philosophers of language have focused primarily on highly idealized linguistic contexts in which cooperative agents are working toward the shared goal of gaining information about the world. This approach abstracts away from important issues like power, ideology, social position, and diversity of goals which are crucial to explaining linguistic phenomena both at the semantic and pragmatic levels. This book begins by examining the work of some of the pioneers of this tradition—primarily David Lewis, Paul Grice, and Robert Stalnaker. The author shows that various problems have their source in idealizations made at the foundational level of linguistic theory and proposes to rebuild from the ground-up. She presents a non-ideal foundational theory of language which retains the major insights of traditional frameworks while rejecting the social idealizations that guide them. Then, she explores the social and political applications of her account to issues such as dog whistling, propaganda, racist speech, silencing, and manipulation.

Considerations on Logical Consequence and Natural Language

Posted on July 17, 2026July 17, 2026 by Veronica Cibotaru

In a recent article, “Logical Consequence and Natural Language”, Michael Glanzberg claims that there is no relation of logical consequence in natural language (2015). The present paper counters that claim. I shall discuss Glanzberg’s arguments and show why they don’t hold. I further show how Glanzberg’s claims may be used to rather support the existence of logical consequence in natural language.

Epistemic Trouble for Engineering ‘Woman’

Posted on May 22, 2026June 10, 2026 by Veronica Cibotaru

This paper puts forth a functionalist difficulty for Sally Haslanger’s proposal for engineering our concept of ‘woman.’ It is argued that the project of bringing about better political function fulfillment cannot get off the ground in virtue of epistemic failure.

New Words for Old Wrongs

Posted on May 19, 2026June 10, 2026 by Ravi Thakral

This paper begins with the idea that there are sometimes gaps in our shared linguistic/conceptual resources that make it difficult for us to understand our own social experiences, and to make them intelligible to others. In this paper, I focus on three cases of this sort, some of which are drawn from the literature on hermeneutical injustice. I offer a diagnosis of what the gaps in these cases consist in, and what it takes to fill them. I argue that these gaps are filled in, at least initially, by labels of a particular kind. Specifically, these are labels that allow us to see the experiences in question as novel instances of phenomena with which we are already normatively familiar. Further, I also show that these labels bring with them important downsides: they introduce distortions into our understandings of these experiences. Using a pair of case studies (‘statutory rape,’ ‘sexual harassment’), I illustrate these distortions.

Generics and Social Justice

Posted on May 5, 2026May 5, 2026 by Ravi Thakral

Is it harmful to make generic claims about social groups? Those who say yes cite
the reinforcement of oppressive stereotypes and cognitive bias. Those who say no
cite the potential of generics to do good, rather than harm, by taking advantage of
the same mechanisms that perpetuate the harms. This paper analyzes generic utterances in the context of social justice efforts to weigh in on the debate about whether
and how generic utterances contribute to stereotypes and oppression. We need to
first pay more attention to what it means to utter generics in social justice contexts.
Doing so will allow us to distinguish those generic utterances that are helpful for
social justice projects from those that might impede their progress. I argue that there
is an important pragmatic sense in which generics can be undermined: especially
generics used in service of social justice claims. I then offer an epistemic thesis for
why some generics are more susceptible to being undermined by counter-examples
than others. I conclude that if we are interested in using generics in the service of
social justice, then there is reason to restrict the contexts in which we utter generics. In doing so, I challenge the conventional wisdom that generics are resistant to
counterexamples.

Cognitive Transformation, Dementia, and the Moral Weigh of Advance Directives

Posted on April 1, 2026April 12, 2026 by Petronella Randell

Dementia patients in the moderate-late stage of the disease can, and often do, express different preferences than they did at the onset of their condition. The received view in the philosophical literature argues that advance directives which prioritize the patient’s preferences at onset ought to be given decisive moral weight in medical decision-making. Clinical practice, on the other hand, favors giving moral weight to the preferences expressed by dementia patients after onset. The purpose of this article is to show that the received view in the philosophical literature is inadequate and is out of touch with real clinical practice. I argue that having dementia is a cognitive transformative experience and that preference changes which result from this are legitimate and ought to be given moral weight in medical decision-making. This argument ought to encourage us to reduce our confidence in the moral weight of advance directives for dementia patients.

The Limit of Language in Daoism

Posted on March 6, 2026May 27, 2026 by Veronica Cibotaru

The paper is concerned with the development of the paradoxical theme of Daoism. Based on Chad Hansen’s interpretation of Daoism and Chinese philosophy in general, it traces the history of Daoism by following their treatment of the limit of language. The Daoists seem to have noticed that there is a limit to what language can do and that the limit of language is paradoxical. The ‘theoretical’ treatment of the paradox of the limit of language matures as Daoism develops. Yet the Daoists seem to have noticed that the limit of language and its paradoxical nature cannot be overcome. At the end, we are left with the paradoxes of the Daoists. In this paper, we jump into the abyss of the Daoists’ paradoxes from which there is no escape. But the Daoists’ paradoxes are fun!

What Is It to Be Responsible for What You Say?

Posted on February 27, 2026February 27, 2026 by Veronica Cibotaru

In asserting something I incur certain kinds of liabilities, including a responsibility for the truth of the content I express. If I say ‘After leaving the EU, the UK will take back control of c. £350 million per week’, or I tell you that ‘The number 14 bus stops at the British Museum’, I become liable for the truth of these claims. As my audience, you could hold me unreliable or devious if it turns out that what I said is false. Yet this socio-linguistic practice – of acquiring and ascribing ‘linguistic liability’ – is complicated, especially given philosophical distinctions between the various different kinds of contents people can express (am I liable, for instance, for the claim that the number 14 bus stops at the British Museum today or only usually?). This paper explores the different kinds of contents speakers might be taken to express, arguing that our practices around linguistic liability (including in legal disputes) reveal a crucial role for a notion of context-independent, literal meaning attaching to words and sentences. These practices thus vindicate what philosophers tend to term ‘minimal semantic content’.

The Problem of Speaking for Others

Posted on February 20, 2026February 20, 2026 by Olivia Maegaard Nielsen

As philosophers and social theorists we are authorized by virtue of our academic positions to develop theories that express and encompass the ideas, needs, and goals of others. However, we must begin to ask ourselves whether this is a legitimate authority. Is the discursive practice of speaking for others ever a valid practice, and, if so, what are the criteria for validity? In particular, is it ever valid to speak for others who are unlike me or who are less privileged than me?

Ever the Twain shall Meet? Chomsky and Wittgenstein on Linguistic Competence

Posted on February 16, 2026February 16, 2026 by Veronica Cibotaru

It is a dominant view in the philosophical literature on the later Wittgenstein that Chomsky’s approach to the investigation of natural language stands in stark contrast to Wittgenstein’s, and that their respective conceptions of language and linguistic understanding are irreconcilable. The aim in this paper is to show that this view is largely incorrect and that the two approaches to language and its use are indeed compatible, notwithstanding their distinctive foci of interest. The author argues that there is a significant correspondence in at least five different areas of their work, and that once we pay attention to these there will be less temptation to see Wittgenstein and Chomsky as enemies.