The aim of natural language ontology is to uncover the ontological categories and structures that are implicit in the use of natural language, that is, that a speaker accepts when using a language. This article aims to clarify what exactly the subject matter of natural language ontology is, what sorts of linguistic data it should take into account, how natural language ontology relates to other branches of metaphysics, in what ways natural language ontology is important, and what may be distinctive of the ontological categories and structures reflected in natural language.
The Location of Culture
This work analyzes the contemporary conditions of culture and criticizes common definitions of identity. Bhabha (b. 1949) makes use of continental philosophy, social sciences and literature (crediting Morrison, Salman Rushdie, and even Anish Kapoor), draws on Said and Spivak, and reads Fanon extensively—blending anti-colonial critique with post-structuralism. His main object is the long-term effects of colonialism on social identities and culture, even after the departure of the colonizers or the abolition of slavery. From an inquiry concerning the effects of the awareness of social positions and the political usages of identity, he finds that culture is characterized by hybridation and going beyond established limits. Against the idea that cultures are fixed traditions belonging to identified communities, Bhabha tries to explain how social meanings are an on-going, dynamic and relational process, underlining contradictions, ambivalence, and two of the main concepts of this book: hybridity (the mixed nature of culture) and mimicry (the adoption of ideas and values from other cultures). In his view, “[d]ifferences in culture and power are constituted through the social conditions of enunciation” (p. 242), meaning that culture needs to be seen as fragmented, unstable and sometimes antagonistic. Bhabha elaborates a definition of the boundary not as a limit, but as the site for theoretical production and artistic creation, exemplified by the proliferation of “post” in contemporary theory (poststructuralism, postmodernism, etc), which he understands as a movement of going beyond, pointing towards a constant invention of oneself.
Elite Capture
Identity politics is everywhere, polarising discourse from the campaign trail to the classroom and amplifying antagonisms in the media. But the compulsively referenced phrase bears little resemblance to the concept as first introduced by the radical Black feminist Combahee River Collective. While the Collective articulated a political viewpoint grounded in their own position as Black lesbians with the explicit aim of building solidarity across lines of difference, identity politics is now frequently weaponised as a means of closing ranks around ever-narrower conceptions of group interests.
But the trouble, Olúfẹ́mi O. Táíwò deftly argues, is not with identity politics itself. Through a substantive engagement with the global Black radical tradition and a critical understanding of racial capitalism, Táíwò identifies the process by which a radical concept can be stripped of its political substance and liberatory potential by becoming the victim of elite capture -deployed by political, social and economic elites in the service of their own interests.
Táíwò’s crucial intervention both elucidates this complex process and helps us move beyond the binary of ‘class’ vs. ‘race’. By rejecting elitist identity politics in favour of a constructive politics of radical solidarity, he advances the possibility of organising across our differences in the urgent struggle for a better world.
Can the Subaltern Speak?
In this talk given in 1983 at the University of Illinois, Spivak (b. 1942) criticizes a Western understanding of the political subject by examining how Third World subjects are perceived within Western discourse. She studies the way Western representations prevent the subaltern woman from making her own voice heard. Her critique depends on a definition of the subaltern, the “Other,” who is paradoxically both constituted and erased by Western theories, and is neither heard nor answered, leading Spivak to question their very possibility to speak. She specifically uses the history of British colonialism’s relation to the Hindu practice of sati, the ritual self-immolation of a widow on her husband’s funeral pyre, which was read by the British as barbarism and deprived of the social signification it holds. Spivak highlights the contradictions of the so-called “civilizing mission” of colonialism, showing how women’s rights have been used by colonialism against the subalterns themselves, thereby robbing them of their own voices. Drawing critically on French theory (Derrida, Althusser, Deleuze, Foucault), Marxism (Marx, Benjamin, Gramsci) and other postcolonial scholars (Said), this landmark essay mobilizes historical documentation alongside critical theory to produce a seminal work of political and social philosophy. At the same time, Spivak offers a meta-philosophical enquiry, pointing to a major bias in the very constitution and discourse of the discipline.
Verification and Understanding
The object of this paper is to discuss one or two points arising out of the view held by certain modern philosophers that the whole meaning of a proposition is given in a set of conditional propositions about the experiences which would verify it. Or, as C. S. Peirce said, that ” the rational meaning of every propo-
sition lies in the future.” And for these philosophers to say that the proposition is true is just to say that if I get into certain situations I do have the prescribed experiences which verify the proposition. A proposition (or arrangement of signs)t which cannot be so verified is either tautological, e.g., the “propositions” of logic and mathematics, or it is just metaphysical nonsense. Our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects, and if we fancy we have any other we are deceiving ourselves with empty…. Now it may be true that the scientist does tend to identify what he understands with the means of its verification, but it is also true that verification is usually employed in science and elsewhere, not to establish the meaning of propositions, but to prove them true. This, I think, is the usual meaning of the word “verification” and a confusion between these two quite different uses of the word by positivist philosophers leads to certain paradoxical results.
Necessary Propositions
I should like to make a few comments on a recent article on necessary propositions by Mr. Norman Malcolm. Not so much because of anything specifically said by Mr. Malcolm as because his article expresses a prevalent view. Mr. Malcolm rejects what may be called the ‘metaphysical’ view of these propositions, viz. that they describe a special realm of necessary facts known by a kind of interior ‘looking’ called intuition or self-evidence. But the main concern of his paper is to reject also the later positivist view that they are ‘really’ verbal…, that they are rules of grammar or commands to use words in certain ways.
‘There is no reason for the necessity of the ultimate principles of deduction.’ Margaret Macdonald on logical necessity
This paper aims at contributing to the recent enterprise of rediscovering Margaret Macdonald’s views, by focusing on her reflections on the necessity of logic, a theme that runs through many of her papers and reviews. We will see both Macdonald’s negative views about what the necessity of logic is not (Section I), and her positive view about what it is and how it supports her claim that it is in fact irrational to ask for a reason for the necessity of the ultimate principles of deduction, such as the Principle of Contradiction (Section II). To show how her view on the necessity of logic is different from others, such as David Lewis’s, we will then consider what she would reply to current rejectors of the Principle of Contradiction (Section III).
Queer feminist logic and contradictions: Or how logic and feminism can be relevant to each other
Work in the field of feminist logic is still rather scarce and the field itself remains a contested area of study, but still, it is developing. One approach concentrates on analyzing logical systems with respect to structural features that may perpetuate sexism and oppression or, on the other hand, features that may be helpful for resist-ing and opposing these social phenomena. Upon this assumption, I want to inves-tigate possible applications of queer feminist views on (philosophy of) logic with respect to a very specific group, namely contradictory logics, i.e., logical systems containing contradictions in their set of theorems. I want to show that, on the one hand, the formal set-up of contradictory logics makes them well-suited from the perspectives of feminist logic and, on the other hand, that queer feminist theories provide a relevant, and so far undeveloped, conceptual motivation for contradictory logics. Thus, bringing together contradictory logics and queer feminist theories may prove fruitful both as a ‘real-life’ motivation for these peripheral logical systems and as a formal basis for a philosophical field that is still characterized by a distrust of formalism.
Feminist Logic, Broadly Speaking
I argue that the continued focus on the possibility question – whether feminist logic can exist as a respectable practice – has several harmful consequences. First, it in-vites the association of feminist logic with substantial positions in the philosophy of logic, which unnecessarily leaves room for dismissing the field a priori. Second, it invites a systematic reading of feminist logicians as arguing in isolation from their logical practice, which can hide some genuine possibilities for the field. To avoid these issues, I propose a very broad characterization of feminist logic as a kind of practice which addresses some harmful aspect of dominant practices by focusing on their interaction with logical practices. This characterization trivializes the possibil-ity question, enforces no particular conception of logic to the exclusion of others, yet leaves room for both conservative and radical approaches.
The Logic of Kant’s Categorical “Imperative”
Introduction: In Kant’s moral philosophy, the imperative is perched precariously between two realms governed by the indicative form of speech. In the Critique of Pure Reason, it reminds us of an intelligible, rational realm beyond that governed by descriptive causal explanation. But in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, it reminds us of the sensible pull of causality that frequently leads us to violate its intelligible principles. Correspondingly, Kant approaches the moral law from two directions in the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. When he is explaining moral motivation, he describes and refers to the moral law as an imperative, because this is the form it takes for causally enmeshed human beings. But when he is analyzing its rational formal structure and situating it within his broader analysis of reason, he formulates the moral law in the indicative mood, because this is the form it takes for perfectly rational beings. The vast majority of Kant’s actual formulations of the moral law in the Groundwork are not in the imperative. Of 47 formulations to be found in the text, only four are in the strict imperative. Of those four, only the first receives extended analysis. Of the remaining 43, 31 are expressed in the indicative mood. So two-thirds of Kant’s formulations of the moral law in the Groundwork are descriptive rather than prescriptive. These serve to buttress his repeated reminder that for agents as members of the intelligible world, the “I ought” becomes an “I will”. In the Groundwork, Kant usually addresses us as members of that world.