Sometimes, a form of discrimination is hard to register,
understand, and articulate. A rich precedent demonstrates
how victim testimonies have been key in uncovering such
“hidden” forms of discrimination, from sexual harassment to
microaggressions. I reflect on how this plausibly goes too for
“attentional discrimination”, referring to cases where the
more meaningful attributes of one social group are made
salient in attention in contrast to the less meaningful attributes
of another. Victim testimonies understandably dominate
the “context-of-discovery” stage of research into these
initially opaque forms of discrimination; a victim’s encounter
with the gap between their experience and dominant conceptual
frameworks for understanding it is what provides an
initial foothold for analysis to begin. Some object, however,
to this methodology continuing to dominate the later “context-of-justification”
stage, where the hypothesis is rigorously
challenged. I argue that this objection underestimates not
just how other methodologies are more likely to inherit the
various mechanisms of invisibility hiding the discrimination
in question, but also how victim testimonies are distinctively
well-suited to recognize and challenge those mechanisms.
Victim testimonies, then, ought to continue playing
a dominant role into these later stages of research regarding
hidden forms of discrimination.
Japanese Provides a New Relation between Language and the Real World
In Categories and On Interpretation, Aristotle develops his view on the relation between language and the real world. However, there exist in Japanese words conflicting with the idea. This paper argues that each of the four formal classes of lexically meaningful elements of Japanese defined on their combinability with the nominative case and the tense markers consistently corresponds to the divisions of reality, and shows that the relation of words to the world cannot be predicted from their use in a sentence. Under this analysis, Aristotle’s idea, which is based on the “omoma-rhema” distinction, from which the universal “noun-verb” distinction originates, is thrown into a question.
Considerations on Logical Consequence and Natural Language
In a recent article, “Logical Consequence and Natural Language”, Michael Glanzberg claims that there is no relation of logical consequence in natural language (2015). The present paper counters that claim. I shall discuss Glanzberg’s arguments and show why they don’t hold. I further show how Glanzberg’s claims may be used to rather support the existence of logical consequence in natural language.
Structures of Matter and Patterns in Science
Inspired by the work and life of Dorothy Wrinch, 1894-1976. The proceedings of a symposium held at Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts, September 28-30, 1977 and selected papers of Dorothy Wrinch, from the Sophia Smith Collection.
On the Structure of Scientific Inquiry
The object of this paper is the study, in some of its aspects, of the structure of scientific inquiry. The subject is a large one and covers the major part of the field of scientific methodology. We shall confine our attention more particularly to the consideration of those problems of scientific structure which occur in the case of more advanced sciences and merely outline the corresponding problems which occur primarily in sciences in the more elementary stage
Modalities: Philosophical Essays
This book is a collection of papers by Ruth Barcan Marcus, covering much ground in the development of her thought, and spanning from 1961 to 1990. Many of the papers deal with logical, semantic, metaphysical, and epistemological issues in intensional logic, and in particular, modalities. Some important themes that run through these papers are extensionality, the necessity of identity, the directly referential conception of proper names as “tags,” essentialism, substitutional quantification, and possibilia and possible worlds. What emerges from them is a robust defense of quantified modal logic in the light of a host of objections, particularly from Quine. Modalities also includes two papers on belief, which have consequences for epistemic logic and more widely for theories of rationality; two papers on ethical issues, which have consequences for deontic logic and practical reasoning; and finally, two papers on historical figures, Spinoza and Russell, dealing with the ontological proof of God’s existence, and the nature of particularity, identity, and individuation, respectively.
Distinguishing Situated Knowledge and Standpoint Theory: Defending the Achievement Thesis
Original accounts of feminist standpoint theory emphasize its fundamentally critical stance toward situated knowledge (Smith 1974; Hartsock 1983; Collins 1986). The function of a critical standpoint is not to carelessly accept the beliefs of marginalized people, but instead to interpret those beliefs in light of thoroughgoing and pervasive ideological distortions. Some formulations of standpoint theory capture this critical function in the achievement thesis. It claims that a standpoint is not obtained automatically but must be achieved through a struggle against a dominant ideology. Contrary to the standard acceptance of the achievement thesis, Bright has recently argued that the requirement of achievement can warrant the dogmatic exclusion of some perspectives from becoming standpoints. In turn, he advances an account of standpoint theory which abandons the achievement thesis. Against Bright’s non-achievement account of standpoint theory, I argue that doing away with the achievement thesis abandons standpoint theory’s original aim of being critical of the social structures which construct and legitimize situated knowledge. Further, I argue that Bright’s concern with the possible dogmatism of the achievement thesis is better addressed by a commitment to the classic account of standpoint theory rather than a revision of it.
Political Rioting: A Moral Assessment
Avia Pasternak offers a moral assessment of political rioting, focusing on cases like the riots over the police killing of Freddie Gray in Baltimore in 2015 and the 2005 French Banlieu riots. As she notes, there are two common responses to such cases: that rioters are just the same as common criminals, or that rioters are morally worse than common criminals. In response, Pasternak develops an analysis of political rioting as a form of “spontaneous, disorganized, public collective violence in order to protest against and to defy [the] political order” (2). In her view, political rioting ought to be understood as a form of defensive harm–harm inflicted in order to avert an attack, as in justified cases of self-defence or just wars. Those who engage in political rioting, Pasternak argues, “do so in order to bring an end, or at least to ameliorate their on-going unjust treatment at the hands of their state. It follows then that in determining the appropriate moral response to rioters, we ought to examine their actions in light of the various constraints offered by just war theorists” (3). Pasternak focuses on three such constraints: necessity, success, and proportionality. And she argues that, objections to the contrary notwithstanding, “under circumstances that are not far from those we find in some real-world democracies, the resort to political rioting can comply with the criteria of permissible defensive harm” (4).
Logical Illumination Of Indian Mysticism
Figures from Eastern Philosophy in general and Nāgārjuna in particular are often labeled as engaging in mysticism. In this lecture, Matilal argues that if we want to use this label, we must at least admit that this mysticism is illuminated by rigorous logical argument.
The Problem of Speaking for Others
As philosophers and social theorists we are authorized by virtue of our academic positions to develop theories that express and encompass the ideas, needs, and goals of others. However, we must begin to ask ourselves whether this is a legitimate authority. Is the discursive practice of speaking for others ever a valid practice, and, if so, what are the criteria for validity? In particular, is it ever valid to speak for others who are unlike me or who are less privileged than me?