Pasternak, Avia. Political Rioting: A Moral Assessment
2018, Philosophy and Public Affairs
, Contributed by: Henry Krahn
Abstract:
Avia Pasternak offers a moral assessment of political rioting, focusing on cases like the riots over the police killing of Freddie Gray in Baltimore in 2015 and the 2005 French Banlieu riots. As she notes, there are two common responses to such cases: that rioters are just the same as common criminals, or that rioters are morally worse than common criminals. In response, Pasternak develops an analysis of political rioting as a form of "spontaneous, disorganized, public collective violence in order to protest against and to defy [the] political order" (2). In her view, political rioting ought to be understood as a form of defensive harm--harm inflicted in order to avert an attack, as in justified cases of self-defence or just wars. Those who engage in political rioting, Pasternak argues, "do so in order to bring an end, or at least to ameliorate their on-going unjust treatment at the hands of their state. It follows then that in determining the appropriate moral response to rioters, we ought to examine their actions in light of the various constraints offered by just war theorists" (3). Pasternak focuses on three such constraints: necessity, success, and proportionality. And she argues that, objections to the contrary notwithstanding, "under circumstances that are not far from those we find in some real-world democracies, the resort to political rioting can comply with the criteria of permissible defensive harm" (4).
Avia Pasternak offers a moral assessment of political rioting, focusing on cases like the riots over the police killing of Freddie Gray in Baltimore in 2015 and the 2005 French Banlieu riots. As she notes, there are two common responses to such cases: that rioters are just the same as common criminals, or that rioters are morally worse than common criminals. In response, Pasternak develops an analysis of political rioting as a form of "spontaneous, disorganized, public collective violence in order to protest against and to defy [the] political order" (2). In her view, political rioting ought to be understood as a form of defensive harm--harm inflicted in order to avert an attack, as in justified cases of self-defence or just wars. Those who engage in political rioting, Pasternak argues, "do so in order to bring an end, or at least to ameliorate their on-going unjust treatment at the hands of their state. It follows then that in determining the appropriate moral response to rioters, we ought to examine their actions in light of the various constraints offered by just war theorists" (3). Pasternak focuses on three such constraints: necessity, success, and proportionality. And she argues that, objections to the contrary notwithstanding, "under circumstances that are not far from those we find in some real-world democracies, the resort to political rioting can comply with the criteria of permissible defensive harm" (4).
Comment: This paper offers a thorough and careful discussion of political rioting that is deeply informed by real-life cases, which it discusses in detail. This paper would be a great starting place for a class discussion over what people are entitled to do in situations of entrenched injustice, or over the limits of morally acceptable protest. The paper's analysis builds on the just war literature, so the paper could also be used in a class on the ethics of war to discuss how principles from that literature apply to domestic politics.